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Protention in Husserl’s Phenomenology

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**Introduction**

Regardless their divergent attitudes toward the fruitfulness of phenomenology, contemporary philosophers tend to acknowledge its descriptive sensitivity to the variety of human experiences. Husserl’s invitation to return to the things themselves is the cue to undertake the infinite task of constantly proving to ourselves our loyalty to what appears the way it appears. His voluminous work handed down to us attests to his resolution to follow his own investigation to the end. The outcome of his restless efforts is a vast amount of meticulous analyses. His contribution to the renewal of philosophical thinking is incontestable and measured only by the ambivalence of its reception both within phenomenology itself as well as from other philosophical traditions. The richness of Husserl’s thought is made abundantly clear the years following his death, through the publication of the unpublished material found in his research manuscripts.

Husserl’s texts on time-consciousness serve as an outstanding example of his insightful philosophical research. The present study focuses on a small and quite unexamined part of his overall theory on time-consciousness: the question of Protention. The reason for this neglect has mainly been the unfortunate lack of access to the manuscripts (mostly belonging to L-Manuskripte) in which Husserl has undertaken most of his efforts to deal with the issue of protention. Thus, even though his theory of time-consciousness enjoys certain fame, consciousness’s primordial manner of relating to the future has not been adequately accounted for. Our aim is to study closely Husserl’s conception of protentional consciousness and trace its uniqueness as well as its contribution to our overall awareness of time.

In Part 1, we will begin with some general remarks regarding Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness (§1), by sketchily going through the structure of our living-present, i.e., its primordial articulation in proto-impression (*Urimpression*), retention and protention, in Husserl’s *Hua X*.1 To do so, however, certain preliminary clarifications are in order. On the one hand, we are faced with an essential question: what is given in time-consciousness and offers itself to

1 All references to Husserl’s work drawn from the *Husserliana* series will be indicated with the official abbreviation *Hua*, followed by the Latin number of the volume and the Arabic number of the page.
phenomenological description? On the other hand, we have to be clear about questions of methodology, i.e., about how one should carry out such a description. That analysis will lead us to phenomenological reduction in its direct relation to time-consciousness (§2). We will examine a specific conception of reduction that chimes well with the analysis of time-consciousness and, in particular, of protentional consciousness. Performing the reduction brings to light a supra-temporal element, i.e., the ego-pole and invites us to consider to what extent one can achieve a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness by taking into account the relation of our primal awareness of time to our consciousness’s ego aspect.

Part 2 is meant to offer a picture of retention or primary memory, i.e., the primal mode of experiencing past in the deepest level of time-consciousness (§3). One of retention’s major features is its double intentional directedness: on the one hand, retention intends the immanent temporal object by contributing to its constitution through “transversal intentionality,” while, on the other hand, it intends the past retentional phases, i.e., the past phases of consciousness itself through “longitudinal intentionality.” The latter intentionality is responsible for the constitution of the unity of our flow of consciousness and is thus a primal form of self-awareness. It is on this basis that one should revisit the well-known debate concerning the levels of constitution as they are presented in Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness. More specifically, the questions that are addressed are the following: is it appropriate to refer to our pre-reflective awareness of experiences in this deepest level of constitution as an awareness of “internal objects”? And should we consider that what Husserl calls “absolute flow” is exhibiting itself in a radically different manner, i.e., is there a mode of self-appearance proper to the absolute flow? The eventual rejection of this model of constitution, i.e., constitution as act-constitution, as essentially inapplicable to the level of time-constitution, mirrors in the dismissal of the “apprehension/content” schema for describing the lowest level of our awareness of time. However, this dismissal does not amount to an overall rejection of the schema, as has been widely accepted.

It is Part 3 that turns to protention itself (§4). Husserl’s gradual clarification of the role of protention in our time-consciousness goes hand in hand with his reworking of time-diagrams and leads to sweeping changes in his time theory. The development
of his thought on the topic brings to light the significance of protention’s fulfillment in its double meaning, i.e., both as particular and as general fulfillment. The former is tied to the constitution of particular temporal objects, while the latter brings about the primal awareness of the process of fulfillment and, thus, of the temporal flow. Thus, protention will be examined as a sort of empty constitution according to its modes of making-intuitive (Veranschaulichung): the “confirming” (bewahrheitende) and the “picturing” (ausmalende) or “clarifying” (klärende) making-intuitive—a distinction introduced by Husserl in his Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. We will extensively examine these modes as well as what Husserl names “mere filling” (bloßes Füllsel) in their connection with general and particular fulfillment. Our findings, so we believe, make Husserl’s description of protention to appear much more nuanced and attractive than it is usually taken to be.

Husserl’s theory of protention reveals its richness once we move to the material analysis of protention (§5), i.e., once we focus on its content (§6). We will, first, discuss the senses in which protention appears as modification and the various protentional functions that are distinguished once one takes into account the peculiarities of protentional content. “Disappointment” and “phantasmatic self-affection” will be given special attention. The pertinent works by Lohmar, Ferrer, and Rodemeyer will serve as main points of reference and also as the means in order for us to clarify and delimitate our own views regarding protention’s typology.

To illustrate protention’s function in a palpable way, we will attempt to specify how different protentional functions operate and cooperate at the perceptual level. But since sense-perception brings us face to face with cases where protentions are disappointed, one important aspect remains to be discussed, i.e., how some cases of “disappointment” lead to a radical “corrective” transformation of our protentional horizons. In addressing the corrective transformation of protentional consciousness, we encounter the distinctively affective character of this primal experience, i.e., in irritation and surprise. Thus, it seems proper to consider the affective aspect of our consciousness by entertaining the idea that affective elements are essential components of our living-present’s primal temporalization (§7). Delimiting the affective structure of the living-present, we will investigate affection’s relation to protention on the model of the “affective relief,” i.e., the unitary nexus of affectivity
that maps the gradation of affective force on our living-present. The model of affective relief, largely overlooked in phenomenological research though it is, has the benefit of emphasizing the dynamic-affective unity of our living-present on a level where the affective prominences (*Abgehobenheiten*) have not yet acquired the meaning of object-presentation. It will be shown that affection and protention are closely connected at the level of affectivity and this is brought to our attention once we pay heed to affective propagation (*Fortpflanzung*).

We will additionally take into account the protentional dynamic of the subjective side of affection, i.e., of our consciousness’s readiness to be affected (§8). We will focus particularly on the element which seems to exhibit a peculiar protentional dynamic, namely “instincts.” A discussion on Husserl’s theory of instincts and the various distinctions introduced by it will be necessary in order to pinpoint some of the dimensions that are relevant to our investigation of the intertwinement between protention and instinctive striving. What has been said with respect to instincts and protention will then be applied on the model of affective relief (§9). Our “readiness to be affected,” i.e., the subjective side of the relief, is partly structured by our instincts and their corresponding formations. What we will try to point out is how the subject-side of the relief contributes to the unitary propagation of its affective force.

The most important philosophical contribution of our study, so we think, consists in that it brings to light the richness of Husserl’s notion of protention and, in particular, its close relationship with affectivity. It proves, however, that the findings of our research are not irrelevant to the everyday understanding of time. The Postscript will attempt to drop some hints in this direction (§10).
Part 1

Phenomenology of time-consciousness

§1. Preliminary Remarks

It would be no exaggeration to claim that the problem of time has been a constant theme of theoretical endeavour throughout the history of philosophy. Regardless of their divergent points of departure and perspectives, philosophers have always dealt with the issue of time both as an enigma to solve and as a dimension of philosophy’s own performance. This is also the case with Husserl’s phenomenology and it comes as no surprise that he wrote hundreds of pages in his attempt to obtain a clear phenomenological understanding of it. Following a long tradition of thought, extending from Augustine to Kant, he too believed that the appropriate locus of dealing with the puzzle of time is its inextricable tie with our own self-awareness. Our awareness of time seems to somehow involve our self-awareness but also, the other way around, our self-awareness seems to presuppose time-consciousness as a necessary condition for the continuity of the self. Husserl grasped this seemingly paradoxical situation and, as we will see in what follows, his account of time-consciousness includes an exceptionally enlightening analysis of it.

The project to examine our consciousness of time is steadily accompanied by the feeling, so to say, that its own point of departure is unsafe. We always know what we are talking about when we are talking about time. Yet even the most trivial and randomly formulated expression of doubt about such knowledge is enough to shatter our certainty.² Feeling this uncertainty, i.e., experiencing in a peculiar manner our

² Augustine’s surprising realization in his Book XI of Confessions that he is not in a position to give a proper reply to anyone who asks him what time is, should be regarded as a self-conscious theoretical familiarization with an already latently familiar uncertainty. Cf. St. Augustine (1912), p. 239. In this respect, even though one is inclined to agree with von Herrmann that the natural understanding of time does not reach the notion of a critical examination of its accomplishing knowledge of time, the fact that the starting point of critical examination is the intra-temporal should bear witness to this latent familiarity with our vague understanding of time. Cf. von Herrmann (1992), p. 59f. Thus, even though a distance is a necessary condition for critical examination, a certain connection of the latter with our natural understanding of time is always at play. In a similar vein, the fact that speaking about our not-knowing the essence of time unfolds in time does not in any way prevent this “not-knowing” from being somehow implied in my knowing that speaking about time occurs in time. However, instead of
knowledge of what time is as uncertainty, is fused with our everyday life as that vague fabric our life’s appearance consists in. Our everyday projects, world-views, mutual interactions etc., bear witness to the inextricability of this ‘feeling.’ Committing oneself to projects in their inescapable fragility as well as orienting oneself in the intersubjective nexus by determining the horizons of indeterminateness in various fields and levels –from the most basic perceptual to the highest ones (through promise, narration, history etc.)– are obvious signs of our implicit ‘experience’ of this uncertainty: they are determinate stances toward temporality itself motivated by this experience. This same uncertainty is what calls for a soothing remedy in theoretical as well as in practical terms and serves as the common source of our theoretical and scientific concern with time as well as of our blind trust in the regularity of clock hands.

A most remarkable aspect of our pre-thematic awareness of our insufficient familiarity with time is the aporia regarding the primal mode in which we experience our uncertainty about time. Being pre-thematically aware of it may take on different forms and this can be brought to our attention once our time-consciousness has been thematized. In order to reach a clear understanding of how our experience of this uncertainty partly orients our explicit awareness of time, we must seek its primordial mode in our already pre-philosophically thematized experience of time-consciousness. By means of this circularity, it is not only our time-consciousness that undergoes a cognitive ontification –i.e., it becomes thematized as an object of knowledge– but the pre-thematic awareness of our insufficient familiarity with time is also included in it as a stratum of this ontification: a mode of primal ‘certainty.’ It is this stratum’s primordial structure that one should describe in an explicit philosophical attitude with a view to examining whether one has phenomenological access to the motive that leads to the phenomenologization of primordial time.

claiming that we know about our not-knowing the way we know about the duration of our speaking about it, we should appeal to a less explicit mode of relating to it.

3 As Fink would phrase it, we experience our familiarity with time as insufficient. Cf. Fink (2008), p. 380.
Whether we experience this primal certainty in a cognitive or in a purely affective manner is of course a matter of dispute the present study will address. In virtue of this implicit unthematic experience and the problems that come to the surface once we pay heed to it, it comes as no surprise that almost every major philosophical theory eventually strives to tame it. Evidently, this ‘feeling’ of uncertainty attains specific forms within different theoretical contexts. From the perspective of a philosophy that seeks to gain access to its own foundations, responding to this uncertainty initially amounts to a preliminary decision about the points of departure for examining it, a decision that is necessarily burdened by a provisional naivety. Thus, a phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness, aiming at unearthing this universally functioning layer of consciousness, necessarily starts from some provisionally accepted experiential givens. Every living-experience (Erlebnis) has duration and through this duration it relates to other living-experiences within a conscious experiential flow. What exactly this “through” means and how we can thematize this essential mode of interrelation among living-experiences is something to be discussed later. Further, every living-experience has its own (partial) flow in which consciousness is (able to be) ‘carried away’ toward what is given to it. Our consciousness is directed toward the constitutive products of objective temporal

4 Fink seems to pose a relative question. Cf. Fink (2008), p. 377. What is at stake here is whether or not we can distinguish a motivation lying within our natural attitude and leading eventually to a transcendental-phenomenological account of our consciousness of time, regardless of the “nature” of this motivation. On the more general problem of the motivation of transcendental-phenomenological reduction, cf. Luft (2002), p. 79ff. Luft, in these pages, discusses briefly two main theses (“freedom-thesis” and “paradox-thesis”) regarding the “how” and the possibility of the motivation of reduction. The first one asserts that we are free to perform the reduction, while the second questions freedom’s capacity to “break open” the horizon of our natural attitude, i.e., to “end” its expansibility. Cf. Luft (2002), p. 82.

5 Time-consciousness is the first and universal synthetic structure of our experiential life, extending its reach up to the most complex higher-level constitutive achievements. No matter how ‘thin’ and ‘indistinguishable’ our consciousness’s synthetic life may be, we are always in a position to direct our gaze to its vague corners, even if by more refined performances of reductions. We should examine whether each time we employ the reductive method in phenomenology (not just the transcendental-phenomenological reduction) we must also presuppose a previous process of homogenizing those living-experiences that undergo the relevant reductive ‘de-synthesis.’ This may be particularly true for those experiences that are ‘weaker’ than the ones that usually serve as starting-points for various reductions (reductive instances). Such experiences may include our lived-bodily sensing or, as we will see later on, our instinctive life. Cf. Montagova (2013), p. 28. Below we shall discuss more extensively the idea of reduction that underlies this line of thought.
givenness. Yet we are also able to detach our phenomenological gaze from the constitutive momentum and direct it toward the temporal modes in which a living-experience manifests itself — whether this “detachment,” properly effected as a reductive moment through phenomenological reflection occurs, in its turn, by means of temporal modes or not is a parallel issue we will have to examine. By being directed toward the temporal modes of givenness of a living-experience we are being led to an indubitable, yet phenomenologically provisional, discovery: a ‘now’ ‘follows’ a ‘previous now’ and all these temporal terms are given to a consciousness whose continuity is constituted by those temporal modalities themselves. This means that this ‘derivative’ experience of sequences of ‘nows’ points back to a primal

6 “Provisional” does not mean ‘mistaken’ or ‘misleading.’ It only signifies the persistence of ‘naivety’ even within the transcendental level of inquiry. With respect to the sequence of ‘nows’ that is experienced as provisional, this can only mean that it is a ‘derivative,’ so to speak, understanding of time, made possible through our primordial awareness of time. Cf. Held (2010), p. 92-93.

7 It should be emphasized that this phenomenological discovery is articulated in the form of a judgment. As such it needs to be submitted to further phenomenological analysis. An index for this necessary additional reductive step is that the judgment-form, in which our discovery is initially articulated, may appear to be imposed as a phenomeon whose origin lies in higher levels of experience that are essentially incompatible with our initial steps of reduction to inner time-consciousness. Needless to say that these initial reservations concerning the judgment-form echo Ricoeur’s concern of pointing out that our attempt to “bring the hyletic out of silence” may entail the danger of borrowing determinations from objective time as well as falling prey to the unacknowledged metaphorical character of the very terms we use to describe this deepest level of experience. Cf. Ricoeur (1988), p. 24ff. See also Theodorou (2015), p.238ff. Ricoeur’s diagnosis implies that we are actually capable of experiencing this discrepancy, yet not in a manner that would allow us to reduce that experience back to a primary hyletic givenness. From a phenomenological point of view, this means that the source of rightness of his critique is to be found in another field of experience, one that is not bound by the lawfulness of hyletic givenness. Clearly this signifies Ricoeur’s distance with respect to certain fundamental Husserlian positions. By contrast, if we follow those positions, we become aware that, since the goal of a further reduction would be to depart from the formulated judgment-form toward the relevant underlying experiential ground, metaphor is also excluded, nevertheless without thereby qualifying the ‘literal’ usage of the terms as phenomenologically appropriate. Regardless of the radicality of that reductive step which is necessary for securing the appropriateness and accuracy of our description, one should leave open the possibility that ‘metaphor’ and ‘indication’ as well as the relative experiences from which they originate play an essential role in our understanding of reduction itself and that it may pose a considerable resistance in our attempt to ‘disarm’ them. By that we do not simply imply that metaphor directs the gaze that determines the “objects” of the transcendental field in an articulated phenomenological description, i.e., that it transfers “the ‘appearingly’ structured content from the sensory intuitional field to linguistic understanding and communication,” but also that it delimits the terms in which we understand the reductive process. Cf. Theodorou (2015), p. 241. In any case, before one’s attention is turned to its function, it should be first explained how our mediate relation with what is “named” by the metaphor is articulated. Cf. Bernet (1985), p. LV.
transitivity. We are pre-thematically aware of our experiential life’s streaming and it is in this pre-thematic awareness that the intuitive field in which each living-experience exhibits its duration manifests itself. We are always conscious of the various temporal modalities (being-present, being-just-past, being-imminent) in a primordial manner.

Living-experiences of duration are essentially characterized by a peculiar continuity that is established by an interconnection of its various present-phases. Undoubtedly, similar kinds of interconnection are also experientially discernible within our natural attitude. Even in our scientifically informed or uninformed everyday lives we try to comprehend, by means of our ‘scientific’ common sense, temporal change by reflecting on various aspects of our experience of it. For instance, we seem to ‘know’ that time is linear, be it during my lasting perception of an object or in the transition from yesterday to tomorrow, and that the different presents are but points that belong to this line. Husserl himself was, to some extent, initially drawn from this understanding, a fact that becomes obvious in the development of his time-diagrams. Yet we must be aware that, in the case of a reflection carried out ‘naturally’ –i.e., a reflection abiding to the positing of the world as real by being perceived as an event occurring in the world–, a division of the various reflective layers has a merely relative value. For what this division reveals is not characterized by the essential necessity that pertains to a reflection carried out after the performance of transcendental-phenomenological reduction. Nevertheless, a phenomenological re-appropriation of this division within the transcendental attitude is made possible through a radical modification of our ‘naturally’ performed reflection. The different reflective layers of the latter assume then an essentially indexical function vis-à-vis the transcendental field.

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8 On the possibility of reflection on our living-present, cf. Sakakibara (2010). Sakakibara claims that Husserl, in his later manuscripts, develops his theory of reflection based on the model of self-touching of the functioning Ego, what Husserl in his earlier texts on time-consciousness called “primal consciousness.” Cf. Sakakibara (2010), p. 259. Regarding phenomenological reduction, it should be noted that by the time of the Vorlesungen Husserl had not yet developed his theory of transcendental-phenomenological reduction, even though he was already employing other kinds of reduction, such as the “Reduktion auf den reellen Bestand.” On this kind of reduction as well as on the idea of reduction in Husserl’s work in general, cf. Lohmar (2002b), Lohmar (2012) & Theodorou (2015), p. 17-66.
The issue of phenomenological reductions, needless to say, cannot be extensively addressed in the present context. We simply mean to stress that some methodological questions about reduction in its connection with time-consciousness make genuine part of our study. This is the case all the more because of the scope of Husserl’s analysis of time. Even though his analyses begin by the example of a perceived tone or melody –i.e., a temporal object (Zeitobjekt) which is characterized by a peculiar temporal extension–, they are by no means restricted in merely describing a single conscious living-experience of a tone by means of fuzzy formulations.\(^9\) On the contrary, they aspire to an all-encompassing eidetic validity and thus refer to sense-perception in general and not merely to the temporal structure of the hearing of one tone.\(^10\)

§1.1. Absolute givenness

It is well-known that Husserl dealt with the phenomenon of time throughout his life, beginning from his notorious lectures on time-consciousness held in Göttingen during the winter semester of 1905. The significance he attributed to this phenomenon for his entire phenomenological project can be easily recognized in that he explicitly acknowledged the necessity of a separate, special field of research for treating the issue of inner time-consciousness.\(^11\) Admittedly this declaration is made rather late, 

\(^9\) *Hua* X, 5.

\(^10\) Cf. Held (1966), 15-16. The linguistic-discursive form in which Husserl’s research is presented is but one of the instances in which a phenomenology of time-consciousness openly intersects with fundamental methodological issues of Husserlian phenomenology. It is well beyond the current project’s scope to deal with those complexities inherent in Husserl’s systematic work. Some of these complexities will be addressed in the course of the inquiry but only to the extent that they exhibit an essential relation to the main theme of protention, i.e., only insofar as a certain degree of clarification with respect to these complexities is indicated by the inner coherence of the inquiry as a necessary condition for achieving the current project’s goals.

\(^11\) “Eine eigene Besprechung erfordert die phänomenologische Zeit als allgemeine Eigentümlichkeit aller Erlebnisse” (*Hua* III/1, §81, 180). In *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* Husserl says: “Im ABC der Konstitution aller bewusstwerdenden Objektivität und der Subjektivität für sich selbst seiend liegt hier das A. Es besteht, wie wir sagen können, in einem universalen formalen Rahmen, in einer synthetisch konstituierten Form, an der alle anderen möglichen Synthesen Anteil haben müssen.” (*Hua* XI, §27, 125).
but he had already gone through this special field in his Vorlesungen in a rather impressively detailed application and refinement of his early methodological tools, as they were developed in his Logische Untersuchungen.\textsuperscript{12} The praising introductory reference to Augustine’s XI book of Confessions already predisposes the reader about Husserl’s general orientation. In that respect, the methodological exclusion of objective time, articulated in two parallel operations, comes as no surprise.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly to Augustine, we encounter irresolvable difficulties once we try to clarify the way in which temporal objectivity, i.e., individual objectivity in general, is constituted within subjective time-consciousness. The same complexities are met when we undertake the task to analyze the phenomenological content of temporal living-experiences (Zeiterlebnisse).\textsuperscript{14} These difficulties prompt Husserl to a strict delineation of what properly belongs to a phenomenological analysis of time from what is by principle excluded from it: we should merely focus on “appearing” duration and “appearing” time as such. In contrast to the presumptive mode of givenness of objective time, this “appearing,” phenomenologically speaking, is considered to be an indubitable or absolute kind of givenness. In this givenness we encounter an existing time, a time which is in the sphere of immanence.\textsuperscript{15} And it is exactly this immanent mode of time that we must distinguish from the time of the empirical world.\textsuperscript{16}

What absolute givenness exactly is and in what sense it denotes the transition to an immanent field of our conscious life cannot be determined by recourse to the text of the Vorlesungen. A useful definition of absolute givenness, at least in the sense

\textsuperscript{12} In his Ideen I, Husserl reports in a footnote that he considered his struggling with the enigma of time-consciousness as being completed in 1905, when he communicated his results in the lectures he held at the University of Göttingen that same year. Cf. Hua III/1, §81, 182. Needless to say, his Vorlesungen were not actually Husserl’s final word on the matter.


\textsuperscript{14} These two tasks are roughly the main tasks Husserl takes up in his Vorlesungen. Cf. Kortooms (2002), p. 21.

\textsuperscript{15} Hua X, 5.

\textsuperscript{16} Lohmar notes that “immanent time” may seem ambiguous, denoting, on the one hand, the time of the acts and, on the other hand, the deepest level of constitution where sensual data along with their duration are constituted. Cf. Lohmar (2010), p. 133, endnote 9.
Husserl made use of it at that time, can instead be found in the second Lecture of Die Idee der Phänomenologie. There Husserl says:

“Every intellectual living-experience and every living-experience in general, while being executed, can become the object of a pure seeing and grasping, and in this seeing it is absolute givenness. It is given as a being, as a this-there, and whose being cannot be sensibly doubted.” (Hua II, 31)\(^{17}\)

The similarity to the expressions used in Vorlesungen is rather striking. Even though in the latter there is no reference to a “this-there” (Dies-Da), Husserl claims that through absolute givenness we do “accept” a kind of “being,” namely an “existing” time (eine seiende Zeit).\(^{18}\) The term “acceptance” here should indicate the fact that the experiential status of absolute givenness – as the kind of givenness pertaining to phenomenological experience – is the outcome of a consistent application of our initial methodological restrictions: absolute givenness appears as the outcome of phenomenological reduction after it has been liberated by its initial particularity.\(^{19}\)

What makes it possible is that the phenomenological perception of the sphere of

\(^{17}\) “Jedes intellektive Erlebnis und jedes Erlebnis überhaupt, indem es vollzogen wird, kann zum Gegenstand eines reinen Schauens und Fassens gemacht werden, und in diesem Schauen ist es absolute Gegebenheit. Es ist gegeben als ein Seiendes, als ein Dies-Da, dessen Sein zu bezweifeln gar keinen Sinn gibt.”

\(^{18}\) Hua X, 5. It should be of some interest to work on the hypothesis of a “this-there” in relation to time. How and to what extent would this peculiar ‘pointing’ structure apply to it? The mode of appearing of empirical time qua empirical, i.e., as falling under the lawfulness regulating our objectified experiential flow, does not only direct our search of the essential structures of our time-consciousness (a specifically ‘deictic’ operation); it may also define the mode of appearing of those structures and their components within our phenomenological experience (what is pointed to appears through this ‘deictic’ operation). Montagova, for instance, seems to have implicitly adopted this ‘pointing’ form of primordially experiencing hyletic flow, when she says that we experience it as “simply ‘being-there’” (als einfach “da-seiend”). Cf. Montagova (2013), p. 32. However, in keeping distinct the levels of our inquiry for the sake of systematic precision, we should under no circumstances confuse this ‘deictic’ mode of primal consciousness, i.e., the “simple being-there” of hyletic flow, with the already temporally structured primal consciousness, i.e., with the hyletic material “after” it has become temporally synthesized. Even though there is no such thing as hyletic flow isolated from the correlative primal intentional structure, a certain abstraction from the latter is permitted for reasons of systematicity.

\(^{19}\) Cf. Hua XIII, 159: “In der Tat wird sich zeigen, dass die phänomenologische Reduktion uns zuerst auf die Gegebenheit führt, die wir vorläufig phänomenologische Erschauung nannten, auf eben phänomenologische Wahrnehmung, deren absoluter und dabei zweifelloser Charakter sich allerdings vertreten lässt.”
immanence is disclosed as primarily dependent upon its own positing.\textsuperscript{20} “Acceptance” of an “existing” time after the initial suspension of objective time implies “acceptance” of its primary correlation to consciousness, of its (non-objectifying) givenness for… The character of “doubtlessness” qua character is typical of the sphere of immanence\textsuperscript{21} and is phenomenologically meaningful only in direct reference to this correlation. In a sense, the “suspension of the objective time” amounts not just to an exclusion of all the empirical presuppositions/prejudices with respect to time but also to a fundamental uncovering of consciousness as the original condition for any sense whatsoever.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, in \textit{Ideen I} Husserl speaks of the absolute reality of my experiential actuality as being given through an unconditional positing.\textsuperscript{23}

It is important to note in passing that Husserl did not limit his conception of \textit{absolute} givenness to the mere contradistinction to the \textit{presumptive} mode of givenness which is proper to transcendent objects.\textsuperscript{24} For he introduces a somewhat paradoxical distinction within absolute givenness itself: within the realm of immanence, we can distinguish between modes of givenness that are absolutely indubitable and those that are \textit{not}.\textsuperscript{25} This distinction reveals a whole series of ‘modified’ modes of givenness – such as recollection, anticipation, empathy and fantasy – within the sphere of immanence, some of which will play an important role in the course of our inquiry.\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{21} Cf. \textit{Hua} III/1, 96f. Also cf. Boehm (1968), 72ff.

\textsuperscript{22} DeWarren (2009), p. 101.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Hua} III/1, 98.

\textsuperscript{24} For an exemplary case of this contradistinction cf. \textit{Hua} III/1, 118f.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Hua} XIII, 158. Briefly, this kind of immanence can be characterized as “the immanence of the phenomenological field of consciousness.” Cf. Montagova (2013), p. 30.

\textsuperscript{26} Since a clear-cut definition of what Husserl meant by the term “immanence” in different stages of his work is on its own an arduous undertaking, we will merely focus on and make use of the notions of immanence which are essentially pertinent to the task at hand. For an enlightening discussion of the relation between immanence and transcendence, cf. Boehm (1968), pp. 141-185.
§1.2. The given in time-consciousness

What is it exactly that phenomenologists ‘encounter’ once the suspension of objective time has been performed? Husserl provides us with a description of what the phenomenological field of time-constitution consists in through an analogy to consciousness of spatiality. In the latter, once we have performed the reduction of the perceptual appearance to the primary contents, we can discern visual sensual-contents (Empfindungsinhalte) and a continuum of our quasi-spatial visual field. Similarly, in time-consciousness, we are dealing with temporal apprehensions, their content, and the corresponding appearances. Here too a quasi-temporal field appears which is not regulated according to the lawfulness of objective time. This initial division of what is immanently given in ‘apprehensions’ and ‘contents-of-apprehensions’ was the object of considerable reworkings both by Husserl himself, at least in his middle-period texts on time (1917-1918), and by various Husserlian scholars. Thus, it has acquired a relatively wide fame within Husserlian literature under the rubric of ‘apprehension-content schema.’

Be it as it may –we will discuss later the critical points of the debate–, what should be clear at this point is that, even though in 1905 Husserl uses the term ‘reducing’ (reduzieren) to describe the methodological shift of his research interest to

27 This question still bears a kind of naivety with respect to the “encountering” relation characterizing the performance of reduction. Reflectively encountering time-constituting elements and structures not only is characterized by “belatedness” with respect to an anonymous transcendental pre-temporal functioning; it also motivates us to inquire into the way radical phenomenologizing self-reflection can be directed by a kind of ‘pre-being’ of temporalization itself, without leading to an ‘objectification’ of temporalization. All these issues relate directly to Fink’s VI. Cartesianische Meditation. On “encountering” as mode of givenness in a more general framework, cf. Spiegelberg (1984).

28 Hua X, 5. Husserl here does not yet employ transcendental-phenomenological reduction. The reduction performed at this point is the equivalent of the process denoted Logische Untersuchungen as “Reduktion auf die reelle Erlebnisimmanenz.” Cf. Hua XIX, 413, footnote. See also below, footnote 32.

29 Hua X, 6.

a non-psychological immanence, he has not yet introduced the famous process of transcendental-phenomenological reduction, something that will only happen at least publicly and only in its first steps—two years later in his lectures Die Idee der Phänomenologie. The kind of ‘reduction’ at play here may give the impression that Husserl is still wavering between the focus on an immanent field of living-experiences along with their intentional correlates (as it is examined in his Logische Untersuchungen) and the thematization of the structure of living-experiences that intend transcendent objects (as it is brought about in his Ideen I). The differences between these two kinds of reduction are rather significant. Anticipating our discussion, it should suffice to mention here that the reduction performed in the Vorlesungen excludes from the field of phenomenological givenness the intentional object. In relation to the temporal objects that Husserl includes in his analyses of our temporal experience, this means that “we consider the tone purely as a hyletic datum.” Yet, phenomenological analysis, as it is developed after the introduction of transcendental-phenomenological reduction (especially in Ideen I), deals also with the intentional object and its posited reality and not merely with the reell contents of consciousness. This reconsideration is, naturally, closely linked to Husserl’s reappraisal of the limits and ‘regional’ extension of ‘immanent being.’

In the Vorlesungen, Husserl refers to a “sensed” temporal moment (ein “empfundenes” Zeitliches), which itself is not objective temporality but the phenomenological datum whose empirical apperception leads to the constitution of


32 Hua X, 24. Boehm considers the phenomenological reduction performed at the beginning of the Vorlesungen as being the same kind of reduction Husserl used in Logische Untersuchungen, namely the “Reduktion auf den reellen Bestand.” He cites a note from Husserl himself, where he expressly evaluated this use of phenomenological reduction as “correct.” Cf. Boehm (1968), p. 126.

The tone is considered as a “temporal object” while its duration is denoted as a “time-object” (Zeitobjekt). More specifically Husserl says:

“Unter Zeitobjekten im speziellen Sinn verstehen wir Objekte, die nicht nur Einheiten in der Zeit sind, sondern die Zeitextension auch in sich enthalten.” (Hua X, 23)

our relation to the objective time.\textsuperscript{34} The fact that Husserl uses quotation marks when he refers to this sensed temporal datum points to its exceptional use in the current context. Indeed, on the same page, he adds a footnote explaining the term “sensed”:

\begin{quote}
“‘Sensed’ would then be the indication of a relational concept that in itself would signify nothing about whether what is sensed is sensual [sensuell]– indeed, about whether it is immanent at all in the sense of what is sensual. In other words, it would remain open whether what is sensed is itself already constituted and perhaps entirely different from the sensual. – But this whole distinction is best left aside; not every constitution has the schema: apprehension-content – apprehension.” (\textit{Hua X, 7}; Brough’s translation).\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

As is obvious from the last part of our citation, this footnote is directly related to the discussion of the “apprehension - content of apprehension” model of constitution and it shares its fame as a common textual addendum in most attempts of presenting or contributing to the discussion. What is of interest for us here, however, is that the content which is inextricably connected to apprehension, as one of the two inseparable moments of a presentifying event – i.e., of a conscious perceptual act– has a peculiar mode of givenness: the “sensing” (Empfinden).\textsuperscript{36} A more careful investigation of this mode of givenness will eventually lead us to a finer description of “sensation” (Empfindung) in the context of “proto-impression” (Urimpression), examined both as the originally present content of consciousness and as the non-objectifying primordial consciousness of our experiential life. The latter will prove to be an essential aspect of the ultimate level of time-consciousness, that is, of “absolute consciousness.” As far as the former is concerned, we will see that it is also characterized as “unmodified” content, through which the constitution of a unitary hyletic datum in its duration is accomplished.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Hua X, 7}: “…so haben wir in gleichem Sinne auch ein ‘empfundenes’ Zeitliches und ein wahrgenommenes Zeitliches zu unterscheiden. […] Das erstere aber ist nicht selbst objektive Zeit (oder Stelle in der objektiven Zeit), sondern das phänomenologische Datum durch dessen empirische Aperzeption die Beziehung auf objektive Zeit sich konstituiert.”

\textsuperscript{35} “‘Empfunden” wäre dann also Anzeige eines Relationsbegriffes, der in sich nichts darüber besagen würde, ob das Empfundene sensuell, ja ob es überhaupt immanent ist im Sinne von Sensuellem, m.a.W. es bliebe offen, ob das Empfundene selbst schon konstituiert ist, und vielleicht ganz anders als das Sensuelle. - Aber dieser ganze Unterschied bleibt am besten beiseite; nicht jede Konstitution hat das Schema Auffassungsinhalt – Auffassung.”

\textsuperscript{36} For an analysis of the term “sensing” (Empfinden) as a primordial mode of pre-reflective immediate givenness, cf. Landgrebe (1954).
All the above rather enigmatic formulations will progressively become clearer and clearer. For the moment, let us stress that Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness around the time of the lectures also addresses the *apprehensions* through which sensed temporal data relate to objective time. These apprehensions bear specific characters that “regulate” these contents. Through these apprehension-characters (*Auffassungscharaktere*) – for instance, apprehending the sensed red as the red of a red ball –, the appearing time constitutes the one objective temporal order, i.e. the one objective time in which everything obtains its particular temporal position.\(^{37}\) It is the lawfulness pertaining to these apprehension-characters that leads to the constitution of objectivity and not the primary contents themselves.\(^{38}\) Tracing the essence of these characters is only possible on the basis of their intuitive givenness within phenomenological experience. This is the task eidetic investigation is meant to accomplish: it looks for essences in the immanent field of our experiential life through a carefully performed variation. For example, on the basis of a single ‘exemplary’ experienced object – be it a thing-like spatiotemporal object, a universal one or a separate perceptual act as an object of reflection –, eidetic investigation aims at tracing the a priori essence of what is given to that sort of experience.

Eidetic givenness is a peculiar kind of givenness. A necessary methodological precondition for understanding what this project consists in is the careful distinction between the phenomenological question about the “origin” and the question about the “psychological origin.” The latter unfolds itself through a psychological apperception which posits an already constituted psycho-physical subject, an empirical person as bearer of his own psychical life and, in this life, of its experiences as real and empirical entities. “Origin” in this context can only mean a psychological genesis of our time-representations.\(^{39}\) Keeping his investigation within the phenomenological

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\(^{37}\) *Hua X*, 7.

\(^{38}\) *Hua X*, 8.

\(^{39}\) Cf. *Hua X*, 15, where Husserl criticizes Brentano’s theory of our perception of time. Oskar Kraus reports that, with the exception of the problem of God’s existence,

“Brentano has not returned back to any other question more often and with invincible patience than to the question of the origin of our time-representations and to the problem of continuity in general.” (cited in: DeWarren (2009), p. 54).
boundaries prescribed by the initial suspension of objective time, Husserl describes living-experiences of time with no recourse to their actual reality or unreality, be it psychical or psychophysical. His goal, in 1905, is to clarify the a priori of time by inquiring into the essential constitution of time-consciousness.  

§1.3. Introduction to the phenomenological analysis of time-consciousness

We should keep in mind that Husserl never considered the problems he is dealing with as a mere inheritance of unsolved puzzles calling for further elaboration, even though he draws critically on the analyses of eminent contemporary thinkers. Instead, he recognized them as empirical indications for the necessity of a radical renewal, a kind of renewal that was envisioned and brought about through the gradual refinement of phenomenological reduction. Since a historical-systematic account either of the development of transcendental-phenomenological reduction or of the guiding lines that determine the course of the phenomenological renewal of those problems would lead us astray, we will concern ourselves with it only to the extent that it proves to be intertwined with aspects of our main theme.

Even though, based on textual evidence, we can trace Husserl’s initial interest in inner time-consciousness to his attempt to explain how an object with a temporal extension can be apprehended by a present act of consciousness—an act which itself exhibits a temporal stretch of duration—, we have to be aware that his efforts for a thorough analysis of time are not exhausted in this pursuit. His descriptions evolve on several parallel or crossing axes of inquiry. Lohmar offers us a quite comprehensive list of the various projects that Husserl is taking up in his Vorlesungen: 1) The analysis of immanent time itself, i.e., the flow of consciousness, the character of time in the inner experience of consciousness itself (the time of the act itself); 2) The analysis of subjective time in its function as medium of representation for objective time in events and lasting objects; 3) The search for the lowest level of constitution in

40 Hua X, 10.

41 Such guiding lines would include, for instance, the primacy of sense-perception or the intentional relatedness to the world. For an examination of the different senses that the methodological move of reduction has in Husserl’s development, cf. Theodorou (2015), ch. 2.
which, on the basis of the pure hyletic streaming (in all fields of sensibility), sensual-data together with their duration are constituted; 4) The investigation of specific time-objects like melodies or events (in subjective and objective time); 5) The constitution of the unity of consciousness itself; 6) Working on the methodological tools of these analyses.\textsuperscript{42}

All these projects are quite significant for our narrower task, insofar as they define the theoretical horizons in which phenomenological analysis of protentional consciousness can be actually undertaken in a reflectively self-aware manner. But we will not undertake the treatment of those projects as independent parallel tasks. Instead, we will consider and occasionally refer to each one of them in order to clarify the horizon of our analysis. In this sense, we will come to realize that Husserl is “keen to substantiate his over-arching claim that phenomenological descriptions are rigorous in the sense of clarifying invariant structures of consciousness, as revealed in \textit{eidetic} intuition.”\textsuperscript{43}

For the time being it suffices to offer a general overview of Husserl’s description of the temporal structure of our concrete perception of time. As an initial step, it should be said that the latter must not be considered as “a limit without extension, but rather [as] a field of a presence”\textsuperscript{44}: it consists in a span of originarity that reaches back to what has just passed by –in the form of a peculiar intention which Husserl calls “retention” or “primary memory” (\textit{primäre Erinnerung}) – and, “likewise,” stretches forward to what is just coming –in the form of “protention.” This \textit{expansive ranging of originarity} is characterized by a primary presentifying (\textit{gegenwärtigend}) “extension” which we must distinguish from the “ideal Now” or “rough Now” (\textit{das grobe Jetzt}), that serves as a dependent structural element of the living present.\textsuperscript{45} This element is named “proto-impression” (\textit{Urimpression}) or “proto-presentation”

\textsuperscript{42} Lohmar (2010), p. 117.

\textsuperscript{43} DeWarren (2009), p. 117. For examples of Husserl’s usage of this phrasing, cf. Hua X, 24, 28, 32, 37, 44, 68, 80.

\textsuperscript{44} Held (2010), p.93.

\textsuperscript{45} Hua X, 40.
Despite its structural dependence, it is primal in that it serves as the proto-source (Urquell) of hyletic givenness. In close connection to that, Husserl speaks of “primal sensation” (Urempfindung) and distinguishes it from “sensation” (Empfindung): the former refers to the dependent structural phase of proto-presentation qua proto-origination, while the latter characterizes the whole field of time-constituting consciousness.

The hyletic contents which are given in a proto-impressional mode through the “proto-source” pass by and gradually fade away, i.e., they undergo a retentional modification in which they appear in the primal mode of “just-past” (Soeben). This modification takes place across and through the retentional intending which displays a double intentionality: as “lengthwise intentionality” (Längsintentionalität), it is directed towards the previous time-constituting phases of consciousness and, as “crosswise intentionality” (Querintentionalität), towards the previous phases of the immanent objective unity. Retentional modification is that through which a content is inserted/ixed in a temporal order which is constituted by them, i.e., a temporal modification, since the hyletic content undergoes no qualitative modification: what

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46 “Urpräsentation” appears mainly in the Bernauer Manuskripte, in the specific context of refining the theory of protention’s primal functioning.

47 As Husserl says:

“Die Urimpression ist der absolute Anfang dieser Erzeugung, der Urquell, das, woraus alles andere stetig sich erzeugt. Sie selber aber wird nicht erzeugt, sie entsteht nicht als Erzeugtes, sondern durch genesis spontanea, sie ist Urzeugung. Sie erwächst nicht (sie hat keinen Keim), sie ist Urschöpfung.” (Hua X, 100)

Or:

“Die Urimpression ist das absolut Unmodifizierte, die Urquelle für alles weitere Bewusstsein und Sein.” (Hua X, 67)

Also:


A similar expression can be found in Die Bernauer Manuskripte:

“Die Urgenesis (als eidetische Form), die Form der Konstitution von immanenten hyletischen Gegenständen ist die Unterlage für jede weitere Genesis…” (Hua XXXIII, 282)

48 “Ich sage U r e m p f i n d u n g, das bezeichnet die unselbständige Phase der Originarität; Empfindung schlechthin bezeichnet das ganze zeitkonstituierende Bewusstsein, in dem sich ein immanenter sinnlicher Inhalt konstituiert.” (Hua X, 326, n. 1).

49 Hua X, 80-83.

bears this modification is always what originated as proto-impression. The modification generates the retentional depth, that is, the layering of modifications—i.e., retention of retention—through and among which a continuous synthesis of coincidence (Deckungssynthesis) takes place: a synthesis not only between proto-impressions and their retentions but also between the distinct retentional continua attached to different proto-impressions. This synthesis is interpreted as “duration” which, in material terms, is effected by the “merging” or “fusing” (Verschmelzung) of the present sensual contents with the retentional ones.

Retention should be strictly distinguished from “recollection” (Wiedererinnerung) or, as Husserl also calls it, “secondary memory” (sekundäre Erinnerung). What has already undergone retentional modification may be reproduced through a re-presentifying act and be given again, quasi-perceptually, within the living-present. Recollection, as a present re-presentifying act, occurs in the present and, hence, it is structured through retentions, proto-impressions and protentions. However, even though what is recollected is intuitively given anew, it bears the fundamental character of “past,” of having-been.51

While Husserl has devoted much effort in describing retention and its relation to proto-impression and recollection quite early, it is a fact that he did not develop or refine his theory of protention until 1917/1918, that is, during his stay in Bernau. In the few places in which he deals with protention in the Vorlesungen or in texts originating from the period prior to his Bernau stay, he offers us brief descriptions of certain aspects of it.52 Protention is described in analogy to retention. The task of the present study precisely is to investigate this analogy and its limits, and to bring to light the idiosyncrasy of protention.

52 Hua X, §§24, 40, 43.
§1.4. The environment of the debate on the perception of time

But it is too early to go in the details. Let us return to Husserl’s Vorlesungen to further clarify their starting-point. For Husserl develops his understanding of time-consciousness through a number of—what he considers to be—questionable philosophical prejudices. In the texts included in the main corpus of the Vorlesungen, as they are published in Hua X, he discusses a number of positions supported by various authors of his time, such as Lotze, Herbart, Stern and, of course, Brentano. It was the discussion and criticism of the latter’s theory of perception of time that mostly served Husserl for setting the scenery for his phenomenology of time. Putting aside potential reservations about Husserl’s controversial presentation of Brentano’s theory of time, it is important to notice that “Husserl translates this ‘pre-phenomenological’ (i.e., ‘descriptive psychological’) statement of the problem into the conceptual framework of phenomenological analysis.”\(^{53}\) For that reason it will be useful to take a brief look at the way Husserl receives Brentano’s theory.

According to the latter’s conception and in his terms, always through Husserl’s own perspective, grasping a temporally extended object requires representations and a temporal positioning of the represented content.\(^{54}\) In their absence, we wouldn’t be able to perceive, for instance, a melody, but instead a tone and an empty interval before perceiving the next tone in its isolation. Apart from the necessity of a representational trace being left behind after the tone has elapsed, perceiving the time of the succession of tones also requires that the represented tones undergo a modification which prevents them from appearing as occurring now; otherwise we would have, instead of a melody, a chord of simultaneous tones or a disharmonious tangle of sound.\(^{55}\) What is being modified is the temporal determination (zeitliche Bestimmtheit) of the reproduced tone. After the disappearance of the stimulus producing the tone-sensation, the latter awakens out from itself a similar representation supplied with a temporal determination. This determination changes continuously and in that way we perceive a melody in which each tone has a definite

\(^{53}\) DeWarren (2009), p. 56.

\(^{54}\) Mensch (2010a), p. 53.

\(^{55}\) Hua X, 11.
Brentano claims that this process is regulated by a universal law, according to which a series of representations is attached to every given representation. Each of these reproduces the content of the previous one by fixing on each new representation the moment of past. This temporal moment is produced by phantasy and more specifically through what Brentano called “original association.” The latter is not an association of two present contents, since one of the associated elements no longer exists as a real sensation. Instead, in our case, association functions as the origin of one of the associated elements. In order to illustrate this associative function, Brentano drew a diagram, cited by Stumpf:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 1**

Stumpf himself described the diagram as follows:

“In each moment of an (external or internal) perception, a presentation is released from the perceptual content. This presentation is qualitatively the same as the perceptual content, but temporally it is shoved back up to a certain limit. [...] When several impressions, a, b, c, d, follow one another, with the entrance of the second, the first is in this way temporally sunk down, and so on. Brentano illustrated this with the

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56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
accompanying diagram, where the horizontal line designates the objective flow of time and the vertical lines at each point designate the present presentations.”

The modifying temporal predicates attributed to the contents by the representational function of original association are irreal, but the representations themselves are real. Thus, the vertical lines illustrate the “real,” as it were, co-presence of the original sensation with all the corresponding phantasy representations as well as the co-presence of the latter with one another. The role of phantasy here is obviously not limited to reproducing the content of the previous representation; it also produces a new moment. Even though it somehow contains an intuitive core, indicating a certain situatedness in the present, it also “produces a form of subtraction by creating a distance […] from the core of presence.”

As one would expect, Husserl rejects much of Brentano’s account. He differentiates his approach from the latter’s by pointing out that Brentano’s theory makes use of transcendent presuppositions by accepting existing objects which exert “stimuli” and “induce” sensations in us. That is, it does not move on the ground that Husserl has considered as necessary for a phenomenological analysis, a ground which will eventually become more and more clearly delimited as he develops his method of transcendental phenomenological reduction. Husserl furthermore criticizes Brentano’s employment of phantasy for explaining our perception of time. A first difficulty faced by the latter in this respect is the lack of any distinction between the “irreality” of the immediate past and the “irreality” of the remote past. If we accept Brentano’s view about the role of phantasy, then a re-presentification of a succession from the remote past – which is itself already produced as a continuum of original associations –, would mean that we now just have phantasies of phantasies. The distinction between

61 Hua X, 14.
64 Hua X, 16.
65 Ibid.
those two kinds of irreality would be necessary for Brentano in order to explain the mode of transcendence peculiar to the past. Supposing that an “irreal” content is attached to a “real” one does not offer us an explanation of how the real continuity of temporal passage comes up.\textsuperscript{66} Since the unity of consciousness that encompasses the present and the past is a phenomenological datum, it is necessary to give a satisfying account of how this unity is constituted. As long as the temporal moment “past” belongs to the sphere of originary intuition of time, it is also a “present” moment, and that is an obvious absurdity. All those past moments that comprise a succession would be simultaneous, as already indicated on Brentano’s diagram. Husserl notes that Brentano’s failure to distinguish between act of apprehension, content of apprehension, and apprehended object is the reason for his confusion.\textsuperscript{67}

After his discussion of Brentano’s theory of our perception of time, Husserl continues by pointing out that we can trace a certain underlying guiding motive in Brentano’s thought, a motive which originates from Herbart and was taken up by Lotze. This motive is nothing else than the conviction that the grasping of a succession of representations requires that these representations are objects of a knowing which embraces them in a unitary indivisible act. Husserl adopts Stern’s term to denote this conception as the “dogma of the momentariness of a whole of consciousness” and turns to the latter’s critique against this dogma. The main tenet of this dogma is that the contents contained in a conscious act must be contained \textit{simultaneously}. Stern himself opposed this conception by introducing the term “presence-time” (\textit{Präsenzzeit}). The latter denotes the stretch of time in which a mental act “extends.”\textsuperscript{68} The significance of “presence-time” for Husserl’s theory is hard to underestimate. Even though perceiving time within presence-time is not strictly equivalent to what Husserl understands as inner time-consciousness, the notion of presence-time makes him realize that a conscious act is temporally extended in a

\textsuperscript{66} DeWarren (2009), p. 89.

\textsuperscript{67} Hua X, 17.

\textsuperscript{68} Hua X, 20, n. 4. Gallagher has pinpointed emphatically the difference between Stern’s “presence-time” and James’ “specious present”: the former designates the temporal extension of the act while the latter refer to the temporal extension of the sensed content. Cf. Gallagher (1998), p. 35.
different manner than the temporal content. Husserl will try to develop the very point that Stern has left untouched, namely, “how the presence-time of an act of consciousness itself ‘appears’ or is ‘manifest’ (‘erscheint’) in addition to (‘nebst’) the consciousness of temporal relations.”

§2. Phenomenological reduction and suspension of objective time

In the vein of his criticism of Brentano, Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness begins with the performance of a special suspension of objective time. This is the means by which he reaches the proper field of inquiry of a phenomenological description of time. Our analysis of protention also falls within the scope of this suspension. Protention, like retention and proto-impression, is not an “act” that unfolds in the objective time; it has no “objective” duration that would allow its subsumption under the category of beings that are essentially susceptible to objective measurement in both terms: either within the theoretically constituted measured time of natural sciences or within the pre-theorically constituted measurable objective time of our every-day experience. On the contrary, it is a fundamental condition for our perception of any duration that admits of such measurement. This remark is quite significant. Even though “suspension” means exclusion from our field of inquiry, we should not draw the conclusion that analysis of subjective-immanent time should ignore its relation to this “objective” time. Regarding protentional consciousness, “suspension” of objective time does not only free it from the regularity and lawfullness of the latter, for instance from its countability. It also brings to light the fact that even though it exhibits an intentional structure, what it intends is by no means an “object” that lies in objective time. Suspension of objective time situates protention, as well as retention and proto-impression, in their proper constitutive level. But let us see what Husserl means by “suspension” or “exclusion” of objective time. This exclusion applies to all assumptions and convictions with respect to objective time. In his own words:

69 DeWarren (2009), p. 95.

70 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
“Inherent in this, as in any phenomenological analysis, is the complete exclusion of every assumption, stipulation, and conviction with respect to the objective time (the complete exclusion of all transcending presuppositions concerning what exists).” (Hua X, 4; Brough’s translation).

Even though suspension (“exclusion”) is used by Husserl here as a general title denoting his systematic exclusion of objective time, we should also consider it in a narrower methodological sense. Thus, it also signifies one of the two steps in which a specific kind of reduction with respect to time-consciousness is carried out: a reduction denoting “a methodological circumstance in which the ‘sense’ (Sinn) and ‘validity’ (als was gilt uns die Zeit) of time is made into a theme of reflection,” even if we have not yet clarified what kind of ‘sense’ and ‘validity’ time-consciousness may have. According to this two-stepped methodology, Husserl performs, first, an abstraction from every transcendent interpretation (Deutung) of time and, second, a reduction of perceptual appearance to the given primal contents. Strictly speaking, Husserl does not characterize this methodological suspension of objective time as a reduction. Nevertheless, the fact that he avoids employing categories pertaining to and derived from objective time for describing this newly discovered field of analysis makes it quite clear that he is performing a form of reduction.

The reductive route he follows in the case of time-consciousness can be schematically described as departing from objective time, considered as a synthetic

71 “Darin liegt, wie bei jeder solchen Analyse, der völlige Ausschluss jedweder Annahmen, Festsetzungen, Überzeugungen in betreff der objektiven Zeit (aller transzendierenden Voraussetzungen von Existierendem).”

72 DeWarren (2009), p. 100.

73 Hua X, 5. In Ideen I, Husserl acknowledges the stepwise character of reduction and the necessary plurality of reductions. Cf. Hua III/1, 69.

74 Cf. Lohmar (2010), p. 116. Even a reflectively aware performance of this reduction would be burdened with many difficulties which will not concern us here. In passing, one may mention: a) the primal unsuitability of our language concerning the task of describing these deeper levels of constitution and b) the originally unthemetic consciousness of the pre-egoic accomplishments, which take place on this deepest level of constitution.

75 One should be careful, though, not to consider that this reduction is carried out by a reflective turning of our regard to the transcendental functioning Ego. As noted above, Husserl had not yet begun to
accomplishment, and leading to subjective time, considered as the founding level of experience. At first sight, this shift may seem to conflate two systematically separate levels of synthesis: one leading from primal hyletic givenness to subjective time and another one departing from subjective time and being oriented toward objective time. Despite this initial impression, Husserl gradually manages to distinguish these two levels, attaining thus a clearer view of the overall complex synthetic process through which objective time is constituted.

§2.1. The Idea of reduction

No matter how Husserl understands reduction in the various phases of his analyses of time-consciousness, one thing is certain: no analysis of time-consciousness is possible without a clear view of the context in which it is exercised. And this holds true in the case of protention too. Let us then slightly digress in order to provide a concise presentation of Husserl’s reductive method. Our aim here is no other than to prepare the ground for the discussion of protention in terms of what essentially belongs to its phenomenological structure. And the means to do so is to clarify the methodological context through which we thematize and describe protentional consciousness.

Phenomenological reflection on reduction, in the context of a theory of constitution, can only be performed on the basis of intentionality. This means that elaborate such a reduction until a little later, in his 1907 lectures Die Idee der Phänomenologie, leading up to its formulation in Ideen I. For instance, cf. Hua III/1, 122: “Die Ausschaltung der Thesis der Welt, der Natur, war für uns das methodische Mittel, um die Blickwendung auf das transzendental reine Bewusstsein überhaupt zu ermöglichen.”

One should likewise not mistake the organic relation between “abstraction” and “reduction” in the Vorlesungen, for the relation between the “restrictive epoche” and the “productive performance” of reduction in the context of Ideen I, where productivity is understood as the discovery and opening up of “absolute being” in the specific non-metaphysical Husserlian sense. For a historical as well as systematic discussion of the latter relation, cf. Boehm (1968), pp. 134-139. As already mentioned, Boehm classifies the reduction of the Vorlesungen under the heading of the “Reduktion auf den reellen Bestand,” i.e., the kind of reduction first performed in the 1st edition of Logische Untersuchungen. So it comes as no surprise that he does not take into account the former relation.

76 Lohmar (2010), p. 117.
77 Ibid., p. 133, endnote 8.
78 The present analysis is based for the most part on the discussion about the idea of reduction in Lohmar’s article “Die Idee der Reduktion. Husserls Reduktionen – und ihr gemeinsamer, methodischer
intentionality provides us with the necessary eidetic ground for reaching an essential view of reduction itself. Whatever modifications reduction admits of, they all have a bearing on the various components of intentionality itself. These modifications can thus be traced to the distinct interrelations of those intentional components. More generally, the concerned components are, on the one hand, the synthetic accomplishments and posittings involved in each intention and, on the other hand, the intuitive ground upon which they occur.

In the narrow context under investigation, instead of focusing directly on transcendental reduction and its articulation through those intentional components, however, it is methodologically as well as historically-systematically more appropriate to consider first Husserl’s guiding notion of reduction. Lohmar offers us a quite coherent interpretation of what it actually consists in. According to Lohmar, Husserl’s reductions should be seen as methodical instances which bear a common trait. Each of them is a method whose aim is to lead our gaze back to an experiential field. And their common trait—with the significant exception of eidetic reduction—is the underlying tendency to explore the legitimacy of specific posittings on the ground of an intuitive experiential field. What differentiates those reductions is the fact that each time Husserl deals with a different kind of positing.

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79 As expected, things become more complicated once we decide to follow the distinction between the noetic and the noematic side of phenomenological reflection. Namely we will have to explain in what sense intentionality appears as the eidetic ground of the reflecting as opposed to the reflected living-experiencing. As already noted, dealing with these and similar issues that are intimately connected with the huge issue of phenomenological reduction is not part of this study’s task. The analysis included in this chapter concerns only a particular conception of the more general idea of reduction.

80 Lohmar (2002b).

81 Lohmar deals with the issue of eidetic analysis in his article “Die phänomenologische Methode der Wesenschau und ihre Präzisierung als eidetische Variation”. Cf. Lohmar (2005).

82 Briefly these reductions are: a) The “Reduktion auf den reellen Bestand” in the 5. Logische Untersuchung, b) the “transcendental reduction” of Ideen I, c) the Rückführung of logical and mathematical judgments to the experience of individual, concrete objects, as it is suggested in Formale und transzendentielle Logik, d) the “primordial reduction” of Kartesianische Meditationen, e) the Rückgang of the scientific idealizations to the pre-scientific life-world in Krisis and f) the Rückführung of logical categories to pre-predicative experience in Erfahrung und Urteil. According to Lohmar, even though three of them (c, e, f) do not expressly employ the term “reduction” they are are clearly
Lohmar speaks of a double meaning of the term “reduction.” It can mean either a “retrogression” (Rückgang) to a methodically impoverished experiential field or a concrete “return” (Zurückführung) of the specific positing under discussion to the relevant intuitive givenness in that experiential field.\(^83\) This distinction is especially tangible in some of the cases discussed by Lohmar—e.g. the Rückgang of scientific idealizations to the pre-scientific life-world in Krisis or the Rückführung of logical categories to pre-predicative experience in Erfahrung und Urteil. It is rather easy to notice that the former denotes a more general application of reductive method while the latter a more concrete one. However, they should not be understood as separate “moves” but as two distinct folds of one reductive move.\(^84\)

In close connection to the above distinction, Lohmar poses the question of whether a reduction is, first, “possible” and, second, “effective.” The former implies that in order for a reduction to be possible the prospective residuum should be a well-structured and stable experiential field, able to be given “on its own” (für sich), that is to say, without implicitly employing the reduced sense-elements and without being dependent on other experiential fields.\(^85\) The latter asks whether the positing we are variations of the same reductive method. However, it has to be explained why Husserl did not expressly use the term “reduction” to denote them. Cf. Lohmar (2002b), p. 754f.

\(^83\) Ibid., 768. By “experiential field” one should not understand the various sense-fields but the various levels of experience that gradually become “enriched” when we follow the constitutive “ascent.” Each higher level of experience endows its lower level with additional synthetic accomplishments that are not included in it.

\(^84\) Ibid., p. 769. Of course, this may raise questions about their systematic relation. For example, is the methodical impoverishment of the relevant experiential field actually directed by the prospect of a more specific process of Zurückführung? Or, reversely: since the intuitive givenness in that experiential field is inevitably already determined by the impoverished version of that field when that “return” occurs, how does this influence the initial refinement of the experiential field? In more general terms, how should we account for this fundamental process of impoverishment/refinement? Is it a goal-oriented process? If it is, then how can we determine in advance the criteria for deciding whether we have reached the degree of impoverishment which is appropriate to each synthetic accomplishment? Lohmar describes it as a de-synthesizing, which unfolds by going back to the synthetic accomplishments of consciousness, first of all to the intentional apprehension, but also to lower (e.g. inner time-consciousness) and higher synthetic accomplishments (e.g. categorial intuition), and to the different experiential field which each time provides intuitive fullness.

\(^85\) Ibid., p. 770. It should be noted that the experiential fields do not consist simply from impressional material. Refining our conception of the reductive method, we reach what serves as “ground” through careful reductive and analytic steps. The guiding conception for searching for this experiential ground is the “style of evidence.” The experiences that serve as ground for the various synthetic
each time testing can really be led back to its intuitive ground in the experiential field we have reached through reduction.\textsuperscript{86} Those two aspects of reduction, namely, “possibility” and “effectiveness,” correspond to two moments of reductive “leading back”: a) is it possible as a “retrogression” (Rückgang) to a methodically impoverished experiential field?, b) is it effective as a “return” (Zurückführung) of a specific positing to the corresponding intuitive givenness in that experiential field?

Reduction’s performance is always described along the axis relating a positing with a corresponding experiential field. The performance of the reduction as a “testing” operation is thus demarcated by its way of examining this relation. For example, when the positing of reality within a perceptual act undergoes the reductive testing-process, what we recognize is that the perceptual act makes a claim for the validity of the reality of what is perceived (positing something as something real, i.e., as empirically in-itself), not its effecting this validity. In this sense, the positing we are examining is now merely “nominally,” so to say, included in the corresponding experiential field; the latter incorporates a claim (Anspruch), not a validity (Geltung). This is what makes phenomenologizing different from the practice of mundane sciences with respect to their scientific ideal of absolute certainty or of presuppositionlessness. As Fink says, our methodical horizon is the interpretation of transcendental world-experience in view of the constitutive problems that are posed in it.\textsuperscript{87} Phenomenological reduction does not open up the field of transcendental being in a “divided horizontal consciousness” (in einem gegliederten Horizontbewusstsein).\textsuperscript{88} Or, as Husserl himself puts it:

“The new field does not lie spread out before our view with a wealth of prominent data in such a manner that we can simply reach out and be sure of the possibility of making accomplishments from various levels of experience are not always mere sense-matter. Thus, “ground” may also encompass “motivations,” “full-fledged experiences” etc. This is quite significant for the analysis of ‘expectation,’ since its motivation from previous experience serves as its ground of legitimacy.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 771.

\textsuperscript{87} Fink (1988b), p. 221. One can also quite reasonably ask how I can have for me the act-structures that are revealed by reduction. Cf. Broekman (1963), p. 74. However, this ego for whom the act-structures are revealed does not participate in the doxic element involved in its acts. Cf. Cairns (1976), p. 12.

\textsuperscript{88} Fink (1988a), p. 54.
them the objects of a science – to say nothing of being sure of the method by which we ought to proceed.” (Hua III/1, 135; Kersten’s translation, slightly altered)\textsuperscript{89}

Although Lohmar makes it clear that transcendental reduction, as it is performed in Ideen I, is but one case of reduction,\textsuperscript{90} his interpretation of reduction can be seen as an attempt to offer a reply to the purely transcendental-methodological question that Fink has famously formulated in a concise and eloquent way: “what is the situation of the phenomenological analysis”?\textsuperscript{91} More specifically, Fink says that:

“[t]he problem of the situation of the phenomenological analysis is the transcendental interpretation of givenness of all analytical components and states-of-affairs for the phenomenological onlooker.” (Fink (1988a), p. 57)\textsuperscript{92}

Undoubtedly, the relation itself between positing and experiential field, as well as its members, counts among the analytical components and states-of-affairs Fink is talking about. No matter what form this interpretation of givenness of all analytical components may take, every component and state-of-affair share a common feature, namely, their attachment to the living-experience we are analyzing.

That brings us to the description of time-consciousness. Except for Husserl’s brief discussion of suspension of objective time at the beginning of the Vorlesungen, so far we have not encountered any other instances of explicit or implicit performance of reduction. We will have the chance for such a discussion in what follows, especially when we will be discussing the role of protention within our perceptual field.\textsuperscript{93} For the moment it suffices to mention that Husserl had not undertaken a separate extensive analysis of this issue, even though he seems to have always been

\textsuperscript{89} “Nicht liegt das neue Feld so ausgebreitet vor unserem Blicke mit Füllen abgehobener Gegebenheiten, dass wir einfach zugreifen und der Möglichkeit sicher sein könnten, sie zu Objekten einer Wissenschaft zu machen, geschweige denn sicher der Methode, nach der hierbei vorzugehen wäre.”

\textsuperscript{90} Lohmar (2002b), pp. 754, 761-764.

\textsuperscript{91} Fink (1988a), p. 55.

\textsuperscript{92} “Das Problem der Situation der phänomenologischen Analyse ist die transzendente Interpretation der Gegebenheit aller analytischen Bestände und Sachverhalte für den phänomenologisierenden Zuschauer.”

\textsuperscript{93} See below, §6.7.
aware of its necessity, what becomes quite obvious—as we will see—in his late manuscripts on temporality.

§2.2. The supra-temporal

But let us revisit the notion of “exclusion” in the Vorlesungen, i.e., Husserl’s exclusion of objective time. What is implied by it is that time-constitution is not regulated by any natural or psychological law. A careful carrying out of the kind of reduction that Husserl puts to use at this point requires refraining from attributing any kind of objective reality to the living-experiences. The exclusion of objective time simply means that we exclude every transcendent interpretation and positing of the duration of a time-object and that we consider a perceived object purely as hyletic datum.\(^94\) Among the most common natural convictions about our perception of time that are excluded is the one presupposing the abstract transcendent simultaneity of our act and its temporal object:\(^95\) we commonly believe that an act and its object are ‘simultaneous’ with respect to a time encompassing both of them, so to speak, ‘from without,’ i.e., as a kind of container which precedes and regulates the temporal coexistence of acts and their objects. The only modality of temporal givenness that one is allowed, and in fact required, to be taken into account in this reductive step is “absolute givenness,” which essentially characterizes “appearing time” and “appearing duration.”\(^96\) As Husserl says, any attempt to question this absolute givenness would be a senseless gesture.\(^97\) Even though it still remains quite ambiguous what he means by the term “immanent time” at this point, it is quite clear that its subjective character is not excluded from our current level of phenomenological analysis; and the proof is its contradistinction to the explicit

\(^94\) Cf. Hua X, 24.

\(^95\) As Heidegger points out already in his 1924 lecture Der Begriff der Zeit, our common and scientific understanding of objective time is illustrated in the conception of the clock, through which time is represented as a linear succession of fixed “now-points” in ordered regularity. Cf. GA 64, p. 109f.

\(^96\) Hua X, 5.

\(^97\) Ibid.
exclusion of objective time. In 1917/18, however, Husserl undertakes the task of reaching a region in which everything subjective – in an ‘egoic’ sense – is expressly excluded:

“a) We now want to exercise in full awareness a kind of reduction, one that we have already exercised but without having clearly defined it: the reduction to ‘primordial sensuality’ (‘ursprüngliche Sensualität’) […] The reduction that we mean and which provides us with an a priori necessary structure is the abstraction from an Ego and from everything egoic – [it is] surely a mere abstraction, nevertheless an important one.” (Hua XXXIII, 275).

It is rather clear that we are dealing here with a more radical kind of reduction. We have to see what this reduction is meant to accomplish. By performing this reduction to my stream of consciousness, I am initially reduced to my stream of living-experiences. In that sense, I observe everything that is given to me in an immanently real (reell) manner. I encounter my living-present which exhibits the structure of

98 It is also unclear what one should understand here by the term “subjective,” since Husserl hadn’t yet developed his theory of transcendental reduction as we know it from Ideen I, in fact not even in its primitive form as it was publicly introduced in Die Idee der Phänomenologie, i.e., the lectures he gave in Göttingen between 26th April and 2nd May 1907. Given this feature of that pivotal transitory period, one can understand here “subjective immanent time” both as a kind of phenomenological-psychological immanent time and the immanent time pertaining to consciousness as a streaming field of constitutive accomplishments. A first level of ambiguity becomes obvious once we pose the question: is this immanent time already a constitutive product, bearing thus its own temporal form? Husserl will try to elucidate this point, especially in his later time-analyses.

99 Husserl’s early time-analyses do not exhibit such an ‘egological’ character. Subjectivity is considered in its formal synthetic unity. It is noteworthy the fact that Bernauer Manuskripte do not seem to offer a clear and definite view of Husserl’s conception of ‘egoic temporality.’ Only in C-Manuskripte can one find more elaborate descriptions of it. However, in those late manuscripts, the absence of deeper formal analyses on temporality that Husserl undertook in his earlier researches is rather striking.

100 “a) Wir wollen nun voll bewusst eine Art Reduktion üben, die wir schon bisher, aber ohne deutliche Bezeichnung geübt haben: die Reduktion auf die ‘ursprüngliche Sensualität’. […] Die Reduktion, die wir meinen und die uns eine apriorisch notwendige Struktur ergibt, ist die Abstraktion von einem Ich und allem Ichlichem – freilich eine bloße Abstraktion, aber eine wichtige.”

For another example, where Husserl seems to be using a broader notion of transcendental subjectivity cf. Hua XXXIII, 184: “Nennt man die phänomenologische Zeit und ihrer Gegenständlichkeiten transzendental-subjektive gegenüber der Naturzeit als ‘objektiver’, so liegt hinter der Subjektivität dieser Zeitsphäre eine weitere transzendental-subjektive Sphäre, die Sphäre von ‘Erlebnissen’ (ebenfalls neuer Stufe und neuen Sinnes), in denen sich diese Zeitlichkeit konstituiert, Erlebnisse, die, wird man also zunächst sagen, zeitliche Gegenstände mit ihrer Zeitform darstellen, zur Erscheinung bringen (Erscheinungen ebenfalls transzendental tieferer Stufe), aber nicht selbst zeitliche sind, weder objektiv-zeitliche noch zeitliche als Vorkommnis jener transzendentalen Zeit erster Stufe.”
primal present and its surrounding horizons of just-past and immediate-future. Following the letter of the kind of reduction Husserl now performs, we abstract from the ego and we expose –“abstractly”– the primal structure of the passivity of primordial sensibility. Even though he emphatically insists that this reduction is merely an abstraction and that the egoic living-experiences should not be regarded as something fundamentally distinct from the same living-experiences when they are examined as being egoless, he nevertheless recognizes that such an abstract view is necessary for achieving a complete view of certain spheres of living-experiences.  

By following this reductive route, on our way to the level of the flow of our primary experiential life, we come across a certain eidetic element this radical reduction leaves out of investigation. This essential element is the Ego-pole, which may here be defined as primal Ego-pole. In Husserl’s words:

“What we, most of all, do not have in the stream of living-experiences is the ego itself, the identical centre or the pole to which the total content of the stream of living-experiences is related; the ego which becomes affected by this or that content and which is subsequently related to this content in different modes of active comportment and actively shapes this content in various ways.” (Hua XXXIII, 277).

This Ego-pole is, so Husserl, supratemporal (“über”-zeitlich). It is always “numerically one,” the “Urstand,” the nameless “functioning” counterpart of every being and objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit). It is always there due to an essential necessity regulating our constituting primal experiential life. In that sense, it can also be characterized as “all-temporal”: it always appears as the same ego at every random temporal position. But can this ego’s supratemporality and ‘sameness’ be ‘led back’ to the primal experiential streaming? Does this kind of temporality have its source

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101 Cf. Hua XXXIII, 276.

102 “Was wir vor allem nicht im Erlebnisstrom haben, ist das Ich selbst, das identische Zentrum, der Pol, auf den der gesamte Gehalt des Erlebnisstroms bezogen ist, das Ich, das von dem oder jenem Gehalt affiziert wird, und das daraufhin sich tätig zu diesem Gehalt so und so verhält und ihn aktiv so und so gestaltet.”

103 Hua XXXIII, 277f.

104 What is at stake here is the delicate issue of describing the process of identification of the Ego. Temporal syntheses of coincidence are responsible for the unity of our consciousness. However, this does not enable us to speak about an Ego, since the latter exhibits a kind of ‘stability’ throughout the
in the flow of consciousness? In order to reply to this question –to be sure, negatively– Husserl tests the hypothesis of an ego that is constituted as an individual hyletic datum, by examining its paradigmatic form of reflection: the ego of an act appears as an object for the reflecting ego and the latter, in its turn, becomes an object for a higher order reflecting ego and so on.\textsuperscript{105} He briefly concludes that reflection encounters a temporal stretch of affection exercised to the ego, an affection which precedes the active turning-toward. The ego is necessarily always there, belonging to the primal streaming as the unitary primal-Ego (Ur-Ich).\textsuperscript{106} Its temporal modality is, as we saw, supratemporality.

Husserl has used a similar characterization for describing Ego’s temporality in a text from 1909. There he says quite clearly:

“In relation to all living-experiences of the relative Now –the primordial ones or the ones that are modified in the mode of memory– to every Now belongs a phase of the Ego, as an Ego that carries-out, turns-toward, acts or as such that could turn-toward: therefore, as field of the Ego, a phenomenological field of duration, in which the Ego is all-present.” (\textit{Hua} XIII, 53).\textsuperscript{107}

Even though “all-presence” may be quite unhesitatingly interpreted as “supratemporality,” here an additional feature is explicitly brought to our attention, namely, the ego’s active-intentional correlation to an object-pole, i.e., its role as a correlative

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\textit{Das ego selbst ist für sich selbst seiendes in kontinuierlicher Evidenz, also sich in sich selbst als seien, kontinuierlich konstituierendes […] Das ego erfasst sich nicht bloß als strömendes Leben, sonder als Ich, der ich dies und jenes erlebe, dies und jenes cogito als derselbe durchlebe.” (\textit{Hua} I, 100).}
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This is the reason why Husserl attempts to determine how the Ego appears through our experiential flow by means of a reflective turning of regard toward it. On this issue, cf. Cavallaro (2016).

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Hua} XXXIII, 284.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Hua} XXXIII, 286.

\textsuperscript{107} “Zu jedem Jetzt gehört in Bezug auf alle Erlebnisse des betreffenden Jetzt, des ursprünglichen oder erinnerungsmässig modifizierten, eine Phase des Ich, als vollziehendes, sich zuwendendes, tätiges Ich oder als solches, das sich zuwenden könnte. Also als Feld des Ich, ein phänomenologisches Dauerfeld, in dem das Ich allgemeinwahr ist.”
subject-pole.\textsuperscript{108} Notwithstanding Husserl’s tendency to use, even in texts written during his Bernau stay (1917-1918), characterizations stemming from his conception of “pure ego,” as it is found in his Ideas I, it is obvious that this “active” feature does not belong to the level we are currently referring to. The kind of correlation we are dealing with can only be characterized as that which pertains to the primal affection exercised in and through the primary flow.\textsuperscript{109} This seems to imply that we reject in advance the possibility that egoic elements (to be more precise, \textit{pre-egoic} elements) be essential components of the primal temporalizing process and thus of the interrelation between hyletic flow and consciousness’s primordial synthetic function.\textsuperscript{110} However, from a genetic point of view, one can discern a peculiar “blind” ego-centre even in this deepest level of primal temporalization, i.e., a pre-ego (\textit{Vor-Ich}), essentially distinguished from primal ego (\textit{Ur-Ich}), a term used by Husserl to denote the primal functioning ego as ground of all validity.\textsuperscript{111} Thus, primal affection may be examined through its relation to this pre-egoic centre. Whether such an inquiry can actually prove fruitful or not is, of course, something that remains to be decided by the course of our research. When we will discuss the content-aspect of our protentional consciousness, we will see that this possibility opens up a new field of inquiry.

An inquiry into the reductive moments involved in Husserl’s description of time-consciousness will prove to have important benefits for our research. For our intention is to phenomenologically identify the experiential ground on the basis of which one can properly describe \textit{protention}, i.e., that part of the overall temporal structure of


\textsuperscript{110} Hyletic flow, as already clearly noted above, is not a state of a raw material which can exist on its own, without the primal synthetic function of the living-present. There is no hyletic flow “prior” to its encounter with temporal constitutive synthesis. Cf. Rodemeyer (2003), p. 140. This does not mean, however, that we cannot perform an abstractive reduction to it.

\textsuperscript{111} Cf. Lee (1993), p. 214f. Lee distinguishes between \textit{Vor-Ich} and \textit{Ur-Ich} in terms of the distinction between “origin of genesis” and “origin of validity,” correspondingly. In his analysis he includes certain \textit{pre-egoic} elements (such as primal instincts, primal kinesthesia and primal affectivity) among the components of the primal temporalizing flow. We will partly follow this line of thought in the last part of this study.
consciousness which is directed toward its immediate future experiential life. To our dismay, Husserl has never taken up a similar task, a fact that to some extent explains the divergent and sometimes conflicting interpretations of protention in the Husserlian literature. For that same reason, it is almost inevitable that our analysis, though we mean to remain faithful to Husserl’s thought as far as possible, will have to go beyond Husserl’s explicit descriptions.

**Part 2**

*Phenomenological analysis of retentional consciousness*

§3. Retention or primary memory

Tackling with the issue of the perception of temporal objects entails explaining how temporal duration is constituted. After having discussed and criticized the most important views of his contemporaries and predecessors, Husserl gives his own account of how it is possible for “running off phenomena” (*Ablaufsphänomene*) to appear as phenomena exhibiting their own type of continuity. His major contribution to this issue is the exploration of the status of “primary memory” or “fresh memory,” later brought under the rubric of “retention” once its primary constitutive function was revealed more clearly. What retention or primary memory actually does is to bring about the primal past-character of a lived experience by modifying what was given originally in the mode of proto-impression. More specifically, primary memory is the consciousness of what has been just perceived as

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112 One has to be aware that this task implicitly includes a clarification of the necessity of carrying out the description of protentional consciousness on that specific experiential ground.

113 Even though the term “*Ablaufsphänomene*” does not appear until 1911, it denotes accurately the kind of phenomena that were at stake from the beginning of Husserl’s involvement with the problem of time-consciousness. Cf. *Hua X*, 364.
well as of the just-having-perceived; it attaches itself to perception in a continuous manner.\textsuperscript{114}

Defining in this way primary memory requires describing the mode of consciousness which allows me to afford \textit{present awareness} of a temporally extended object. A close look at my experience of the latter shows that such awareness presupposes that my consciousness “stretches” itself in order to preserve the just-past moments of that object.\textsuperscript{115} The latter is still present to consciousness in the mode of “just-past,” a “still-being-present” of the “just-past” emphatically distinguished from representation. What is given in primary memory as past is given directly, i.e. “perceptually,” and not through representation.\textsuperscript{116} Referring to ‘primary memory’ as a “perceptual” mode of being conscious of the just-past is meant to point out that it should not be considered a reproductive act, since it is essentially interrelated with my immediate experience and ‘shares’ its \textit{originality}.\textsuperscript{117} In fact, retention should not be considered an “act” at all, if one wishes to avoid the unwanted consequence of an infinite regress that would haunt any attempt to find this act’s ultimate constitutive source.\textsuperscript{118} Husserl will attribute this reproductive character to what he calls “secondary memory” or “recollection.” It is not hard to notice that this is Husserl’s way of distancing himself from Brentano’s account of “original association” we discussed earlier.\textsuperscript{119}

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\textsuperscript{115} This fact signals Husserl’s position with respect to the theoretical dilemma of understanding perception of the present either as \textit{momentary} or as \textit{extended}.
\textsuperscript{116} Kortooms (2002), p. 64.
\textsuperscript{119} See above, §1.4.
\end{flushright}
We should pay closer attention to primary memory’s originarity and to its distinction from perception as “presentification” \((\text{Gegenwärtigung})\).\(^{120}\) Husserl distinguishes between two ways of speaking about what is perceived, depending on the direction of our intentional act. On the one hand, perception is considered as just the momentary-now of consciousness in which the objective momentary-now is given “in person,” while, on the other hand, we still speak of a perception with regard to objects whose temporal extension exceeds this narrow now-point.\(^{121}\) Likewise, we refer, in a strict sense, to the perception of a now-given tone but also, in a wider sense, to the perception of a whole melody. In the first case, what has just passed is grasped as “not [actively] perceived.”\(^{122}\) In the second case, perception of a melody is possible to the extent that the previous tones are somehow maintained in consciousness. This ambiguity or relativity of perception rests clearly on two possible directions regulating the scope of our focus. As Kortooms points out:

“The criterion for determining whether a perception takes place is the nexus of apprehension of the object on which the intentional act of meaning is focused. The perception of an object lasts as long as something that falls within this nexus of apprehension is given as present now to consciousness.”\(^{123}\)

Phenomenologically speaking, determining those possible directions is a matter of orienting our gaze toward the relevant living nexus of apprehensions \((\text{Auffassungszusammenhang})\).\(^{124}\) This intentional act of meaning is dependent on the actual continuum of apprehensions. Husserl applies an analogous pattern to the description of the temporal structure of the perception of a single tone, i.e., a temporal

\(^{120}\) \textit{Hua X}, 38-40.

\(^{121}\) Cf. \textit{Hua X}, 417: “Wahrnehmung als derjenige Akt, in dem sich originär das Jetzt konstituiert, und Wahrnehmung als Akt, in dem sich ein individuell Gegenständliches überhaupt originär konstituiert, das ist wohl zu unterscheiden.”

\(^{122}\) \textit{Hua X}, 38.


\(^{124}\) \textit{Hua X}, 39. It is clear that our active intentional “pointing to” cannot exhaust the horizon of these possible directions. It may indeed be the case that “the scope of this nexus is determined by something that lies outside time-consciousness” (Kortooms (2002), p. 66). The extra-temporal factor responsible for the delimitation of the nexus is what Husserl calls “temporal matter” \((\text{Zeitmaterie})\) (Cf. \textit{Hua X}, 63).
object whose extension falls within the scope of the original temporal field. He specifies the experiential ground pertaining to perception as “impressional”:

“An object is perceived (i.e., is impressionally conscious), as long as it is still produced in constantly newly appearing proto-impressions.” (Hua X, 39)125

Once temporally stretched objects are at issue, Husserl distinguishes between two modes of primary memory: a) primary memory as contributing to perception and b) primary memory attaching itself to perception once perception has run its course, namely, “bloße Erinnerung,” or “mere primary memory.”126 The former mode unfolds along a continuum of increase (Steigerungskontinuum) of fullness that bears an ideal limit, i.e., the apprehension of the now (Jetzauffassung). The latter, on the contrary, is essentially characterized by the lack of such an ideal limit, in the sense that there is no nexus of apprehensions inherently linking the apprehension of the now with the apprehension of the just-past, even though a continuum of apprehensions somehow culminating in an apprehension of the now is always at work.127 It should be clarified, at any rate, that speaking of a single primary memory or retention is a mere abstraction. What we experience as primary memory, in both cases, is only possible as a continuous experience and not as a single retention.

The juxtaposition of “primary memory” to “secondary memory” (sekundäre Erinnerung) or “recollection” (Wiedererinnerung) will serve as further support for the phenomenological clarification of its originarity and non-reproductivity. Husserl realizes that a different intentional function is necessary in order to ensure the intuitive access to a past no longer belonging to the intuitive range of the living present. As mentioned, it is “recollection” or “secondary memory.” A careful comparison between recollection and perception proves itself useful in delimiting the essential features of the former. Both acts are temporally oriented on the basis of proto-impression surrounded by retention and protention. Thus, in both cases proto-impression is intertwined with the corresponding retentional modifications. What

125 “[E]in zeitobjekt ist wahrgenommen (bzw. impressional bewusst), solange es noch in stetig neu auftretenden Urimpressionen sich erzeugt.”


127 Ibid.
differs is that while in one case we speak of perception of a temporal object, for instance a melody, in the other case we have a quasi-perception of the melody. The present that is given to consciousness through recollection is a non-originally given present, a re-presentified present. However, the act of recollection is itself given originally in the present of its performance, i.e., it exhibits a continuity of proto-impressions and retentions.

Recollection can be carried out in many ways. On the one hand, I can access instantly a memory, limiting my recollection to a privileged phase, without reproducing the temporal object in its totality. On the other hand, I am also in a position to reproduce the latter in its totality going through a continuity of re-presentifications, modifying accordingly the whole perceptual process in which the object was given to me originally. This modifying re-presentification encompasses the continuity of what was originally given as retentional along the perceptual process. The reproduced temporal object also exhibits a unitary duration. As obvious, the modification pertaining to the re-presentifying mode of recollection differs radically from the modification effected by retention.\(^\text{128}\) The latter modification is carried out in a continuous manner, while in the former we cannot trace a continuous transition from the originally given consciousness to the reproduced one. The “now” of proto-impression is not led necessarily to a reproduced “now,” while it is necessarily modified and preserved as a retained “now.”

Our ability to carry out recollection in many ways stems from the essential character of “freedom,” peculiar to all re-presentifying acts.\(^\text{129}\) Certain dimensions of re-presentifying acts depart from the passivity of time-constitution. Such dimensions are, for instance, the choice of the object to be reproduced, the speed in which we run through the reproduced experience, its mode and evidence.\(^\text{130}\) As Husserl says:

\begin{quote}
“Re-presentifying, on the other hand, is something free, a free running through: we can carry out the re-presentification ‘more quickly’ or ‘more slowly,’ more distinctly and
\end{quote}

\(^{128}\) Hua X, 46f.

\(^{129}\) Hua X, 47f.

\(^{130}\) Hua X, 48ff.
explicitly or more confusedly, in a single lightning-like stroke or in articulated steps, and so on.” *(Hua X, 48; Brough’s translation, slightly modified).*

Re-presentification is carried out in a temporal manner through the time-constitutive synthesis of transition. Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from including longer or shorter parts of the reproduced experience in the temporal extension of the re-presentification qua act.

A re-presentified duration is always reproduced in the temporal context in which it was originally given. Thus, recollection exhibits a double-intentional structure. On the one hand, it intends the reproduced duration, while, on the other hand, it intends its temporal position. Apart from its peculiar type of freedom and its double-intentional structure, recollection exhibits its own kind of evidence. It presents its object with a sort of evidence that is proper to the re-presentifying living-experience, regardless of the evidence in which it was initially presented.

Returning to primary memory, we must now concentrate on a point that is crucial for the development of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness. As it is quite clear from the above, Husserl elaborated the problem of defining primary memory’s role using the apprehension/content model. Based on this model, we can see that apprehension’s objectifying function within retention is two-fold. On the one hand, it interprets the retained material with respect to its qualitative content as aspects of the same temporal object. The tone is retained as qualitatively the same tone throughout its retentional receding into the past. On the other hand, apprehension interprets this same material in its role as *temporal representatives of temporal positions* (*Zeitstellenrepräsentanten*) or as *fadings* of the former. These representatives should be seen as an intuitive kind of givenness of temporal position, one that is experienced as fading. Apprehension in the second sense establishes a temporal position’s individuality in a system of temporal positions fixed by the continuity of

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131 “Dagegen das Vergegenwärtigen ist etwas Freies, es ist ein freies Durchlaufen, wir können die Vergegenwärtigung ‘schneller’ oder ‘langsamer’, deutlicher und expliziter oder verworrenen, blitzschnell in einem Zuge oder in artikulierten Schritten usw. vollziehen.”

132 *Hua X*, 66.

this apprehension. This temporal position is, in its turn, maintained in the flow of modifications, and interpreted as receding into the past (Zurücksschiebung) through another kind of apprehension that belongs to the retentional modification.\textsuperscript{134} We need not engage ourselves with more details on this matter here. Below we will have the chance to refer more extensively to the apprehension/content model by discussing the theoretical side-effects of its application to this deeper level of constitution.

\textit{§3.1. The development of time-diagrams: retentional consciousness}

Discussing Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness involves tackling with his time-diagrams.\textsuperscript{135} Regardless of the (appealing or repellent) impression that they make to a reader unacquainted with his time-analyses, one should not underestimate their significance for the realization of his theoretical project. His continuous struggle with those quasi-geometrical formalizations of time-constitution is not a mere temperamental peculiarity, remnant of his mathematical point of departure or a stylistic attachment to his laborious analyses. The experience of a close-reading inquiry points out a certain surprising feature of our otherwise familiar “a-historical” Husserl. What he was actually doing with those time-diagrams may well be characterized as a schematic historiography of his own understanding of this riddle; one must take into account that this recording was actually possible through a recording of a certain practice: i.e., of the \textit{formalization} of time-constitution. But to what extent does such a practice interest us in the context of our inquiry? Should we take the fact that those diagrams reflect Husserl’s progress on this matter at face value? Or rather should we see in them a more complex process within phenomenologizing itself? This is, of course, not the place for such a discussion. The sole point we should highlight with regard to this issue is that the practice of formalization itself may indeed have affected Husserl’s inquiry, by “revealing” certain primal phenomena.

\textsuperscript{134} Cf. Mensch (2010a), p. 78f, where he straightforwardly equates the interpretation of temporal representatives of temporal positions with the interpretation responsible for the appearance of this receding into the past (Zurücksschiebung).

\textsuperscript{135} This chapter is based mainly on Alexander Schnell’s comprehensive analysis in: Schnell (2002).
That being said, one should bear in mind that the development and reworking of the time-diagrams goes hand in hand with the reevaluation of our protentional consciousness. Therefore, the discussion about the kind of changes that were imported to Husserl’s initial time-diagrams can be finalized only once we reach a further stage of our inquiry and become more familiarized with the phenomenon of protention.

For the sake of the analysis, we must note that Husserl came to doubt the applicability of the model of act-intentionality to his time-analysis, a fact to which we have already briefly alluded. Apart from that, Husserl is also led to doubt the non-temporal character both of the intentional act and of its object. As we will see below, both of these moments of doubt are expressed in his time-diagrams.

Husserl’s first attempt in 1904 to illustrate the temporal change, i.e., the ‘sinking back’ into the past, before reaching a clear understanding of retentional consciousness as such, is a simple depiction involving a certain content “a” along with its relevant temporal moment “t.” The latter belongs to the former “in an indescribable manner.”136 The illustration goes as follows:137

\[ a, (a_t1), ((a_t1)_2), \ldots \]

As it can be easily noticed, this illustration as well as the similar ones that stem from the reworking of this schema, suffers from several weaknesses that are discernible from the perspective of Husserl’s later analysis. Thus, for example, here one is not able to trace the continuity of the modifications of “a” along with its temporal moments. Furthermore, it is impossible to discern the inclusion of the previous modifications in each newly appearing temporal moment, something that is also true of the future, i.e., the subsequent modifications of the previous modifications. Finally, this would possibly lead to a regressus ad infinitum, due to the fact that we would not be able to be aware of the lived-through content in its constant sliding back, since we would always face a new one.138 Nevertheless, this latter

136 Hua X, 207.
137 Hua X, 208.
drawback is easily avoided by pointing out the difference between the time stretches pertaining to the modification of the same content:\footnote{Hua X, 209.}

\[(a_{0-\tau})_{\tau'-1} = a_{0-1} \text{ (where } t_0 < t' < t_1)\]

Temporal modification of the same content occurs through these time-stretches.

The first diagram, in the proper sense of the word, can be found in Text Nr. 31 from \textit{Hua X}. It was sketched in February 1905 and belongs to the Lectures’ draft. What this version accomplishes is a first depiction of the connection between an apprehension and its temporal moment:\footnote{Hua X, 230.}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\end{center}

\textbf{Figure 1}

We have to be cautious about what we take each part of the diagram to symbolize and keep in mind that Husserl has not yet reached a clear account of retentional consciousness. According to his words, in this first diagram, the XX\’ axis depicts the objective time-line.\footnote{Hua X, 230.} This is something that will change in his later manuscripts. The vertical axis depicts the sinking into the (similarly objective) past, while the slant lines illustrate the contents of the originary temporal field. One of the main problems of this diagram, which is due to its ‘static’ origin and becomes discernible retrospectively from the point of view of Husserl’s later reworkings of time-diagrams,
is that the contents of the originary temporal field seem to be simultaneous.\textsuperscript{142} Given this peculiar simultaneity, there seems to be no temporal difference with respect to the content when A is located in B and when A is located in C. It is the same A pointing to A\textsubscript{B} and to A\textsubscript{C}.\textsuperscript{143} This conception differs significantly from retentional consciousness since, as we will see, the latter involves a mediation of this reference from the dynamic of the originary temporal field. For the time being, we are simply dealing with a formal correlation between the horizontal and the vertical axis and a kind of dependence of the latter on the former. In these terms, an objective moment is simply carried over from the XX' line of objective temporality to the axis of sinking-into-the-past. This is a clear sign of the fact that what Husserl will come to call “retention” is not discovered yet. Retention’s discovery and development is accompanied by more elaborate time-diagrams that account for the various retentional functions. Naturally, one should not expect that Husserl reached a complete diagram of retentional consciousness straight away. Here is a first version of it from 1909:\textsuperscript{144}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{diagram.png}
\caption{Figure 2}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{142} Husserl says: “Alle Punkte sind darin natürlich simultan” (\textit{Hua X}, 230). “Darin” refers to the originary temporal field.


\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Hua X}, 331.
And then two other similar versions:¹⁴⁵

![Figure 3](image1)

![Figure 4](image2)

(Reversing the diagram of Figure 3 in order to depict the ‘sinking down’ of the past, according to a marginal note of Husserl)¹⁴⁶

It becomes obvious that a certain rotation of the axes takes place. However, this signifies more than a mere change in the mode of graphic illustration. The abandonment of the isosceles triangle in his depiction signals the overcoming of the dependence of the vertical axis from the horizontal objective time-line. What is now in the centre of Husserl’s attention is retentional consciousness as such and not the “originary temporal field.”¹⁴⁷ Taking into account Husserl’s clarifications about the status of each “primary memory,” depicted by the points of the vertical lines, along with the additional remark that each axis expresses a memory-continuum, we come to realize the extent to which Husserl acknowledges the peculiarities of retentional consciousness. First and foremost, each primary memory (for instance the memory of t₀ at t₂) contains all the primary memories that mediate between the present moment and the primarily remembered moment (i.e., between t₂ and t₀). Apart from that, we cannot fail to notice that even though the intended point (e.g. t₀) remains the same throughout the running-off process, its mode of givenness undergoes the same

¹⁴⁵ *Hua X*, 330.

¹⁴⁶ *Hua X*, 331.

modifications that each actual now also does. At this point one should consider Ricoeur’s criticism according to which each vertical line in those last diagrams seems to be restricted to representing only a single aspect of the identification between the actual now situated on the horizontal axis and the series of its retentional modifications. The singularity of this aspect stems from what he describes as the diagram’s failure “to picture the identity of what is far away and what lies deep.” His point, following from this diagnosis, is that any graphic depiction of this complex phenomenon is essentially impossible. Seen from Ricoeur’s scope, the diagram fails to illustrate each single retention (in a series of retentions) attached to each single now that has lapsed between the current actual now and the first actual now of the process. Since the vertical line cannot picture the intertwinement between source-points along their retentional modification—it only depicts the retentional implication between retentions of retentions and not their identification with the correlative source-points—the same can be said of the retentions that are originally attached to those source points. However, this reading tends to neglect the significance of the diagonal lines. Not only do they illustrate the continuity of the retentional sinking-down of a proto-impression; they also reveal the identity between what is retained and what was actual now. How this happens will become clear once we will examine this identity in light of Husserl’s later analysis of protention, an analysis that will lead us away from considering the horizontal line as consisting in source-points and will reveal its functional structure in the process of fulfillment and de-fulfillment.

Should we conclude, following Ricoeur, that retention is inherently non-illustrable? Anticipating the analysis of protention, we mean to respond in the

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148 Ibid., p. 98. Husserl elsewhere speaks of two primary modifying processes: the one that turns proto-impression into retention and another one that modifies retention into a retention of retention. Cf. Hua Mat. VIII, 80-81. See below in §3.2.

149 Ricoeur (1990), p. 29.

150 See below, §4.2.1.

151 Schnell (2002), p. 119, endnote 27. This criticism is formulated by Ricoeur in his Time and Narrative. Cf. Ricoeur (1990), p. 29. Ricoeur goes so far as to suggest that we “should perhaps quickly
negative. Let us note here that such illustration is possible on the basis of the essential interweaving between retentions and protentions: only then will we be able to understand the merging of a retentional modification to the continuum of retentional modifications and thus attain a ‘genetic’ account of a single now-point. Protention’s reappraisal in the Bernauer Manuskripte will show, so we think, as much.

§3.2. Double intentionality of retention and the constitution of the flow of consciousness

Husserl’s elaboration of his own time-diagrams bears witness to his gradual acknowledgment of some fundamental issues that he will have to deal with. One of the core issues he addresses in the description of retentional consciousness is its peculiar double-intentionality. In Hua X §39, written in 1911, Husserl deals with the issue of retention’s double intentionality in close connection with the problem of the constitution of the unity of the ultimate constituting flow of consciousness. He formulates the problem under discussion as follows; if a finite flow (pertaining to an enduring process or object) has flowed away, I can always turn back to it; so it seems that it forms a unity in memory (Erinnerung). It is not only the unity of the enduring tone that is constituted in consciousness, but also the unity of the consciousness (or the flow of consciousness) correlating to this (objective) unity of duration. In that sense, the unity of the consciousness that is constituted is the unity of the correlative consciousness-of.\footnote{This becomes clearer in Appendix VIII, where Husserl takes up the longitudinal direction of inquiry by referring to primal-living-experience (Urerlebnis) consisting in its content and “intentional” form. Cf. Hua X, 116. This is particularly clear where he says: “Diese [sc. die Akte des inneren Bewusstseins] sind selbst also intentionale Erlebnisse, ihr Gegenstand sind die Zeitpunkte und Zeitdauern mit ihrer jeweiligen gegenständlichen Fülle.” (Hua X, 117)} Then Husserl poses the crucial question: shouldn’t we claim that this unity in its turn is constituted in an analogous fashion, being itself a constituted temporal order?
Husserl’s reply to this question is rather clear: the immanent temporal unity of the tone (as enduring temporal object) and the unity of the (corresponding) flow of consciousness are constituted at the same time (zugleich) in the same unitary flow of consciousness –the latter constitutes its own unity. Husserl claims that this can be understood if we take into account the stream’s essential constitution and the “look’s” possible directions. Our look can be directed “through” the different phases of the flow—as intentionalities intending the tone– towards the ‘content’ of the constituted unity. This amounts to a transversal look and the ‘content’ is the extended temporal “matter,” to which he had referred earlier. 153 It defines the extent of the synthesis of coincidence occurring among the phases qua partial intentions aiming at the content. 154 But our investigation may follow another course: by restricting our view to the flow of the consciousness that is conscious–of a tone, we are able to focus “on” that flow itself, “on” the correlative stretch of that flow.

Those two possible courses of investigation depend on the essential intentional structure of retention. The latter exhibits a peculiar double intentionality. There is little doubt that this discovery was enabled by his earlier analysis of recollection and the discovery of its double intentionality. 155 There is clearly a significant difference between those two kinds of double intentionality. In the case of recollection, what is intended is, on the one hand, the already hyletically fulfilled duration and, on the other hand, its positioning in a temporal context. 156 When we now turn to retention, we cannot fail to notice that its double intentional role is a necessary precondition for

153 Cf. Hua X, 39. The relevant text was among the texts comprising the main corpus of the 1905 Lectures. More specifically Husserl refers to this ‘matter’ as ‘time-matter’ (Zeitmaterie). For instance, cf. Hua X, 63.

154 “Matter” is one of the intentional components of an act. Husserl analyzes its role in the Fifth Logical Investigation. Cf. Hua XIX, 429-430. Husserl refers to time-matter as that which determines the object with respect to its extra-temporal determinations (Hua X, 63) or its material determinations (Hua X, 221).


156 Intending a duration’s position within a temporal context implies an intention of my whole past conscious life. As DeWarren mentions: “In intending the memorial object, consciousness intends itself as past in an implicit manner. This reproductive modification of consciousness is not a thematic object of consciousness; on the contrary, my past consciousness is reproduced as a lived experience, and thus does not appear as an object.” DeWarren (2009), p. 168.
recollec
tion itself. First of all, the fact that it is described as intentionality means that retention exhibits an “of”-structure. What serves as the “object” of retention’s “of”-structure, i.e., that of which it is a retention, is a constitutive component of the higher order constitutive accomplishments of the act of recollection. In particular, what is presupposed for the act of recollection is not only the fact that the unity of the reproduced duration must already be primordially constituted in order for it to be reproducible. It is further necessary that I be already originally self-conscious in order for me to be able to reproduce myself (my flow of consciousness) in the mode of recollection as having originally perceived that duration or enduring object.

We can see now that retention, on the one hand, intends the immanent object and contributes to its constitution. Husserl emphasizes the fact that it is to this intentionality he had been referring earlier using the term “primary memory” of the just-past sensed tone, a term which indicates the mode of intending the just-past tone. On the other hand, retention is constitutive of the unity of this primary memory in its flow. In that sense, retention is both retention of the previous retention and retention of the continuously past retentional phases, i.e., of the past phases of consciousness itself. Husserl names the latter intentionality by using the term “longitudinal intentionality” (Längsintentionalität). In contradistinction to that, he calls the former one “transversal intentionality” (Querintentionlität). As it is obvious, “longitudinal intentionality” undergoes a synthetic process by means of which it coincides with itself. The ‘moments’ of synthesis are no other than the retentinal links conjoining the “discrete” retentional layers, i.e., the relevant retained proto-impressions. Each new proto-impression introduces a new sequence of retentional modifications and this whole sequence is retained as such, undergoing itself further retentional modification with every new proto-impressional emergence. In that sense, retentional intentionality is directed toward the retentions of second,

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159 Hua X, 80.
160 Hua X, 81, 379.
161 Hua X, 82, 380.
third, fourth etc. degree. The continuity constituted by the longitudinal intending of retentions of retentions leads to the constitution of the flow’s unity. The latter has the form of a one-dimensional quasi-temporal order. The stream is oriented to the future, i.e., it flows toward ever new proto-impressional givenness. Each phase of it includes a unitary continuity of retentions in the mode of pre-being-at-the-same-time (im Vor-Zugleich).

If we pay attention to this mode of pre-being-at-the-same-time, from a methodological point of view, we notice that the prefix “pre-” denotes a deeper constitutive level and quasi-temporal relations regulating this pre-temporal continuity of the phases of consciousness. Retentions of retentions, the essential fabric of this continuity, may be modified into an objectified/constituted temporal succession, i.e., a properly temporal one, only through a reflective re-presentifying act.162 Nevertheless, this kind of modification should not be confused with the modification proper to retention. According to Husserl, there are two kinds of modification taking place within the retentional process: a) primal sensing is transformed into retention and b) retention is transformed into retention of retention etc. This double modification is not only significant in structural-functional terms. Without the first modification we would never be able to trace retention at all as phenomenon, i.e., to obtain a ‘narrow’ past perspective within our living-present as phenomenologizing self-observers, let alone to carry out its description on the experiential basis of the sensing of continuity. With respect to the second kind of modification (retention is transformed into further retention) one might argue that without it we would not be able to grasp retention’s unity, let alone its unifying function.163

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162 One may question whether this is the case. Within every re-presentifying act, retentions of retentions of the thematized flow of consciousness may be lived-through only by means of the living (actual) retentional continuity. The living retentions of the re-presentifying act restore the vividness of the thematized retentational intertwinement. The latter is experienced as a retentional continuum through a non-thematic living retentional continuum. However, re-living their retentational continuity can only occur along the already retained retentional interconnections, i.e., those that have already been lived-through originally and calling for a reproduction.

163 Unity of this kind should not be confused with a temporally constituted individuality. Cf. Hua X, 74-75.
We spoke earlier about the two possible courses of investigation. Husserl gives us a more explicit description of what it means to orient the investigation according to the double intentionality of retention. When I direct my attention, my living attention, to the tone, by living through the transversal intentionality, the tone is there as enduring, always expanding in its duration. Needless to say, transversal intentionality does not operate only in retention. Primal sensing is also grasped as a sensing-of the now pertaining to the tone. Living through the transversal intentionality of the primal sensing implies living through the constitution of the objective now. Nevertheless, since transversal intentionality aims at constituting the unity of objective duration, this is not enough. Apart from living attentively through primal sensing’s objectifying temporal intention, we have to direct our attention toward the series of the previous past now-points through primary memory, i.e., through the retentions of the primal sensings that were intending those past now-points of the tone. Even then we still cannot attain a clear view of the constitution of unity of duration, for the simple reason that, as already mentioned, the flow does not only modify proto-impressions by turning them into retentions. It also modifies the already given retentions that are continuously attached to each proto-impression and are retentionally modified. In the case of transversal intentionality, the continuity of modifications concerns the objective time-points and the unity that is thus constituted is the unity of the tone in its duration. On the other hand, I am always in a position to change my attitude and redirect my reflective look by following the longitudinal intentionality toward what is constituted in it. By doing so, I redirect my look from the tone toward the phases of primal sensing and retention as phases of consciousness itself. One sees that Husserl is now employing once again the term “pre-being-at-the-same-time,” but in this case in direct connection with the reflective attitude. It is the mode in which I grasp reflectively the retained sequence of past consciousness along with the at-each-time actual primal sensing.

Returning to the main issue of the constitutive operation of the double intentionality, we may conclude that transversal intentionality constitutes immanent time, an authentic time in which duration and change takes place. Longitudinal

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164 *Hua* X, 82, 380.
intentionality, on the other hand, constitutes what Husserl calls in this text “pre-
phenomenal” or “pre-immanent temporality,” i.e., the quasi-temporal ordering of the
phases of the flow. It is the form of the time-constituting consciousness. As it must
have already been clear, what is at stake with the latter intentionality is the flow’s
ability to appear to itself without depending on a “second” flow; it is the fundamental
level of consciousness’s self-appearing.

§3.3. Self-consciousness and retention’s double intentionality – the debate

This leads us to the important and widely discussed issue of self-consciousness.
Without getting into the details, we only intend to touch on it as far as the relevant
discussion is drawing on Husserl’s conception of double intentionality. The relevant
literature on this topic registers a quite prolific discussion between eminent Husserlian
scholars. We will try to follow this discussion and trace its main contours and stages,
with a view to clarifying what is at stake.

Dan Zahavi is one of the major contributors in this discussion and the one who
thematized it as such. His underlying concern is to promote a phenomenological
conception of pre-reflective self-awareness, i.e., of a mode of self-awareness that does
not depend on consciousness’s turning of its reflective regard to itself. In the course
of his investigation he takes up the task of refuting the idea that Husserl was “a
reflection theorist,” i.e., a proponent of the position that self-awareness is only
possible through a reflective self-objectifying act. However, this is the main
framework of his theory and we will not discuss it further. What is of specific interest
for us here is his explicit rejection of what he calls “internal object interpretation.”
According to this interpretation, Husserl’s account of time-consciousness involves a
distinction among three different levels of consciousness. It is a fact that §34 of Hua
X admits of such an interpretation. In the specific section we find out the tripartite

165 Hua X, 83, 381.
166 Zahavi challenged the common-held view on this issue in Zahavi (1999), p. 63ff. See especially, p. 70ff.
division of temporal constitution: a) the things of experience in objective time, b) the
immanent unities in the pre-empirical time, the constituting multiplicities of
appearance and c) the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness, which, in this
respect, would be considered as the constituting dimension that makes possible the
living-experiences that are situated on the second level to appear as constituted
immanent objects. This is exactly what Zahavi means to criticize, admitting that
Husserl himself had in various cases advocated this position (more extensively in his
Bernauer Manuskripte). However, Husserl himself had also defended, so Zahavi, a
different account which is systematically more convincing; this is what Zahavi names
“pre-reflective self-awareness.”

Even though there are occasions, and by that we mean particular living-
experiences, in which I am aware of my own experiences as immanent objects –such
a case is the prominent living-experience of reflection– the question is whether my
experiences, be it living-through phases as dependent parts of full-fledged enduring
intentional experiences or full-fledged experiences, are likewise given as objects in
inner time-consciousness prior to reflection.168 Being an object implies that this object
appears in a specific manner by transcending the manifold of appearances through
which it is experienced. In that sense, experiences may be rendered objects through a
reflective act. An enlightening example for supporting the view that those experiences
do not primarily appear as objects lies in our experience of every day dealings with
our surrounding world: we rarely dissociate ourselves from our actual living through
these experiences and when we do so we are immersing ourselves in the

168 Zahavi (2004), p. 103. Kortooms also refers to “objects” with regard to this level of deeper living-
experiencing, but he warns us that: “here, ‘object’ must be placed in quotation marks because we are
suggestion, since, as he rightly points out, appealing to a “marginal, non-grasped and non-objectified
‘object’” lacks “terminological rigor” as it involves a proper “category mistake,” that of transferring the
104f.
reflective mode of givenness.\textsuperscript{169} In the pre-reflective level of experience we are dealing with a single experience that does not appear as an object opposite to itself.

One of the major proponents of what Zahavi refers to as the “internal object interpretation” is John B. Brough. According to the former, it is the latter’s insistence in the tripartite structure of time-consciousness that raises the problem. However, Zahavi points out that Brough’s view has changed considerably, since the latter’s reconsidered view is that we should avoid talking in terms of internal objects.\textsuperscript{170} Living-experiencing (\textit{Erleben}) should not be considered an act aiming at an intentional object but rather an implicit and non-objectifying form of self-awareness. We already know that acts are reflectively given as distinct objects. What is at stake now is whether they are also given pre-reflectively as already distinct from one another or not. The metaphors of the flow and the wave are rather helpful in clarifying the way in which experienced acts are discrete.\textsuperscript{171} Even though acts, like waves, are not separate things, they do “enjoy a fleeting individuality.”\textsuperscript{172} In the same respect, the flow itself and the acts are inseparable from one another.

This inseparability, however, calls for clarification, because the relation between the stream of consciousness and the experiences is not identical to the relation between the experiencing and the experiences.\textsuperscript{173} According to the first relation, our conscious life is a continuous stream of living-experiencing which runs off in various partial living-experiences. The latter are dependent moments of the whole and in them something is experienced. This kind of relation, manifest in our experiential flow, should not be confused with the kind of living-experiencing denoted by the term “streaming living present.” The latter is not a “flow” in the sense of a temporal whole.

\textsuperscript{169} Zahavi (2004), p. 104.


\textsuperscript{171} Zahavi informs us that Husserl has employed this metaphor in Ms L I 15 2b. Zahavi (2011), p. 18. There Husserl says: “Bewußtsein ist eine Einheit. Ein Akt ist nichts für sich, er ist Welle im Bewußtseinsstrom.”

\textsuperscript{172} Zahavi (2011), p. 18.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., p. 20. Zahavi cites two passages, one from Hua XXIX, p. 194 and the other one from Hua XXXIV, p. 187, where Husserl pays explicit attention to this difference.
which obtains its individual existence in the unity of a temporal extension and exhibits distinguishable stretches and phases. It is a continuous streaming but not in the mode of being-mutually-outside-of-each-other, i.e., in the mode of a temporal extension of sequence. Clearly, the metaphor applies to our discussion only if we consider the flow as the experiencing of the absolute time-constituting stream.

Brough, in his turn, criticizes Zahavi’s interpretation.\textsuperscript{174} Brough ascribes to Zahavi the claim that:

“[…] my pre-reflective experiencing of acts as immanent temporal unities would occur through the acts themselves. Each act would be intrinsically self-aware, and the consciousness of acts as coexisting or succeeding one another would come about, not through a distinct absolute flow, but through acts being aware of other acts. No distinct absolute flow would be required.”\textsuperscript{175}

The drawbacks of this interpretive model are several. First of all, it would hardly make any sense to claim that, for example, in the case of simultaneity, an act of judging experiences my act of remembering as an event coexisting in time. Furthermore, this interpretation would entail that each act would appropriate the fundamental time-constituting structure, retaining thus both the past phases of itself and of the other act.\textsuperscript{176} A collapse of the two levels of inner time-consciousness would also imply that retention, proto-impression, and protention perform an objectifying function, participating to the act’s overall objectifying character.\textsuperscript{177} Finally, it would be extremely difficult to “understand how any one act or even several acts could account for the abiding awareness I have of my conscious life as an ongoing flow of successive and coexistent experiences.”\textsuperscript{178} All these weaknesses lead us to the conclusion that my non-objectifying experiencing of my living-experiences has its source on the level of the absolute flow and does not originate in the experienced acts themselves.

\textsuperscript{174} Brough (2010), pp. 41-43.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid., p. 41.

\textsuperscript{176} Overall, according to Brough, Zahavi is forced to attribute features of the absolute flow to the experienced flow of conscious experiences. Cf. Drummond (2006), p. 216.

\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., p. 42.

\textsuperscript{178} Brough (2010), p. 42.
To defend himself against these accusations, Zahavi introduces some clarifying remarks aiming to denounce the kind of misinterpretation that seems to haunt the reception of his position. He plainly states that he does not reject the tripartition we saw earlier and that what he endorses is that “Husserl’s investigation of the absolute flow of experiencing is an investigation of the pre-reflective self-manifestation of our experiences and not an analysis of some further, additional, self-appearance.”

Insisting on the latter does not lead to a denial of the distinction between experience and experiencing (*Erlebnis* and *Erleben*). The intentional structure of different experiences varies fundamentally, depending on the kind of experiences they are.

“But”, Zahavi rushes to add, “the very experiencing of the three [different] experiences does not have a different structure in each case. On the contrary, we are faced with the same basic structure of inner time-consciousness.” That is obviously his reply to Brough’s criticism concerning the different kinds of acts experiencing each other when they appear simultaneously and successively. Zahavi’s point lies in the simple statement that “we do need to distinguish the experience and its self-manifestation.” However, even though we must “distinguish the singularity of the *lebendige Gegenwart* from the plurality of changing experiences,” this distinction does not amount to a mutual independence, for this would lead us to assume the existence of an empty field in which concrete experiences subsequently enter.

Reconsidering the criticizing points formulated by Brough, Zahavi now seems to be in agreement with him concerning the issue of the pre-reflective awareness of experiences. Given that the former has expressed his reservations with respect to the term “internal objects,” Zahavi embraces their characterization as “discrete units.” This means that the first point of disagreement no longer bears any value, since they’ve reached a common ground of understanding. Nevertheless, another point remains unsolved. According to Zahavi, it would seem highly inappropriate to assume the existence of a distinct mode of self-appearance for the absolute flow. But it is exactly at this point that Zahavi accuses Brough of a certain wavering. What may be worrying Brough is the fact that the self-manifestation of an experience is not able to

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180 Zahavi uses the example of the following three different experiences: a visual perception of a bird, an anticipation of a forthcoming holiday, and a rejection of the claim that Earth is the largest planet in our solar system. Cf. Ibid.
account for the abiding awareness of our ongoing conscious life.\(^{181}\) From Zahavi’s point of view, a satisfactory reply should point to the common underlying structure of every living-experience. While he is repeating his previous point, Zahavi now brings to the foreground an essential feature of our living-experiences, which has been guiding his argumentation all along: namely, the first-personal character of experience.\(^{182}\) It is this intrinsic feature that is common in every experience and ensures the continuity of our self-awareness along each experience’s self-manifestation.\(^{183}\) This seems to be Zahavi’s last word on the topic, which draws on a remark initially made by Drummond.

Drummond’s analysis helps us gain a more impartial view of the source of the disagreement between Zahavi and Brough. As he puts it:

“Any resolution of the dispute between Brough and Zahavi would have to account for how we might have two ‘dimensions’ or a differentiation within consciousness while preserving a single, albeit perhaps complex, notion of self-awareness.”\(^{184}\)

According to him, the dispute would be solved on condition we accept a distinction between the absolute time-constituting form of consciousness and the concrete flow of subjective life itself. This means that Zahavi and Brough operate with two irreducible aspects of a single self-awareness. But let us see in more details how Drummond unties the knot.

Drummond suggests that we should interpret the difference between time-constituting flow and the immanent flow of experiences as a form-matter distinction.\(^{185}\) More specifically we should consider time-constituting flow as the form

\(^{181}\) Ibid., p. 22.

\(^{182}\) Cf. Zahavi (2004), pp. 103-104 and Zahavi (2008), p. 61, where he also uses the term “mineness” to designate the fact that first-personal experience qua first-person bears an implicit self-awareness.

\(^{183}\) In Husserl’s terms this means that egoic givenness is an essential component of a living-experience’s eidetic structure. We have already seen above how Husserl, in his Bernauer Manuskripte, described the reductive process whereby this element becomes phenomenologically discernible.


\(^{185}\) Ibid. One is inclined to be skeptical about the efficacy of this distinction. First of all, its generality does not help us understand the specifically phenomenological character of the relation between absolute constituting flow of consciousness and constituted flow of experiences. Furthermore, along with the admittedly false application of object-intentionality to the deepest constitutive level of our
in which our *concrete* experiential life (that is, this form along with the material which fills it) flows. That way, according to Drummond, we are able to avoid applying the model of object-intentionality in our discussion of the relation between absolute and immanent flows. But how should we think of that? He says that “absolute form of inner-time consciousness is simply a sheer intentional form comprising two different kinds of intentionality,” i.e., longitudinal and transversal intentionality. The former (Längsintentionalität) makes possible our intrinsic, non-thematic self-awareness, but cannot be thought of as functioning separately from the latter (Querintentionalität), even though it is the condition of the latter. Drummond describes the way this form becomes concretized by referring to affectivity. In that sense, the absolute flow is an openness to the world and to itself. By being affected it takes up new materials and thus becomes a concrete intending of objects. This “taking up” is pre-reflectively recognized as “a differentiation among temporal unities or experiences.”

Now what is important for our discussion is that in this peculiar intermediary process we discern a very important dimension of our pre-reflective self-awareness. Drummond considers the function of “taking up” materials as the experiencing of the immanent, temporalized flow. What accounts for the differentiation of the experiential life, we are also deprived of constitution in general. The fact that object-constitution does not provide us with an appropriate model for the description of this relation does not entail that we must dispense with constitutive process.

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186 Ibid., p. 217.
187 Ibid. As obvious from what he says at this point, Drummond seems to perform here an abstraction from the hyletic multiplicity that is involved in the primal temporal flow. His reference to affectivity signifies the transition to a more concrete account. However, here we are faced with the danger of misinterpreting this “sheer intentional form” as a pre-existent empty field that is subsequently filled by concrete experiences.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Note that he attributes this function to an affectivity supposedly inherent to this form. In this sense, affectivity as the taking-up function of absolute consciousness or of the sheer intentional form, as Drummond puts it, must bear both intentional directions, i.e., the transversal as well as the longitudinal. The differentiation of temporal unities is a differentiation of temporal unities not only of the experienced object but also of the correlative experience of the object. Thus, the longitudinal directedness operative in this primal kind of affectivity must be responsible for the experiencing of the
immanent temporal unities is the fact that the time-constituting form of our inner time-consciousness constantly takes up “different” materials. In that respect, we pre-reflectively experience the differentiation of these temporal unities through the differentiation effected in this “taking up.” Since the latter is an invariant function pertaining to the time-constitutive flow, each temporal unity appears as distinct in relation to the constant taking-up of materials, which provides this unity with the character of “mineness.” Of course, it is not just this single experience that I am aware of as belonging to me. This would only bring us straight back to Brough’s criticism of being led to incoherencies concerning our abiding self-awareness in our experiential flow. Drummond’s suggestion on this matter is that we should actually consider self-awareness as consisting of two irreducible aspects, instead of speaking about two different pre-reflective self-awarenesses. It is through the longitudinal intentionality that the form of inner time-consciousness is also consciousness of itself, being responsible for my awareness that my current experience, as a discrete immanent temporal unity, is unified with my former experiences. Longitudinal intentionality is thus the formal condition of transversal intentionality. These two intentionalities exhibit a structural “simultaneity” (itself not in time) which in terms of our pre-reflective self-awareness denotes both its singularity (one pre-reflective self-awareness) and its inner complexity (two irreducible aspects).

By offering a clear exposition of the dispute, Drummond’s contribution lies in highlighting this complexity and to that extent it opens up a more solid and perhaps more prolific ground for discussion. Nevertheless, his using the distinction between “form” and “matter” in order to distinguish the two levels of experiential flow raises a whole set of new problems regarding the fundamental relation between temporal synthesis and affectivity. The term Drummond uses for denoting this obscure relation is “being affected” or “taking up material.” What is alarming though is that the phases of the experience itself. It is only through this level of longitudinal experiencing that we can then describe effectively the synthetic unity of our conscious life.

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191 Naturally, this signifies a transition to a more ‘genetic’ account of temporality. We will discuss the complex relation between affectivity and temporality in the last sections.


193 Ibid.
distinct points of view from which time-constituting flow is seen, on the one hand, as sheer form, and, on the other hand, as concrete form-matter relation, they seem to be somehow conflated. One gets the impression that the function of affectivity is attributed to the “form” of inner time-consciousness. This attribution bears with it certain fundamental decisions with regard to our understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology and raises many issues. For example: what is it that affects it and what does it mean here to “turn toward”? Or, how can we account phenomenologically for the fact that affectivity occurs on a primal synthetic structure, i.e., on the form of universal time-constituting synthesis? How can one thematize this “form’s” affective readiness, since it always appears in the midst of taking up material, i.e., of “being-affected”? Is that possible or does it signify the necessity of employing different perspectives as well as performing the analysis through different reductive steps? We will encounter some of these issues in the course of our investigation and we will attempt to discuss them in a systematic manner drawing from Husserl’s own analyses.

The debate about the distinct levels of time-consciousness for the most part took place initially through non-published exchanges of arguments, with the exception of Drummond’s intervention. It was an article published by DeRoo that served as a motive for bringing that non-registered argumentation into public. DeRoo’s aim was to renew the debate by adding his interpretation of the level-distinction of time-consciousness. His contribution starts from a parallelism between two tripartitions traced to Husserl’s phenomenology. The first one is the distinction from the Vorlesungen we have been examining in this section. The second one is found in his Analysen zur passiven Synthesis: a) active synthesis, b) passive synthesis, and c) internal time-consciousness. It is what Husserl calls the ABC of constitution. DeRoo claims that these two lists are reminiscent of each other and he sets out to show their parallelism in light of the problem of objectivity, which is the core issue of the debate. By using this parallelism he tries to solve the problem by accounting for the different

194 DeRoo (2011).
kinds of “object” that pertain accordingly to the levels of time-consciousness and passive (associative) synthesis.

DeRoo’s account rests mostly on his understanding of the distinction between passive (associative) synthesis and time-consciousness. According to him, the former provides the content that gives time-consciousness a meaning, while the latter provides the temporalization of the subject that founds passive synthesis. Thus, the role of inner time-consciousness is limited to a pre-reflective self-temporalization achieved through “general fulfillment.” On the other hand, “particular fulfillment” is achieved by passive (associative) synthesis. Therefore, the “objects” of the two levels are distinct: time-consciousness is fulfilled by the retentions of previous protentions, while passive (associative) synthesis is fulfilled by the intuition of the world. As to the distinction between acts or “unities” in the terms we saw earlier, it now corresponds to the distinction between the different passive (associative) syntheses. What has to be avoided is to turn the passive (associative) synthesis into an object of time-consciousness. According to DeRoo, if we stick to the different kinds of fulfillment and their correspondence to different levels of constitution, we can easily escape this risk. Be it as it may, DeRoo is obliged to also cope with the issue of the “objectivity” (Gegenständlichkeit) of the “constituting multiplicities” of passive associations, i.e., with the problem of the object-like status of passive associative syntheses themselves. He tackles with it by appealing to the possibility of turning our reflective regard to them. We are able to “unearth” them from our retentional horizon by tracing their effectiveness, i.e., their effective contribution to active syntheses.

Let us make a number of remarks on DeRoo’s overall approach, since they will be of importance for our later analysis of protention. First of all, he seems to disregard our consciousness’s double-intentionality, which plays a fundamental role in this deepest level of constitution. He only mentions it in passing, without going

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195 Ibid., p. 8.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid. p. 9.
198 DeRoo refers to them at this point as “acts.” Cf. Ibid., p. 10.
further into details of how it relates to the issue under scrutiny.\textsuperscript{199} Secondly, we consider it rather misoriented to ascribe particular fulfillment to passive (associative) synthesis. Particular fulfillment is thematized by Husserl in its role within time-constitution and it seems rather misleading to elevate it to a higher level of constitution. If that were the case, then protention could only be accounted for as an associative-inductive expectation and not in its primal temporalizing role within the synthesis of transition. Thirdly, it seems that, according to DeRoo, the content is not involved in temporal synthesis but only in the form of associations. Thus, what is implied is that the “constituting multiplicities” of which he speaks have not undergone any constitutive process at the fundamental time-constituting level before being involved in these associations. However, if one wishes to read the ABC of constitution as it is, one cannot just start from B.\textsuperscript{200}

Let us summarize the basic points and twists of the debate. Zahavi’s interest in the matter stems from his main concern of elaborating a stable basis upon which he can develop a coherent theory of self-awareness. Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness seems to be the most fitting candidate. Husserl’s theory of self-awareness has been considered by several authors as being based on reflection and that is exactly the conception Zahavi outright rejects. With regard to his theory of time-consciousness, this conception is closely connected to what Zahavi calls the “internal object interpretation,” according to which my own living-experiences are always given as immanent temporal objects. Zahavi strongly dismisses this interpretation and posits that living-experiences are experienced pre-reflectively, i.e., prior to their becoming objects of reflection. This relates directly to the problem of the tripartition of time-consciousness. As we mentioned earlier, this consists in Husserl’s distinction of its levels in: a) the things of experience in objective time, b) the

\textsuperscript{199} Cf. Ibid., p. 4.

\textsuperscript{200} Zahavi has already replied to DeRoo’s article by stating clearly that he fails to see the relevance of the parallelism to the debate at hand. If his aim is to show that there is a certain kind of discreteness at the level of passive (associative) synthesis, then he falls back to what Zahavi has already said about it in earlier texts. In any case, Zahavi is explicitly dismissive of the use of the expression “objectivities” at this level of constitution, since it engenders much confusion. Cf. Zahavi (2011), p. 23.
immanent unities in the pre-empirical time, i.e., the constituting multiplicities of appearance and c) the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness. The main point of the dispute thus lies on how one should adequately interpret this three-fold structure of time-consciousness and more specifically the relationship between the last two levels: should we consider the deepest level, the absolute flow of consciousness, as a distinct level of consciousness whose role is to be the source of the experienced living-experiences or rather as the self-manifestation of the living-experience itself? The first option seems to enable us to escape certain impasses, such as the impossibility to account for the consciousness of simultaneous or successive acts and for our abiding self-awareness, impasses that come up when we choose to interpret the third level as the living-experience’s self-manifestation. This is Brough’s thesis. On the other side, Zahavi insists on the second option by claiming that it helps us to avoid the double mistake of considering living-experiences as discrete immanent objects and of assuming the existence of a mode of self-appearing of that deepest flow of consciousness which is different from the mode of the experiencing of living-experiences. Our abiding self-awareness permeating each living-experience rests merely in the common structure of all living-experiences: their first-personal givenness.

In this section we discussed retention’s role in the accomplishment of our self-awareness as pre-reflective. Our discussion involved a consideration of the deepest level of experiencing and of a common dismissal of the model of object-intentionality as inappropriate for describing the kind of experiencing at stake. Rejecting this model entails a dismissal of the common notion of “constitution” as unfit for denoting this primally experiential process. Regardless of our more general talk of “levels of consciousness” and whether the relation between the second and the third level should be characterized as constitutive or not, we should see what this dismissal of undifferentiated talk of “constitution” consists in. This is only possible if we take into account what is known in the Husserlian literature as the “apprehension/content schema.” Thus, instead of considering the deepest level of experiencing as the act’s

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mode of self-manifestation, responsible for our abiding self-awareness, we should examine it as the appearing of the elements of the act.

§3.4. “Apprehension/content schema”

It can be rather unreservedly accepted that the use of the “schema” to interpret our awareness of time is perhaps the most controversial topic in Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness.202 It is commonly claimed that he gradually abandoned this schema and the relevant discussion is limited to attempts of tracing the exact date that this abandonment occurred. Despite this widespread view, there is enough evidence in favour of the claim that Husserl never really abandoned the schema.203 Through meticulous criticism he came to realize that its applicability bore some inherent limitations. As already mentioned, the most important limitation concerns its applicability to the lowest level of our apprehension of time. According to the schema, worked out by Husserl in his Logische Untersuchungen, there is always a sensory-material that undergoes an apprehension and through this apprehension a transcendent object appears to consciousness. Sensory-contents are apprehended as dependent appearances of an identical independently appearing object bearing a unitary sense. Sensory-contents become intentionally animated through this apprehension by being transformed into “representing contents” (darstellende Inhalte).204 These contents correspond to correlative features of the object as the unitary intentional end-point of the act of apprehension that animated the contents.205

Objects in our visual field are discerned by identifying perspectival patterns through which distinct objects are intended and experienced by our perceptual consciousness. Apparently, claiming that Husserl never really abandoned the schema implies that we cannot consider consciousness as a mere intentional structure bereft of content. If that was the case reduction would have little to illuminate. There would be no experiential


203 Cf. Hua Mat. VIII, 100, 111, 112, 186, 187, 344.

204 Hua XIX/1, 406.

basis that would justify the positing of an object.\textsuperscript{206} This is in general how Husserl understands the constitutive schema. But how does it apply to the level of time-consciousness as time-constituting consciousness?

While listening to a brief stretch of sound we experience it as ongoing through the sinking in the past of its phases. This experience of sinking in the past occurs on the basis of a fading. The latter serves as the temporal perspective through which the temporally departing object is experienced in its unity. Experiencing the fading serves as the immanent datum for the apprehension of temporal departure. This apprehension is preserved in the course of the fadings, i.e., it maintains its unity in this ongoing process. Retention can be rightly characterized as our consciousness of this fading. Even though there are no sensory-contents that sustain the presence of what has lapsed, we still have the experience of holding it fast.\textsuperscript{207} Retention’s modification into retention of retention is responsible for the experience of the further fading of the retained content. Even though we can abstractly speak of an individual retention, as what undergoes this modification into retention of retention, retentions cannot function individually.\textsuperscript{208} Fading as a phenomenon consists in a continuity of changes and retentions become retentions of an object only within this continuity.

While one can see rather easily that we cannot understand the function of “holding fast” without this experience of “fading,” nevertheless those two should be accounted for as distinct dimensions of retention. Retention “preserves” but at the same time is the experiencing of that “fading.” This distinction is necessary if we wish to avoid mixing the levels of inquiry. For instance, not marking out the first operative dimension may lead us to the conclusion that preservation is actually performed by means of certain elements involved in (or stemming from) the “experiencing” of the “fading,” such as “affections” or “associative merging.” In any case, we should not attribute to affectivity the function of retentional preservation,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{206} Ibid., p. 156. Mensch says that if we rid consciousness of those contents we will only have a “Sartrean” sheer openness, a sheer transparency to what it is not, but, as he correctly points out, this is not Husserl’s position.
\item \textsuperscript{207} Ibid., p. 158.
\item \textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
since the gradation of affective force presupposes the latter. Affection must be temporally stretched if we are to experience its force within a scale expanding across the whole affective relief.\textsuperscript{209} In that sense, and from a more “formal” point of view, affection must be retentionally preserved, if we are to experience its “weakening” in comparison to the more intense affective force of proto-impression.

Unlike proto-impression, retention as well as protention are generated by consciousness. The primally hyletic content of proto-impression, on the other hand, is what is totally unmodified. The complex relation of those three phenomena (proto-impression, retention and protention) is the constitutive basis of all temporal objects. However, these phenomena are not themselves temporal, i.e., they are not temporally constituted; they never appear as temporal objects. Not appearing as such implies that the schema “apprehension/content” does not apply to them. The sensual content emerging through proto-impression is not “constituted,” i.e., it is not the end-product of an apprehension of some lower-level content. The same holds true for retention: it is not an “act” exhibiting its own duration.\textsuperscript{210} Retentions exhibit the fading, but they do not undergo this fading as if they were the identical referents of further perspectival appearances.\textsuperscript{211} On the assumption that they are themselves constituted according to the schema, we would face the threat of infinite regress: we would have to presuppose an even lower level of constitution that would explain how the phases of primally appearing sensual content and of retentions are themselves constituted. The alternative that Husserl suggests is rather simple. We must acknowledge the fact that time-constituting phenomena are primally experienced as such, i.e., without any mediating intentional relation.\textsuperscript{212} The non-applicability of the schema on this level of time-constitution does not result to the dismissal of the schema for the higher levels of constitution.\textsuperscript{213} Even though retention is not constituted according to the schema, it

\textsuperscript{209} We will discuss Husserl’s model of the affective relief below in §7.

\textsuperscript{210} \textit{Hua X}, 118.

\textsuperscript{211} Mensch (2010a), p. 124.

\textsuperscript{212} \textit{Hua X}, 119.

still offers itself as content for higher level apprehensions of departure to pastness.\textsuperscript{214} By being such content, it relates to other retentions, thus representing this departure.\textsuperscript{215} In terms of what we have seen so far, we are dealing here with the primal experiencing of those contents as contents for higher level apprehensions. Thus, on this level, primally appearing contents are contents as much as they are the primal experiencing of those contents.

\textit{Excursus: Merging as process of unification}

We saw above that the phenomenon of “fading” consists in the continuity of retentional modifications, but nothing was said yet of the way this continuity is brought about. In this excursus we shall consider the process through which such fading is experienced as continuous. We will address the issue by building on Mensch’s understanding of it but, finally, we will dissent from his view on two points: The first one concerns the experiential basis of the ‘merging’ process: is the latter performed through retentional modification or rather through the cooperation between proto-impressional change and retentional modification? The second refers to what it is that undergoes ‘merging’ on this level: is it time as form \textit{regardless of} its content or rather time as form of a content?

According to Mensch, two conditions must be met in order for ‘merging’ to be possible.\textsuperscript{216} The first is the “pre-individual character of the retained,” what he calls the “ontological condition”: if the retained were to be regarded as individual, then merging would only amount to a collection of individuals and not to a unity. The second is “the ongoing process of retention that places the retained in coincidence,” i.e., the “\textit{dynamic condition}.” What is retained in the implicit interconnection of previous retentions is placed in coincidence in this process and it is this retentional coincidence of the retained which allows the similarity between the retained features

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{214} Mensch (2010b), p. 161.
\item \textsuperscript{215} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Mensch (2010a), p. 117.
\end{itemize}
to appear – such feature being, for instance, their protentional reference –, thus resulting to their merging.

As Mensch rightly points out, the term “merging” (*Verschmelzen*) occurs mainly in Husserl’s later texts (few occasions in *Die Bernauer Manuskripte* and more in *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* and *C-Manuskripte*), where it denotes Husserl’s preferred way to describe how retention and protention function in constitution. To be precise with the way this merging occurs, however, some misinterpretations should be put aside. One of them is the view that retention is what unites impressional and retentional material. Mensch claims that this is the case and quotes a passage from *C-Manuskripte* that supposedly supports his interpretation. The passage is the following:

“The transition from proto-impression to proto-impression signifies that the new proto-impression simultaneously unites with the immediate retentional transformation of the earlier proto-impression, and this simultaneous union itself undergoes a retentional transformation, and so on. The simultaneous union is, however, only possible as a merging of contents. Thus a primal merging of contents takes place between the impression and the immediate primal retention in the simultaneity of both. This steadily continues for each moment as an immediate merging of content in each moment.” (*Hua Mat.* VIII, 82; Mensch’s translation, slightly altered).

What is surprising is that this passage expresses quite clearly that it is not by means of a specifically retentional function that this particular kind of merging takes place. It is in the peculiar “simultaneity of both [i.e., impression and the immediate primal retention]” that merging occurs and this “simultaneity,” seen from the point of view of the contents that merge, is the field of the interplay between proto-impressions and...

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217 Cf. Hua XXXIII, 75, 84, 125f., 211, 219, 268.


219 Ibid.

220 “Der Übergang von Ur impression in Ur impression besagt in Wahrheit, dass die neue mit der unmittelbar retentionalen Wandlung der früheren sich simultan einigt, und diese simultane Einigung nun selbst wieder sich retentional wandelt usw. Die simultane Einigung ist aber nur möglich als inhaltliche Verschmelzung; also eine inhaltliche Urverschmelzung findet statt zwischen Impression und der unmittelbaren Uretention in der Simultaneität beider, und das geht nun in Ständigkeit weiter für jeden Moment und in ihm als unmittelbare inhaltliche Verschmelzung.”
their retentional modifications. It is in fact the proto-impressional change that actually contributes to and effectuates this unity. This is rather obvious if we follow Husserl from where Mensch’s citation stops. He says:

“The process of merging and its result is transformed into the retentational at once and in each moment and it remains a merging in this mode.” (Hua Mat, VIII, 82)

The fact that Husserl refers to the process of merging as something that itself becomes retentional lets us understand that he is referring to a process distinct –but not separate– from retentional modification. One could argue that since a retention of retention is always possible, Husserl may be implying that this merging process, itself brought about through retention, in its turn becomes retentationally modified through a second order retention. However, one has to notice that if he meant to refer to it as a form of retention of retention, he would have refrained from using the phrase “transforming into the retentional”; the latter attests to the fact that merging was not (purely) retentional, i.e., effected retentinally, before this transformation. Even though it is necessary for retention to have taken place for the process of merging to expand along the proto-retention (Urretention), it is not retention itself that carries out this merging. Rather, it consists in a kind of cooperation between two processes: proto-impressional change, on the one hand, and retentional modification, on the other hand. If we take into account Husserl’s contention that proto-impressional data exert the strongest affective force, it would be inappropriate to assume that the unification between proto-impression and retention is actually performed by retention. Merging is actually initiated by the proto-impressional presence of the primally given datum or impression. The fact that proto-impressional change is involved in the process of merging is a hint to the fact that the protentional dynamic of time-consciousness is not just a component that undergoes unification through this process but also contributes to the furthering of proto-impressional change.

221 Husserl calls this “simultaneity,” already in 1911, as a “pre-being-at-once” (Vor-Zugleich). Cf. Hua X, 78f.

222 “Das Verschmelzen und sein Ergebnis wandelt sich alsbald und in jedem Moment ins Retentionale und bleibt in diesem Modus Verschmelzung.”

223 Husserl refers to these modifications as primal transformations (Urwandlungen). Cf. Hua Mat. VIII, 81, n.
Regardless of what kind of primal temporal process is responsible for the performance of merging, Mensch provides us with a clear description of what Husserl means by it. As he says, merging only occurs when the contents exhibit a kind of similarity. Similar qualities of contents re-enforce each other and achieve a contrast with heterogeneous elements. In the case of retention we are able to illustrate this by using a spatial analogy. Metaphorically speaking, each retention functions like a transparency that is placed in a series of other transparencies, one on top of the other. What is similar in them appears prominently. It is a process of “shining through the coincidence.”

However, it is not just the contents that are merging in this process. The latter affects also the times of those contents. The merging of the contents is always accompanied by the merging of their respective times. Husserl says that the unities constituted by the coincidence between proto-impression and retention, as well as between the various retentional layers, merge according to their content, i.e., according to a content-similarity. Their times, on the other hand, merge together with respect to the continuously homogeneous time-form which stems from the homogeneous temporalization. But how does this homogeneous time-form and temporalization occur? Husserl gives us a description of how it comes about:

“1) [The proto-modal staying streaming present] itself is a unity of associative merging, in which a single time is temporalized, a time which is the form of all temporalization, and it [also] temporalizes or constitutes temporal objects, onta, along with their respective time…” (Hua Mat. VIII, 296)

In order to properly understand what Husserl says here we have to keep in mind that he refers to temporalization’s homogeneity on the basis of a distinction between a

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225 Ibid., p. 120.
226 Hua Mat. VIII, 298.
227 Ibid.
228 “1) Sie [sc. die urmodale stehende strömende Gegenwart] selbst ist Einheit einer assoziativen Verschmelzung, in der eine einzige Zeit, die die Form aller Zeitigung ist, sich selbst zeitigt und zeitliche Gegenstände, onta, zeitigt oder konstituiert mit je ihrer Zeit…”
single homogeneous sense-field and the coexistence of heterogeneous sense-fields. Merging of the temporalizations of immanent data that belong to a group of data exhibiting a kind of similarity leads to an intimately homogeneous ontic present and correlatively to a unitary region of being. While we are not concerned here with the higher constitutive outcome of this process, i.e., the objectification/ontification proper, we must take into account what Husserl adds immediately afterwards:

“In the merging was involved (therein lied its completeness) the analogy of form and fullness [Fülle] taken together. What was merged with respect to the form, as belonging to the ‘noetic side’ of the living present, were the ‘noetic forms,’ which correspond to each constituted single datum of the realm and to its constituted ontic time-forms.” (Hua Mat. VIII, 296)

It is rather evident from this passage that Husserl attributes great significance to the correspondence of the noetic forms to the relevant data. If the unity of the noetic forms, taken as a unity of universal forms, is a lower level accomplishment, one may be tempted to analyze them separately on an allegedly distinct ontological basis. Nonetheless, insofar as Husserl describes the process of unification of the various temporalizations as a case of merging, we must consider this process as permeating both the noetic forms and the corresponding contents. From a phenomenological point of view, times of contents can be experienced as merging, i.e., their merging has a sensual bearing, to the extent that they are times of those contents. The homogeneity of the content’s temporal form resulting from the retentional merging is possible thanks to the fact that proto-impression establishes both the content and its time-form. Nevertheless, Mensch seems to imply the exact opposite when he partly attributes their merging to their purported inherent empty quality:

229 Hua Mat. VIII, 298.

230 Hua Mat. VIII, 296.

231 “An der Verschmelzung war (darin lag ihre Vollkommenheit) beteiligt die Analogie der Form und der Fülle in eins. Der Form nach verschmolzen sind, als zur ‘noetischen Seite’ der lebendigen Gegenwart gehörig, die ‘noetischen Formen’, die jedem sich konstituierenden einzelnen Datum des Reichs entsprechen bzw. den konstituierten ont<ischen> Zeitformen.”

232 According to Mensch, these noetic forms are “fading,” “anticipation” and “interpretative intention.” Cf. Mensch (2010a), p. 122. With respect to anticipation he says that it is interpreted as temporal approach. We will see below that this “approach” exhibits its own synthetic structure and is experienced through it. See below, §6.1.1. & §6.1.2.
“Abstractly considered as empty container for some possible content, every moment of time is like every other. We, thus, have a similarity of moments in that they are not inherently tied to some particular data.”\textsuperscript{233}

In contrast to this position, one may claim that what actually makes it possible for times of objects to merge with each other is their proto-impressional concretization. Even if their empty quality is able to establish or initiate a relation of similarity across the double process of ‘retentionalization’ and ‘proto-impressional change,’ this is only possible insofar as this emptiness is a \textit{proto-impressional emptiness}, an emptiness bearing an impressional form, i.e., a ‘quality’ with a temporally concrete existence consisting in a particular kind of ‘fullness.’\textsuperscript{234} Keeping up with this line of thought, it is even more striking that Mensch cites a specific passage from \textit{C-Manuskripte} with the view to support his claim, a passage which clearly undermines his thesis. His translation of the relative passage goes as follows:

“All of the moments in the streaming, which pertain to the different, simultaneous local data of the impressions, are completely alike and, as such, merge.”\textsuperscript{235}

For the sake of clarity at this point it is more appropriate to cite the whole paragraph from which the above excerpt was isolated. There Husserl says:

“With respect to retentionality the following can be said: each impressional datum (and each of its localized moments) has its retentionality in streaming in such a way that every local datum is accompanied by a separate retentional primal datum and retentionally fading continuity (as its retentional modification). But all of the moments in the streaming in a unitary continuity, which pertain to the different simultaneous local data of the proto-impression, are completely alike and, as such, merge. And in that way the unitary form of the temporal being-at-once [Zugleich] is one with the

\textsuperscript{233} Mensch (2010a), p. 121.

\textsuperscript{234} Of course, we must not conflate this kind of emptiness with the emptiness pertaining to “empty intentions” (\textit{Leerintentionen}) in general nor with the emptiness resulting from the process of de-fulfillment (\textit{Ent-füllung}) at the level of time-constituting consciousness. In any case, this proto-impressationally “qualified” emptiness is a clear formal limitation of time’s “indifference” with respect to its content. Mensch is somehow already aware of that when he points out that “we can assert that each moment, in its ability to bear every possible content, is of the duration which exhibits all the object’s contents.” Mensch (2010a), p. 121. This seems to imply that what Mensch signified as “time’s inherent empty quality” has already a material range, which is delimited by the appearance of a temporal object.

\textsuperscript{235} Mensch (2010a), p. 121.
proto-impressional field. This being-at-once is constantly modified until it reaches zero.” (Hua Mat. VIII, 144)\textsuperscript{236}

A quick comparison between the two translations allows us to notice that Mensch has chosen to translate “Urimpression” (singular form) as “impressions” (plural form). Leaving aside the otherwise significant issue of the omission of the prefix “proto-” (“Ur-”), we should not lightheartedly accept the change of the singular form to plural, suggested in his translation. On the contrary, what Husserl means in this sentence (and what is somehow obscured by the use of plural form) is that the simultaneous local data are different on the basis of their belonging to a “single” proto-impression, i.e., to a primal proto-impressional “extension.” Only then are we in a position to understand why Husserl says, expressing it in a rather conclusive fashion, that the form of the temporal being-at-once (Zugleich), a form consisting of the temporal moments pertaining to the different local data, is one with the proto-impressional field. The form Husserl is referring to is a product of the merging that Mensch initially meant to describe. Based on this reading, we realize that the complete likeness of the moments actually emerges through the experiential manifestation of the indissoluble bond between moments and the particular data temporalized within them.\textsuperscript{237} Proto-impression does not just pose a primordial limitation to the intuitive range of likeness between the different temporal moments as such; it also establishes primordially the element which calls for and is capable of this kind of merging.\textsuperscript{238} It should be obvious by now that what Mensch employs as a means to explain the possibility of merging between retention and proto-impression was actually used by

\textsuperscript{236} “Hinsichtlich der Retentionalität: Jedes impressionale Datum (und jedes seiner lokalisierten Momente) hat im Strömen seine Retentionalität, so dass mit jedem urimpressionalen Lokaldatum ein eigenes retentionales Urdatum und retentional abklingende Kontinuität einhergeht (als seine retentionale Abwandlung). Aber alle zu den verschiedenen simultanen Lokaldaten der Urimpression im Strömen gehörigen Momente in einheitlicher Kontinuität sind völlig gleich und als das verschmolzen, und so ist die einheitliche Form des zeitlichen Zugleich eins mit dem urimpressionalen Feld. Dieses Zugleich wandelt sich stetig ab zum Null.”

\textsuperscript{237} In a rather Henryian way, we could say that concentration of the impressionality through auto-impression occurs as an auto-impressional relief (sic).

\textsuperscript{238} As obvious, we consider proto-impression here in its functional sense, i.e., as “Quellmoment.” Cf. Brudzinska (2010), p. 106f. To that extent we should also count the transcendental function we just mentioned among the ones denoted by the term “welling-up” (quellen / Quellmoment).
Husserl in his efforts to give a genetic account of the constitution of a proto-impressional “field.”

§3.5. Near and far retention

Let us return to retention and focus on what is relevant for our later analysis of protention. In particular, we will linger on the distinction between “near” and “far” retention suggested by Lanei Rodemeyer to portray two functional aspects of retention. Briefly, the former is “retention that is actively involved in the constitution of the living present, making it possible, for example, to experience objects as wholes through retaining their difference aspects as I move around them.” In addition, it constitutes the continuity of the retentional phases and of the newest phase as it modifies this continuity. “Far retention” is “retention of these phases in their relation to each other, modifying and interlocking with each other,” as Rodemeyer says, “even after their experiences are no longer in my present, active consciousness.” Apart from that, “far retention retains the contents of these experiences in a minimal fashion, as ‘sleeping’ but passively present.”

Interestingly, Rodemeyer introduces her distinction between far and near retention while she discusses the intermediary level between retention and recollection. We know that “retention extends the presencing activity of the living present by ‘holding on’ what is immediately passing.” Nevertheless, as she points out, this process must have a limit beyond which a past needs to be recalled and recalled with a certain difficulty, if it is to be experienced as such. While discussing this point she makes a very important but rather brief remark that must be addressed carefully, if we are to do justice to her distinction of near and far retention.

239 See below, §6.6.
241 Ibid., p. 89.
242 Ibid., p. 82.
Commenting on the imagery of the “comet’s tail,” she says that my retention of an object can fade away in two different ways. First, it fades away insofar as my living present itself has boundaries “with regard to the immediate constitution of temporally long objects.” This is a rather ‘formal’ aspect of retentional fading and it signifies the transition beyond the limit of ‘holding on’ to which we just referred. In contrast to it, we have a different sense of fading. An experience of an object becomes a distinct unity that recedes into the past and is retained as such while I am experiencing another object. As Rodemeyer says, this “holding on” is distinguished from the previous one in that it does not necessarily partake in the constitution of what I am currently experiencing. Thus, a content may be held onto as fading in a two-fold manner: either as belonging to the ‘same’ constitutive activity or as pertaining to a ‘different’ constitutive activity than the one currently taking place. Hence, apart from the formal limitation of our living present, we are now dealing with the potential division of constituting activities as the mark of another kind of retentional limitation. The latter limitation points to a different kind of ‘beyond,’ essentially distinguished from the formal ‘beyond’ of the living present itself.

The problematic of the in-between of “retention” and “recollection” comes to the foreground when she poses two crucial questions: “how do my retentions both disappear and, at the same time, become reproducible as recollections?” and “how do we understand our retentions of retentions if their contents apparently ‘die away’?” One comes to realize that we do not have yet a clear view of the difference between recollection and retention. Rodemeyer’s account of their in-between anticipates her analysis of far retention when she claims that its activity consists in making possible “my comfortable and usually effortless dealings with common and familiar objects.”

Her argument begins with a position she considers self-evident, namely that the self-unifying function of retention “does not seem to be an active part of the living present and yet is still somehow integral to my present experiences, i.e., the

243 Ibid., p. 83.
244 Ibid.
245 Ibid., p. 86.
modifying continuity of retentions in retentions.”\textsuperscript{246} The purported obviousness of the fact that the self-unifying function of retention does not appear to be an active part of the living present raises a methodological issue: to determine the phenomenological ground on the basis of which the living present manifests its own limits as radically involved in the primal temporalizing synthesis (e.g. the radical passing over in the ‘sleeping’ horizon sphere). Stressing the necessity for such a “phenomenological ground” derives from the simple fact that any clear-cut definition of “activity” in the living present is possible only through its reflective self-appearance. One is thus in a position to describe the institution of the intra-retentional difference of a retentionally “active” constitution from a retentionally “inactive” one as an experienced modification, i.e., as a difference constituted by the exact retentional process that it supposedly determines in a primordial manner.\textsuperscript{247}

Leaving aside the aforementioned methodological vagueness for a moment, we move on with Rodemeyer’s line of preparatory argumentation. Following her position about the seemingly non-active part (not) played by the self-unifying function of retention, there is a significant citation from \textit{Analysen zur passiven Synthese}. The passage is the following:

\begin{quote}
Initially, however, we want to say that every accomplishment of the living present, that is, every accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes sedimented in the realm of the dead, or rather, dormant horizontal sphere, precisely in the manner of a fixed order of sedimentation: While at the head, the living process receives new, original life, at the feet, everything that is, as it were, in the final acquisition of the retentional synthesis, becomes steadily sedimented.” (\textit{Hua XI}, 178; Steinbock’s translation).\textsuperscript{248}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., p. 87.
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\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{247} We, nonetheless, keep in mind that even though such a modification is experienced through the pre-reflective longitudinal self-relation of consciousness, the institution of this difference should be accounted for as a separate function. Of course, the latter depends fundamentally on the primary hyletic flow and the facticity, as it were, of the hyletic contents.
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\textsuperscript{248} “Zunächst aber ist zu sagen, dass jede lebendige Gegenwartsleistung, das ist jede Sinnes- oder Gegenstandsleistung, sich im Gebiet der toten oder vielmehr schlafenden Horizontsphäre niederschlägt, und zwar in der Weise einer festen Sedimentordnung, da stetig, während am Kopfende der lebendige Prozess neues, ursprüngliches Leben erhält, am Fußende alles, was gewissermaßen Enderwerb der retentionalen Synthese ist, sich niederschlägt.”
\end{flushright}
The above passage serves as textual basis for her initial description of the difference between “that which is still actively being presenced and that which is past and yet remains part of my present consciousness without my being actively aware of it.” Based on this passage, Rodemeyer understands “sedimentation” as a specific process of retentional modification. But when Husserl says that everything which is “at the feet” of the living present, as the final acquisition of retentional synthesis, becomes steadily sedimented, he does not mean that sedimentation is a function exclusively carried out by retention. On the contrary, if we take into account that the counterpart of this process, i.e., the function (Urquellen) of the “reception” of new unmodified original life, is not attributed to retentional process, then we can reasonably assume that the “sedimentation” should not be attributed to it as well. Even though retentional modification is a necessary condition for a constituted unity to become sedimented, its primary role in sedimentation lies in its ‘emptying’ (de-fulfilling) function. As we shall see, Rodemeyer’s position is that there exists a specific dimension of retention through which all the constituted unities that no longer belong to the sphere of primal constitution become vague and, through this vagueness, are gradually transformed into “general memories.” The experiences are not lost, they are minimized or generalized. But, as Mensch has rightly pointed out, we should not straightforwardly equate the “loss of detail” resulting from the continuous retentional sinking down to a generalization.

Let us see how Rodemeyer describes the living process of our living-present. Following Husserl’s words, she speaks of its two “edges.” What is performed “at its head” is “the active constitution of an experience, a constitution which also is a ‘constituting’ of the retentional phase in itself.” At the opposite side, “as these phases move toward the ‘foot’ of the process, the content of the experience ‘goes to sleep,’ as it were, i.e., it no longer is actively part of my present consciousness.”

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250 Mensch (2010a), p. 211. Furthermore, we fully endorse his observation that Husserl’s aim with regard to his use of the term far retention is to describe “how a set of specific memories can be associatively reawakened.” Ibid., p. 210.


252 Ibid.
we know, the new, primordial life is “received” as and through proto-impression. But even if we consider proto-impression as the ‘living’ locus of primal presentation, a dependent ‘moment’ of the living present’s span, it would be mistaken to describe its occurrence as the mere effecting (non-independent) moment of constitution. Proto-impression plays a specific role within the primal constituting activity, expressed by both adjectives “new” and “original” in the abovementioned citation. However, as Rodemeyer mentions, it is not merely proto-impression that is involved in it: retention’s contribution is essential. Thus, “at the head” of the living present they co-function. It is this dimension of retention that Rodemeyer calls “near retention.”

After the initial phase of the process has taken place, it moves on to the “feet.” During this transition, the content of the experience “goes to sleep” or, explained above, “it no longer is actively part of my present consciousness.” But that is not all that happens at the “bottom” of the process. Along with this “falling asleep” of the content, the retentional phase correlating to the content becomes integrated into the unified continuum of retention. Notwithstanding Rodemeyer’s underlying intention, her choice of terms is rather unfortunate: integration in the “unified” retentional continuum is something that occurs along with primal retention, i.e., along with the primal retentional modification of the just-past proto-impression. Retention of previous phases in their interrelation is brought about through retention’s longitudinal intentionality. Each retention is not only retention of a previous proto-impression; it is also a retention of retention etc. Thus, the retentional chain is retained as a whole and as such undergoes retentional modification. It seems that what Rodemeyer is implying is that longitudinal intentionality is not part of near retention. The continuity of the retentional flow is retained by “far retention.”

She distinguishes near retention from far retention by saying that the latter “is my retention of these phases in their relation to each other as a unified whole, even after their experiences are no longer in my present, active consciousness.” In spite of the latter clarification, it is still hard to see in what sense the “constitution of the

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253 Ibid., p. 32.
254 Ibid., p. 89.
255 Ibid.
continuity of retentional phases” differs from the “retention of these phases in their relation to each other.” Retaining the continuity is a process progressing with each new retentional interlocking. In that sense, we can understand that what Rodemeyer calls “far retention” is merely the conserving aspect of retention, the “retaining” seen independently from and in contrast to ‘intending,’ ‘modifying’ or ‘constituting.’ While near retention “constitutes” the continuity of retentional phases, far retention “retains,” i.e., “preserves,” this continuity in its inner articulation, in the respective forms of retentional modification and interrelation of these phases. What Husserl called, in Rodemeyer’s citation, “final acquisition” (Enderwerb) should be understood, in her terms, as the constitutive product of near retentional synthesis.  

After having discussed various aspects of our time-consciousness and pointed out some of its more essential features as they are analyzed by Husserl himself as well as by prominent Husserl-scholars, we are now in a position to turn to a more detailed analysis of protentional consciousness. What we have seen so far will be placed in a new perspective, one that will force us, following Husserl, to rework many of the issues that may have appeared as definitely solved in the course of this study thus far.

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256 As a last remark, it is rather striking that while she includes another citation from Analysen (ibid., p. 88; the citation is taken from Hua XI, 288), in which the relevance of the Ego for the introduction of (to be more precise, for the only reference to) this distinction becomes rather obvious, Rodemeyer seems to downplay this reference to the Ego. It becomes quite clear that the determinations “near-” and “far-” assume their significance from their relevance to this Ego and more precisely from the shift of focus toward the affective “appearance” of the retentional synthesis. We will not pursue this point further.
Part 3

Phenomenological analysis of protentional consciousness

§4. Protention as phenomenon

When describing the phenomenon of protention, the first issue we are confronted with is the necessity of offering an adequate explanation as to how protention appears within the scope of a phenomenological investigation of time-consciousness. No matter how self-evident it may be, clarifying its phenomenological relevance by reference to its mere appearance is crucial for our project, insofar as protention (as well as retention) is not a “thing” in the world. It is not correlative to our natural attitude and does not simply fall within the scope of transcendental-phenomenological reduction. Even though it is a part or character of the ‘residuum’ of the latter, the mere prospect of its phenomenologizability along with other phenomena does not indicate its specific mode of appearance. Yet we are already somehow pre-theretically aware of our temporal horizons. Protention qua protention appears already as a component of our consciousness’s temporal structure. It is a phenomenon that owes its manifestation to the performance of a reduction, be it the reduction to the immanently real (reell) components of consciousness or transcendental-phenomenological reduction. This does not mean that it is a mere speculative phenomenon, so to say, lacking any bearing to our everyday living in the life-world. Hearing someone speaking we anticipate one’s words without struggling to ‘guess’ what one will say. While listening to a piece of music we are aware that it has not come to an end. We are using an elevator with the anticipation that it will lift us. Every (empirical, factual, natural) indication in our everyday lives that we are somehow already familiar with certain aspects of our relation to the future can serve as a point of departure for our search of that primary phenomenon called protention. Despite the fact that empirical induction differs radically from the latter, our ability to disengage ourselves from

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257 To that extent one has to agree with Henry’s remark that “[o]ne must understand how each actual, retentional, or protentional consciousness itself becomes a ‘phenomenon’.” Henry (2008), p. 31. Naturally what is presented in this subchapter about protention’s phenomenological status applies also to retention, given that they are both essential components of the primary temporalizing synthesis or synthesis of transition.
what is currently given and being directed towards what is prefigured inductively attests to a primal mode of effecting this “disengagement” and “forward directedness.” Even our capacity to be surprised rests on our familiarity with our own opening up to what-is-coming: things did not transpire as they were expected and we are already in the position to experience this divergence as divergence. Without attributing, for the moment, any substantial transcendental function to this kind of familiarity, our sole intention with respect to it is to describe the affinity between the manifest phenomenon of protention and what coherently points back to it in our natural attitude. This affinity is a general title for a radical similarity (regarded from within the transcendental attitude) that cuts across the attitudes and constitutes what we can denote as our pre-thematic awareness of our protentional (and retentional) horizon; it is an index that phenomenological reflection thematizes the primal (i.e., pre-reflective and pre-apperceptive) consciousness of our temporal streaming.

Since protention as a term does not figure in our everyday language and consequently does not denote any particular worldly object or process (natural, cultural or psychical), it becomes evident that our acquaintance with it in its proper functioning presupposes a certain level of familiarization with Husserl’s phenomenology of time-consciousness. Regardless of the motives that lead to its phenomenological delimitation, the context of its manifestation already features as a frame that not only determines its appearance as to its “how” but also with respect to its “that it appears.” Protention’s manifestation is fundamentally dependent upon the modes of appearing of the various elements comprising our primal living-experiencing immanence. For instance, performing a reduction to the transcendental-subjective streaming of proto-impressions (following the general idea of reduction we discussed earlier)\(^{258}\) and turning my attention to the primal change, I experience the flow of hyletic components as simply being-there. Seen eidetically, the latter is pointed out as the mode of appearance of the hyletic flow within phenomenological reflection and, as such, it contributes to the appearance of protention as modification of the originary mode of appearing.\(^{259}\) Whether this implies a strict methodological

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\(^{258}\) See above, §2.1.

\(^{259}\) Naturally this does not exclude the further distinction between the former mode of appearance, i.e., “being there” and the impressional mode of givenness of proto-impression as being already involved in
confinement to the deepest time-constituting layers of consciousness or whether it is also somehow structurally related to higher-level accomplishments remains to be seen in what follows. Of course, it is by no way implied that the dependence between proto-impressional change and protention is one-sided. Their quasi-organic interrelations have been thoroughly examined in Husserl’s work on time-consciousness.\footnote{For example cf. Hua XXXIII, 6ff.} What is at issue though is the fact that investigating time-consciousness involves directing our investigative gaze toward specific formations of phenomenological givens or, to be more precise, to the primal modes of givenness as such, as we saw at the beginning of this study. It is precisely our ability to account for the necessity that unifies them in a particular transcendental framework and to draw our attention to it that shows whether or not something appears at all on this level. If that necessity remains unthinkable, then phenomena which manifest themselves at the level of time-consciousness as time-constituting phenomena would inevitably reveal themselves as mere semblances. Without discussing this fundamental issue any further, it should suffice here to merely point out that thinking this necessity through entails describing the relations that determine the components of those primal phenomena as well as their connection with co-functioning phenomena.

On which criteria should a preliminary grasp of protention (a grasp that thematizes our pre-thematic awareness of protention) be based in order to play the role of leading-clue for its proper thematic phenomenological description?\footnote{As it is obvious, the term “criterion” is used here in a rather broad sense. If we decided to define it more closely, we would have to specify what this preliminary grasp amounts to. For instance, relating to the general idea of reduction discussed earlier, if our aim is to test a synthetic accomplishment’s legitimacy on the basis of a corresponding experiential field, then protention should be regarded in its role within the primal synthesis of transition and not, for instance, as an abstract “openness” to the future. This does not preclude the possibility that protention is involved in this synthetic function in various ways (see below the distinctions of protention with regard to its content). Thus, the term “criterion” would have to be understood as that which determines whether protention is involved in this synthesis and contributes to it. Granted this, we can distinguish it from other modes of relating to the future, such as wishing, hoping, predicting etc. or even, with certain qualifications, expectation and anticipation. Of course, this does not entail that they are not related to protention: from a Husserlian}
suffice to follow the indications implicit in its etymological variations or are we already mislead by the comforting guidance offered by that higher-level sense-formation, totally ignoring the methodological difficulties that arise even from our efforts to express linguistically such primal phenomena? In any case, stressing the necessity of undertaking such a task and understanding its parallel function as a kind of measure for a primal phenomenon’s givenness, will keep us alert against the danger of accepting secondary and inessential features as essential ones.

Thus, we are still left with the task of clarifying how protentional consciousness can become phenomenologically accessible, i.e., describable in intentional terms, on a proper experiential ground. Our programmatic question remains still unanswered: how does protentional consciousness emerge as phenomenon? One way to proceed would be to situate our inquiry within our phenomenological reflective scope. Following a strict reflective order, all the potential protentional functions are to be analyzed only within the retentional sphere, i.e., as protentions rendered intuitive through a re-presentification of the relevant past living-experiential phase. Reproducing our protentional intentions along with their fulfillments and eventual de-fulfillments contributes to a clear delineation of the various hyletic variations of the synthesis of fulfillment (or ‘disappointment’) and to a distinction of the correlative protentional forms. But do we have to assume that an essential sketching and division

point of view, they are all founded on protentional consciousness. What is meant is simply that they are not intentions that are involved in the primal synthesis of transition.

262 Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 25ff. Ferrer’s broader perspective is guided by the etymology of the term “protention.” He adopts Held’s emphasis on the distinction between “protendieren” [protending] (from the Latin word ‘tendere,’ which means ‘spanning’ or ‘extending’) and “protenieren” [protenuate] or “protinieren” [protain] (from the Latin word ‘tenere,’ which means ‘holding’). Cf. Held (2010), p. 112, endnote 19. What is denoted by the former version of the verb is protention’s ‘tendentious’ character, with its striving toward intuitive fulfillment, while the latter version expresses protention’s function of ‘prefiguring’ what-is-to-come. Even though this distinction provides us with a firm ground for configuring our analysis of protention, it is quite uncertain whether an etymological analysis can serve as an appropriate phenomenological starting-point from a Husserlian perspective. If one wishes to follow this distinction and also preserve the reference to protention’s etymological roots, one has to explain the link between the phenomena themselves and the phenomenological relevance of the etymology of the terms that are employed to describe the eidetic structures exhibited by those phenomena. One should regard the two dimensions as intertwined to such degree that they can only be discerned via specific methodological steps. Otherwise we are faced with the risk of ‘substantializing’ in an exceptionally non-phenomenological manner the one or the other, thus burdening phenomenological analysis with paradoxes that are only seemingly derived from within the analysis.
of protentional functions is only possible on the intuitive ground provided by a former reflectively re-presentified living-experience? Is protention accessible only as already fulfilled? Do our descriptions of it come always already “too late”? Is there not a way to describe protentional consciousness in its proper originary constitutive “environment,” i.e., in its synthetic function while still bearing the character of ‘not-yet’? We will claim that this is indeed possible.

§4.1. Reduction and protentional consciousness

We have already referred to the significance of phenomenological reduction for Husserl, at least, as much as it is needed for our current discussion. In the present context, the programmatic question to pose is what motivates the phenomenological interest in the essential relevance between the process of phenomenological reduction and protention. Even though we have not yet seen in detail what protention and its exact role is, that much can be said in advance about it: unlike “expectation” and “anticipation,” with which we are somehow already (reflectively) acquainted in our natural attitude toward the world, no reflection carried out within our natural attitude is able to thematize our protentional relation with futurity. To the extent that there is no sufficient clarity about the specific circumstances under which protention and our pre-thematic awareness of it become thematized, protention is susceptible to a speculative delineation: its phenomenological description may seem to loosely encompass various, sometimes incompatible, elements, depending on its explicit or implicit point of departure. It is easy to realize that the methodological circumstances under which we encounter it thematically involve a certain overcoming of the natural attitude. Otherwise we would be simply referring to an “objectively predetermined future co-presence” of a conscious act and its correlativety given object, both retaining an empirical-transcendent sense.


264 See above, §2 & §2.1.

265 For example, we can offer different descriptions of it depending on whether we start from the concrete ego or from our stream of consciousness.
Nonetheless, the specific way and extent of this overcoming of natural attitude is yet to be examined. The only established fact so far is that any phenomenological systematic reference to protention implies an already performed phenomenological reduction. But access to protentional consciousness is made possible through specific reductive steps. We will be in a position to trace those steps once we will have examined in detail its essential structure and elements. Following Husserl’s analysis, we will first inquire into protention’s formal structure in its relation to the other two aspects of our time-consciousness: proto-impression and retention.

§4.2. The development of time-diagrams (II): protention and its relation to “general” and “particular” fulfillment

While Husserl has devoted much effort in describing adequately retention and its relation to proto-impression and recollection (Wiedererinnerung) quite early, he did not develop or refine his theory of protention until 1917/1918, during his stay in Bernau. In the few moments that he deals with protention in the Göttinger Lectures of WS 1904/05 or in texts originating from the period prior to his Bernau stay, he offers us brief descriptions of certain aspects of it.266 Protention is described in analogy to retention: they are both determined within a short range from the respective proto-impressional phase and after that they enter a dark horizon of undetermined retentions and protentions.267 The latter intend in an empty, undetermined way something that is to come: they constitute it emptily.268 This “empty intending” is demarcated easily once we compare protentions in the different contexts of originary perception, on the one hand, and recollection on the other. Briefly, what distinguishes them is that, in the case of recollection, protentions are not left open and undetermined, since they are directed toward the already fulfilled phase of an event.

266 Hua X, §§24, 40, 43.
267 Hua X, 84.
268 “Jeder ursprünglich konstituierende Prozeß ist beseelt von Protentionen, die das Kommende als solches leer konstituieren und auffangen, zur Erfüllung bringen.” (Hua X, §24, 52)
As we saw earlier, Husserl’s attempts to describe time-consciousness were vividly depicted in his time-diagrams. This is also the case with his effort to investigate protention more closely. Naturally, this led him to some ‘corrections’ and refinements of his previous time-diagrams. In contrast to the brief discussion on protention prior to 1917/18, Husserl devotes much more effort to outline its importance in his Bernauer Manuskripte, where he offers us a far more elaborate approach of protention, something which is quite obvious especially in Texts No 1 and No 2. With respect to its intentional form, we now see that, apart from retention, protention too affords a double-intentional directedness, heading both towards: a) the coming phases of the “primal process” (Urprozess) and b) the following objective unity. Therefore we can ascribe to it a transversal and a longitudinal intentionality. Similarly to retention’s retaining the previous retentions, protention too intends in a mediate way the following protentions: each protention is directed to the following phase and this phase qua protended includes a protention tending toward the following phase etc. Thus, each protention enters into a peculiar relation of fulfillment with the following protentions. As Husserl formulates it:

“The later protentions are fulfillments of the previous ones, each previous one is fulfilled on the way.” (Hua XXXIII, 10)

Nevertheless, we have to note that this kind of fulfillment can in no way be considered as a fulfillment in the sense of coinciding with proto-presentation (Urpräsentation), Husserl’s term here for what he earlier denoted as proto-impression. It is merely a ‘relative fulfillment’ correlated with this “mediate intentionality” (mittelbare Intentionalität) that runs through protentional consciousness. The function of fulfillment plays a fundamental role in any attempt

269 Hua XXXIII, 1-49.
270 Hua XXXIII, 10.
271 Hua XXXIII, 8: “Sie geht, wenn wir das Kontinuum in Phasen denken, von <einer> Phase zur nächsten, aber durch sie hindurch auf die folgende, durch sie hindurch auf die wiederfolgende und so auf alle Phasen.”
272 “Die späteren Protentionen sind Erfüllungen der früheren, jede frühere erfüllt sich im Fortgang.”
273 The change of terms certainly signifies a shift in his overall approach and perspective on the matter.
274 Hua XXXIII, 10. Husserl speaks of “relatively empty” protentions preceding the full ones.
to describe protentional consciousness. Protention itself is essentially a *tendency* towards fulfillment. Each protention is fulfilled by the emergence of the newly coming. It is this transition from protention to proto-impression (or to proto-presentation) that is experienced as fulfillment in the strict sense of the term.

Yet fulfillment does not merely designate an actual synthesis of fulfillment between a single protention and the correlative proto-impressional moment to which it is emptily directed. Protention’s own continuation is secured by a sort of formal prefiguring: it prefigures its continuous transition to its following phases, thus bearing witness to a unitary tendency toward the following fulfilling proto-impression. The following phase of consciousness exhibits in advance (i.e., prior to its actual involvement in an immediate synthesis of fulfillment) an intentional homogeneity that encompasses what-is-coming in the form of anticipated fulfillment.

Thus, Husserl speaks of a “double meaning of fulfillment.” On the one hand, we have *particular fulfillment*, i.e., fulfillment of the protentions intending the following proto-impression as constituting what is currently given as present. On the other hand, there is *general fulfillment*, which, roughly speaking, denotes the fulfilling process ‘occurring’ between each protention and its following proto-impression, even when both are already retentionally modified, i.e., both being included in the retentional field. The difference between those two modes of fulfillment will become clearer once we take into account another important novelty of the *Bernauer*

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275 Cf. *Hua X*, 52: “Jeder ursprünglich konstituierende Prozess ist beseelt von Protentionen, die das Kommende als solches leer konstituieren und auffangen, zur Erfüllung bringen.” §24 of *Hua X* is included in the original text of the *Vorlesungen* published by Heidegger, but it was written in 1917, i.e., during the Bernau period, with the view to be integrated to the version Edith Stein was working on, as the editor informs us. Cf. *Hua X*, 52, n.

276 Ferrer, following Held, draws this “tendentious” character of protention from the term itself. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 26f. We have already expressed reservations about this mode of ‘tracing’ essential structural features. See above, p. 89, n. 262.

277 *Hua XXXIII*, 226.


279 It is this point exactly that makes some commentators uneasy, since they consider that protentional homogenization of the future amounts to a radical denial of the essential novel character of the new.

280 *Hua XXXIII*, 29.
Manuskripte: the emphasis given in the inner intentional interwoveness of retention and protention.\textsuperscript{281} If one studies Husserl’s complete time-diagram, one will discern that we cannot simply consider every segment which lies under the horizontal line, depicting the “sequence” of primal-presentations, as merely retentional.\textsuperscript{282}

![Figure 5](image)

What is retained, for instance in the segment $E_1^2E_2$, is not just past proto-impressions but also the retentions and protentions essentially attached to them. Following the retained protentional continuum,\textsuperscript{283} we notice that every previous retention is protentionally directed to the next retention. This intentional directedness is implicated in a synthesis of fulfillment which unfolds along the vertical line: every point of it, regarded as retention, constitutes a synthesis of fulfillment, retaining both the fulfillment in its impressional form as well as the fulfilled protention. Husserl

\textsuperscript{281} Hua XXXIII, 24-30.

\textsuperscript{282} The original diagram is found in Hua XXXIII, 22. We have used here its modified version as it is found in Lohmar (2002a), p. 158.

\textsuperscript{283} It is clear that the analysis of the interwoveness of protention and retention in the retentional field highlights the dependence of the description’s outcome from our mode of examination. We are not dealing with a generation of primal data but with the point of departure of our examination. We are always in the middle of the primal process and select a phase on which we perform our analysis. Cf. Hua XXXIII, 28. Husserl, in a footnote at the bottom of the same page, expresses reservations about the accuracy of this explanation, presumably because it aims to overcome the methodological complications in an all too simplistic manner. He says that we should take into account the distinction between differentiated moments and infinite horizon, as mere potentiality for possible recollections, or else in every vertical stretch we will have an actual infinity of moments.
defines this process of fulfillment as “general fulfillment” (allgemeine Erfüllung)\textsuperscript{284} distinguishing it from “particular fulfillment” (besondere Erfüllung).\textsuperscript{285} The latter refers to the synthesis of fulfillment taking place between a not-yet fulfilled protention and the correlative proto-impressional, or proto-presentational, point which it intends. General fulfillment can be regarded as a ‘self-relating’ fulfillment, as the formal condition for the self-constitution of our experiential life in its unity: every moment is connected with its previous one via this fulfillment.\textsuperscript{286} Consciousness becomes aware of itself through the transition of protentions to their intuitive fulfillment, i.e., through the conscious awareness of a becoming-present of a past protention.\textsuperscript{287} Thus, in the case of “general fulfillment,” self-awareness is attributed to the fulfilling function peculiar to our protentional consciousness. The difference from the kind of self-consciousness brought about through “longitudinal intentionality” should be clear: it is not the intending of the previous phases of primal appearing that achieves consciousness’s self-relation but its awareness that what is given is the same as what was already anticipated in the past as futural.\textsuperscript{288} Particular fulfillment, on the other hand, contributes to the constitution of an immanent temporal object; it is the synthetic function that is actually intuitively given in our reflective regard.

Limiting our view to the latter kind of fulfillment, one can easily notice that this proto-impressional point, despite the emphasis now given to the interweaving of retention and protention, has the same status that was attributed to it in the Lectures. The difference lies in that here the analysis focuses more on two distinct tendencies of fulfillment: the tendency toward “self-fulfilling” (Sich-Erfüllen), on the one hand, and that toward “self-de-fulfilling” (Sich-Entfüllen) or “self-evacuating” (Sich-Entleeren), on the other. To each tendency corresponds a scale of gradation, according to its proximity to the point of fulfillment. The latter is characterized differently, depending on the perspective one adopts in relation to the fulfilling function: it is both a point of

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{284} Hua XXXIII, 29.
\item \textsuperscript{285} Hua XXXIII, 30.
\item \textsuperscript{286} Cf. DeRoo (2013), p. 19.
\item \textsuperscript{287} Bernet (2010), p. 12f.
\item \textsuperscript{288} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
maximum fullness (Maximalpunkt der Erfüllung) and a point of minimal evacuation (Punkt minimaler “Entleerung”). 289 In accordance with this gradation Husserl also speaks of increase and decrease or weakening of intuitive fullness. In this respect, we must also give an account of the mode in which this increase and decrease take place in the primal hyletic flow. But this is something we will deal with below, once we turn to the material aspect of protentional consciousness.

§4.3. Protention as empty constitution

Considering protention as tending toward fulfillment leads to the task of understanding the sense in which protention lacks this fullness toward which it tends in a primordial fashion. In other words we have to take a closer look at protention’s peculiar character of ‘emptiness.’ Husserl describes protention as that which constitutes ‘emptily’ what-is-coming and brings it into fulfillment. 290 How should we understand this protentional “emptiness” and to what kind of “constitution” is Husserl referring here? Is it an emptiness that refers back to proto-impressional ‘fullness’ and denotes a radical deprivation of intuitiveness? Or are we rather faced with a ‘relative’ emptiness?

Given protention’s primal functionality within our consciousness of the present, we should consider its ‘emptiness’ as a character that becomes manifest through protention’s contribution to the synthesis of transition. In light of this specification, we should also take into account Held’s remark that through phenomenological reflection we always analyze the total structure of the proto-impressional phase, which means that protention is available for description in its fulfillment. 291 What was initially protended has already been presented in a proto-impressional manner in the reflection. Even though it was once unfamiliar, it offers itself to our phenomenological regard as already involved in the intuitive proximity of the present and thus as already familiar. What is ascribed to it as its mode of unfamiliarity rests

289 Hua XXXIII, 30.

290 Hua X, 52.

not on the fact that its primal proximity is still pending but on its imminent self-givenness. As Held notes, unfamiliarity and non-appearance of self-giveness (Ausbleiben der Selbstgebung) can only be conceived, in phenomenological reflection, as privative modes of experience.292 As already said, phenomenological reflection always arrives “too late.”293

Now what one should ask is whether such a connection between phenomenological reflection and protentional consciousness goes so deep as to orient our investigation in a decisive manner. Those privative modes of experience (that is, unfamiliarity and non-appearance of self-givenness), experienced as such reflectively, point back to the primal modes of unfamiliarity at the level of pre-reflective self-awareness.294 It seems that we are left with two choices: either to thematize protentional consciousness in its pre-familiar character (i.e., in its function as prefiguring what-is-coming as always familiar) or to thematize the fundamental “unfamiliarity” of what it protends.

But the best way to do things is rather to follow a multiperspective route of investigation. Firstly, one must pose the question of what serves as intuitive ground for our being pointed back to this original unfamiliarity: should we assume that protentional emptiness somehow “appears” in its unfamiliarity within familiarity, i.e., within the range of primal intuitive proximity? Secondly, does this manifest pre-reflective awareness of original unfamiliarity imply a radical ‘deep’ cessation of the intuitively-based prefiguration of the future? In other words, are we primarily directed toward the newly arriving in a ‘totally’ empty manner? Thirdly, does this ‘emptiness’ coincide with the kind of emptiness that results from the process of self-de-filling (Sich-Entleeren) we mentioned earlier? Is retentional and protentional emptiness the same kind of emptiness, justifying their common ‘de-presentifying’ function?295

292 Ibid., p. 41.
294 Ibid.
295 The term “de-presentification” was used by Fink in order to denote the essential horizon-opening function of retention and protention. Cf. Fink (1966), p. 22ff. See below, p. 99, n. 299. Husserl seems to have endorsed this term in his late manuscripts. For example, cf. Hua Mat. VIII, 134.
Finally, is there a way to get a pre-reflective consciousness of the transition from this ‘emptiness’ to proto-impressional fullness? In short, we should ask in a rather radical manner whether one has to understand protention’s essential ‘empty’ character as being inherently connected to restrictions stemming from phenomenological reflection. By doing that one should try to explain in what sense the intuitiveness of reflection defines the intuitive (or non-intuitive) mode of appearance of protentional consciousness. This would mean that ‘emptiness’ would be dealt with in different forms, traced within and through the intuitive range of reflection: a) emptiness as ‘unfamiliarity’ within familiarity, b) mere ‘emptiness’ (lack of intuitiveness), c) ‘de-presentification’ and d) sensed ‘emptiness’ in the process of fulfillment. All these modes of emptiness seem to be involved in the synthesis of fulfillment.

While three cases of emptiness are rather easy to grasp, we must explain what is meant by the term “de-presentification.” Having included it among the forms of ‘emptiness’ that are peculiar to protentional consciousness, we have insinuated that this term may denote a more “active” or operative aspect of protention. Similarly to proto-impressional presentation, protention too appears as a function of consciousness. Husserl has referred to this “active” aspect of time-consciousness as “productive” and “spontaneous”:

“It is what is primally produced – the ‘new,’ that which has come into being alien to consciousness, that which has been received, as opposed to what has been produced through consciousness’s own spontaneity. The peculiarity of this spontaneity of

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296 Ferrer mentions a “continuous sensed (empfundener) and experienced (erlebter) contrast between the empty protentional form and the full intuited proto-impression.” Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 36. It is rather mysterious how such “sensing” can take place, given that the “emptiness” of the protentional form does not refer to what it prefigures but how it prefigures it, i.e., as lacking any experiential bearing. This could be more understandable if one interpreted the function of protentional modification as offering a peculiar sensual bearing for the experience of transition. Such understanding would subsequently enable us to distinguish various modes of prefiguration as components of the synthesis of transition. Nevertheless, this would be possible if we accepted a parallel “enfeebled” kind of proto-impressional hyle that would allow us to recognize an intuitive proto-form of “medial” experience. The variations of prefiguration do not depend solely on the typology of perceptual experience (e.g. different sense-data or sense-data belonging to different sense-fields), but also on this more “transient” level of experience. We will say more about this below.
While fullness manifests itself in this novel proto-impressional emergence, retention and protention are spontaneous productions of consciousness. Retention, as we have already seen, is the ability of consciousness to “preserve” for a while proto-impressions that have just passed. Now we additionally learn that this “preservation” is a spontaneous accomplishment performed by consciousness. By retaining what has just passed, retention presents it in a modified way with a continuous intuitive weakening. Protention, on the other hand, is also accomplished spontaneously. Instead of preserving what has just passed, it prefigures in an empty manner what-is-to-come. Even though Husserl speaks of retentional “self-emptying,” there is no reference to any kind of protentional emptying. On the contrary, the corresponding function of protention is called “self-fulfilling.” To what extent then can we still include ‘de-presentification’ among the modes of ‘emptiness’ peculiar to protention?

Following the motif of primal intuitive proximity as the proto-impressional range of intuitiveness, protention’s de-presentification is a primary holding-in-distance of what-is-coming rather than a mere pre-presentation of a content of consciousness that lies-ahead. Protention is thus not just the striving toward fulfillment, but also the “opening up” of a horizon in which what-is-coming appears as such, i.e., the “opening up” of the distance of its appearing as such. More specifically, the protentional horizon operates in a twofold way: a) as the horizon through which synthesis of fulfillment takes place and b) as the horizon permeated by the prefiguring.299


299 According to Fink, the horizon that is constituted by protention qua de-presentification is the horizon of prefiguring, whose indeterminateness is a determinateness that shows itself in the manner of a horizon. Fink (1966), p. 24. This means that Fink did not regard protentional horizon as the horizon in which protentional prefiguring will coincide with its correlative following proto-impression. In other words, for him it is not the horizon of protention’s modification into proto-impression. This can probably be attributed to his strong attachment to protention’s role of “opening up” the horizon of prefiguring. Nevertheless, one can still consider de-presentification as an accomplishment carried out within the boundaries of this primal synthesis of fulfillment as that which defines those boundaries, i.e.,
However, such conception provides us only with a partial account of the significance of the retentio-protentio-intertwinement for the primal experiencing of fulfillment. More aspects need to be considered in order to achieve a complete view of it, such as that peculiar kind of modification of the horizon which is involved in the experiencing of fulfillment. We will leave this matter open and discuss its details during our examining various aspects of protentional consciousness. Summarizing our problematic of emptiness qua de-presentification and protention, we have to keep in mind that a more refined analysis is necessary in order to reveal the inherent relation between de-presentifying and protentional prefiguration. Does the former constitute some kind of functional condition for the performance of the latter or are they just distinct aspects that merely come about by a simple shift of perspective within protention’s formal analysis?

as that which “posits” any prefiguration in the horizon of the primal synthesis of fulfillment. In fact, the characters of indeterminateness and determinateness point back exactly to this synthesis.

Husserl’s focus on the “span” of retentio-protentio-intertwinement, in the Bernauer Manuskripte, indicates his concern with an accurate description of the primal experience of fulfillment. Perhaps it is only within this context that a proper interpretation of de-presentification can take place.

It should suffice here to refer, in passing, to one alleged problem that is supposedly overcome with the acknowledgement of retention and protention as de-presentifying intentions. This problem lies in the hypothetical conception of our stream of consciousness as intentionally containing the sum-total of its past and future phases. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 34f. De-presentifying intentions open up or constitute the retentional and protentional horizons respectively, thus averting the perilous possibility of interpreting the continuity of our flow of consciousness as an “actual infinity,” i.e., a “present” infinity, encompassing the totality of past and future hyletic data. Ibid., p. 34. Such conception would amount to a hypostasization of our flow of consciousness that totally disregards its essential constituting life.

Such a functional condition would be, for instance, a process of generalization through which a general frame of appearance is constituted. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 31, where Ferrer refers to this frame of appearance (“…jedem Künftigen einen allgemeinen Erscheinungsrahmen vorschreiben”). Yet this process implies a kind of protentional modification that draws its general orientation (or better its orientation of generalization) from retentional modifications. Thus, we return to Mensch’s remark that we should offer a precise account of how we should conceive the vagueness, which results from the continuous retentional modifications, as amounting to the generality that is ascribed to our retentional horizon, as the genetic origin of our protentional prefiguring. Cf. Mensch (2010a), p. 211.
§4.4. Protention and its modes of making-intuitive

Having discussed, quite sketchily, the kind of ‘emptiness’ that characterizes protentional consciousness we should now see how this emptiness becomes fulfilled through the relevant synthesis of fulfillment. One realizes rather easily the significance of clarifying the phenomenological relevance of emptiness for protentional consciousness. It is already clearly indicated by the fundamental role of fulfilling synthesis in Husserl’s phenomenology of time. His renewed appraisal of protention in his later manuscripts on time-consciousness bears witness to his increased concern with the phenomenon of fulfillment as an essential part of his analysis of intentionality; this reappraisal implies a more refined understanding of emptiness. This is particularly true in his ‘genetic’ analyses, in a sense already at play in the Bernauer Manuskripte.

Some important aspects of this emptiness come to the foreground if we pay heed to the different modes of making-intuitive (Veranschaulichung) that Husserl discusses in his Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis.\footnote{Hua XI, 78-83.} Husserl introduces a distinction of the ways in which an empty presentation (Leervorstellung) may be fulfilled. Initially he limits his analysis to protentions as a specific type of empty presentations. There he outlines two modes of making-intuitive:

a) the merely clarifying (klärende), disclosing (enthüllende), or picturing (ausmalende) making-intuitive, and

b) the confirming (bewahrheitende) or fulfilling (erfüllende) making-intuitive.

Formally seen, these modes of making-intuitive are just different kinds of synthesis of coincidence between the empty protentional intention and their relevant intuition that provides it with fullness.\footnote{Hua XI, 79.} What distinguishes them is the mode in which this occurs, i.e., that which serves as intuitive basis for the synthesis of fulfillment.

Let us begin by the confirming or fulfilling one. We already know that the second mode amounts to the synthesis of coincidence between protention and proto-
impression. It is the fundamental mode of intuiting through which each protention finds its fulfillment in the correlative impressional givenness, confirming it (or disappointing it). This mode of fulfillment is a constant element of protentional consciousness. Husserl describes it as the specific fulfillment of intention: what was merely anticipated coincides with what is actually following. This general character of fulfillment is central for consciousness’s synthetic function. Nevertheless, Husserl goes even further: he distinguishes between that which serves as primary fulfilling and what appears as secondary fulfilling. Husserl is adamant with respect to this distinction:

“What first comes on the scene as coinciding with the prefigured element is that which serves as primary fulfilling. But the overabundance that intuition supplies is also fulfilling in a secondary manner, insofar as it is given as belonging to the object itself which is intended there and is now given in intuition as itself, precisely fulfilling the intention.” (Hua XI, 80; Steinbock’s translation, slightly modified)305

But why does Husserl introduce such a distinction? Why should there be two layers of fulfillment within the confirming mode of fulfillment? Do they correspond to specific functions on the level of time-constitution or is it a distinction whose origin lies in a tacit transposition of the eidetic structure of objectifying intentionality in this deepest level of constitution? A first possibility we should consider is that the “primary” character of fulfillment, i.e., that “aspect” of fulfillment that appears as primary, owes its primacy to the prefiguring’s determinateness, to the intention’s direction. This might be a plausible case. Yet we should try and read this passage more closely.

An object is intended and it is given intuitively “in person,” as self-given. The perceptual intuition that gives the object “in person” is not limited to providing the “self” of the aspect of the object that is originally present but the “self” of the object in its totality. So how should we understand this “overabundance” with which intuition supplies us? An important feature one should take into account is that this “overabundance” is intuitively given as belonging to the object itself qua fulfilling my intention. There are two ways to describe it. Either one may regard it as an index of a

305 “Das erstlich als Deckung der Vorzeichnung Eintretende ist das primär Erfüllende; sekundär ist aber auch das Superplus, das die Anschauung beibringt, erfüllend, sofern es gegeben ist als zu dem Gegenstand selbst gehörig, der da intendiert ist und der nun als er selbst zur Anschauung kommt, die Intention eben erfüllend.”
qualitative difference between what is given as prefigured and what is given as exceeding this prefiguring. In that sense, the surplus fullness not only offers a closer determination of the intended object, i.e., further hyletic determinations through which the object is given as itself; it also serves as the primal experience of its inner concordance as exceeding the particularity of prefiguring. Or one may regard it as an experiential (partial) determination of the substratum that undergoes this “closer determination.”

This line of thought would imply a transition to another level of analysis. Such an implicit transition can be noticed in Ferrer’s discussion. What he does is to attribute this “surplus” to the pre-given world. According to him, “overabundance” is expressed in its intentional form within the immanence of the Ego-momad, but only insofar as it creates a contrast within this immanence. Through this immanent “contrast,” our consciousness is somehow pre-reflectively aware of itself as opening up toward the world’s “overabundance” in relation to any intention of expectation. As it becomes obvious, this “contrast” is already situated at the heart of “innermost” time-consciousness. Since this “overabundance” stems from the world and the worldly objects as essentially exceeding protentional prefiguring, we can furthermore understand it noematically as consisting in an “infinity” of unforeseen aspects of the object and the world. A first difficulty that seems to burden Ferrer’s claim that the pre-given world is the origin of this “surplus” is that it appeals to a pre-givenness of a world that becomes constituted in this process of temporalization. Such an interpretation may indeed find its proper place once we pay heed to the affective dimension of our consciousness. However, we notice that Husserl refers here

306 We are currently putting aside Ferrer’s interpretation of this “overabundance” as an index of consciousness’s openness achieved by proto-impression. Accepting this thesis would require a radical reinterpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality.


308 Ibid., p. 66.

309 Ferrer seems too concerned about a kind of radical inwardness of primal-process (Urprozess) and tries to interpret this “overabundance” as an opening brought about through proto-impression. We should acknowledge his non-systematic appeal to world’s pre-givenness—i.e., prior to an account of affection’s role in time-consciousness, an account that follows a few pages later— as a symptom of this concern.
explicitly to an object, taking for granted that the synthesis of fulfillment will lead to the presentation of this object. In a sense, Ferrer too chooses to interpret this “belonging to the object” (see the previous quotation from Hua XI, 80) as a structure that exhibits a kind of precedence over the intuitive “overabundance” of secondary fulfillment. Nonetheless, given his appeal to “pre-givenness,” this is possible only on the basis of a formation of experiential types, a process that presupposes the primary temporal functions we are currently investigating. It is through its proper type of perceptual experience that the perceived object is capable of appearing in an abundance of impressions that are not exhausted in its current adumbration, but are nevertheless sensually adjoined in prominent unities of formation. Additionally, the world’s pre-givenness is analyzed in strict correlation with the corresponding modes of relating to it, be they passive-affective or active-intentional ones. We will try to follow this line of inquiry below. This will eventually lead to a consideration of other, more “enriched” levels of temporalization and of the ways protention relates to them, either as their inherent “living” force or as being determined from them with respect to its content-aspect.

310 In relation to this, cf. Lohmar (1993), p. 135, n. 1. Lohmar says that in the context of a transcendental synthesis-theory of apprehension (Auffassung) one cannot start from a pre-given source-point of affection, but from the fact that we relate to objects on the ground of what is sensually present.

311 It is rather interesting to point out that this “surplus” is given as belonging to the object itself. From this perspective, the “surplus” can actually take on many noematic forms, i.e., it can be located in various levels of description. For instance, it can be considered either as an impressional “overabundance” exhibiting some degree of fitting relevance to the intentional matter (Materie) at hand or as a “surplus” of object-aspects. Of course, this depends on whether we will count this relation of “belonging to” among the givens that are given together with this fulfilling “surplus” and at the same level with it. In close connection to this and as an immediate follow-up, a further specification would be required: is the conditional character of this “belonging to” (remember: “But the overabundance that intuition supplies is also fulfilling in a secondary manner, insofar as it is given as belonging to the object itself which is intended” (emphasis added)) a temporally articulated precedence or one of a statically considered founding validity?

312 To be fair, Ferrer clearly speaks about the immanence of an Ego-mond, so, from this point of view, his reference to world’s pre-givenness is justified, albeit unaccounted for. Nonetheless, we can only concede to his thesis by adding a brief methodological remark. Insisting on the topic of Ego-mondic immanence, one must be clear about the kind of immanence implied here. More specifically, striving for a certain degree of precision on this matter would instigate us to specify the kind of reduction necessary for rendering the (pre-)worldly origin of this “surplus” accessible to phenomenological description. Do we experience this hylectic overabundance as pre-worldly without apprehending it as such? In its turn, this would mean that, along the way, we would attain a clear view of its proper constitutive role.
§4.4.1. Clarifying or picturing making-intuitive

By now we should have somehow familiarized ourselves with the confirming fulfilling and its significance for a thorough description of protentional consciousness. Now we will turn our attention to the first mode of making-intuitive, i.e., the “clarifying” or “picturing” making-intuitive. A quick look at it is enough to realize that it reveals an exceptional aspect of protention, one that would have remained hidden, had not such a distinction between the two modes of making-intuitive been addressed by Husserl. ‘Picturing’ itself is not inherently related to protention; it is merely one of the modes in which the latter is fulfilled. In the case under consideration, we have a mere picturing of the empty expectation of “how” it will be fulfilled. Unlike the confirming mode, the synthesis of fulfillment we discuss here does not involve an impressional givenness that would properly fulfill protention: we are “picturing” or “uncovering” certain components of what protention intends. Husserl implies that this happens by means of a concrete “image” (Bild), which displays its own kind of fullness. An important fulfilling component of this “image” is what he calls “mere filling” (bloßes Füllsel). Intuition in the case of picturing aspires to a concretely pictured image, however, there is always a part of it which does not enter into a synthesis of coincidence between the empty intention and its picturing fulfillment, i.e. a residue. It is this residual emptiness that is being filled by the aforementioned “mere filling.”

The limitation that gives rise to this peculiar form of fullness is two-fold: a) the prefiguring that pertains to protention (as well as to any other kind of expectation as an intuitive uncovering of protention) can never provide consciousness with the proto-impressional self of what-is-coming and, by consequence, b) the prefiguring can never include the amplitude of the hyletic givenness of what-is-coming.

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313 The “how” is actually the determination of the content, i.e. of its hyletic quality.

314 *Hua XI*, 79.

315 Ibid.

316 The limitation applies both to the determining *shape* of the prefiguring and to the *process* of determining that shape. In the former case deficiency is, as it were, crystallized according to the concreteness of the shape, while in the latter case it exhibits a dynamic character.
Protentional prefiguring does not substitute for the impressional presentation of the datum; what is protended is not prefigured in its affective and qualitative concreteness but includes a residual emptiness corresponding to the essential partiality of the specific form that this prefiguring assumes. Thus, the aforementioned two-fold limitation should be understood as an “active” experiencing of protention’s inability to give impressional what it protends. It is active, since picturing involves the formation of an “image” or a “pre-presentation” (Vorvorstellung) that will serve as fulfilling ground for the empty intending. Thus, in “picturing” making-intuitive protention’s double inability with respect to impressional givenness is experienced through the forming activity that provides us with this “image.”

Before moving on we should clarify how this “picturing” making-intuitive occurs in terms of consciousness’s protentional dynamic. We can find a relevant instructive passage in the Bernauer Manuskripte. Limiting his description to protention, Husserl speaks of a “leading anticipatory memory (or pre-memory)” (voreilende Vorerinnerung):

“It belongs to the essence of this continuously modified Being-forward-directed, which constitutes a momentary continuity, to undergo a successive general modification in primal process, in the sense of transformation in constantly new fulfillment—which is again a manifold of intentions as described above. And the following also pertains implicitly somehow already to every phase: what belongs to its essence is the possibility of a leading anticipatory memory that posits itself in any ‘position’ of the mediate intentionality whatsoever. It anticipates and does so in such a way that it lets an analogizing process to run-off, leading forward, as we said. It allows the modified protentions to run-off in an urging procession of constant modification of fulfillment.

318 We should notice here the parallelism between this fundamental inability of giving impressional what is prefigured and the “overabundance” to which we referred earlier. Protention is thus always “less” than proto-impression. Such an evaluation of protention’s role is based on a purely one-dimensional understanding haunted by the constant fear that protention signifies an irreversible absorption of consciousness into a hypostasized “spontaneity,” bearing with it the “seed” that will be planted to the present, stripping it of any “reality.” Nevertheless, there is nothing forcing us to interpret protention as laying claim to proto-impression’s functional role. Husserl’s explicit references to self-givenness and non-self-givenness serve exactly the task of distinguishing the relevant functional domains.
In these protentions, the piece of the future event plays out and it does so as quasi-reality.” (Hua XXXIII, 26)\textsuperscript{319}

What does Husserl tell us in this passage? A first point to notice is that it belongs to the essence of our being-forward-directed to undergo a general modification into a continuous new fulfillment, i.e., our consciousness’s protentional tendency becomes fulfilled. But what also pertains to the essence of every temporal phase is the exceptional possibility of this “leading anticipatory memory.” The latter posits itself in any place whatsoever within the mediate intentionality, i.e., in any protentional intersection of protentions of protentions. Husserl’s reference to position (place) should be understood as denoting the pre-reflective longitudinal self-consciousness (or primal process), i.e., the formal aspect of the primal temporal constitution of consciousness’s phases. In virtue of this longitudinal intentional intertwinement, consciousness constitutes a continuum of individual temporal positions. Now, to every present phase of an event belongs the possibility of a spontaneous (i.e., self-aware and active) intuitive forward-projection toward any specific future phase of primal process whatsoever, a phase that essentially belongs to consciousness’s protentional continuum. This is clearly signified both by the use of the term “anticipated” and by the recourse to an “analogizing process” that transpires by following the urge to fulfillment. Both terms relate to a “richer” notion of fulfillment than the one signified by “general fulfillment” or by the formal conception of synthesis of fulfillment or synthesis of coincidence. Thanks to anticipatory memory, protention becomes properly quasi-reality, i.e., imaginative-reproductive. In their becoming ‘pictured,’ protentions follow a process of fulfillment that draws its fulfilling character from the ‘picturing,’ i.e., representifying event taking place.\textsuperscript{320}

\textsuperscript{319} “Zum Wesen dieses stetig modifizierten, eine Momentankontinuität ausmachenden Vorgerichtetseins gehört es, im Urprozess eine sukzessiv allgemeine Modifikation zu erfahren im Sinne der Wandlung in stetig neue Erfüllung, die wieder Intentionen sind, wie oben beschrieben. Und auch das liegt implizit in gewisser Weise schon in jeder Phase: Zu ihrem Wesen gehört die Möglichkeit einer voreilenden Vorerinnerung, die sich an irgendeine ‘Stelle’ der mittelbaren Intentionalität setzt, sie antizipiert, und zwar so, dass sie einen analogisierenden Prozess ablaufen lässt, voreilend, wie gesagt, die in einem Zug stetiger Erfüllungsmodifikation die modifizierten Protentionen ablaufen lässt, in denen das Stück des künftigen Ereignisses sich abspielt, als Quasi-Wirklichkeit.”

\textsuperscript{320} Husserl says that in the frame of pre-memory no fulfillment takes place. Cf. Hua Mat. VIII, 95. He clearly refers to particular fulfillment occurring through impressional givenness.
“Leading” means “forward-projected,” while “anticipatory memory” denotes the representifying spontaneity and its proper intuitive fullness.\footnote{Ferrer understands this passage quite differently. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 69. He says that here Husserl describes how a small stretch of fulfillment often suffices for the emergence of spontaneous protentions that prefigure future moments of an event according to the model / matrix of already lapsed phases. The more uninterrupted an event transpires the faster (?) is the “rest” of it prefigured according to the style of the past and the more urging could the “illusion” arise that we are able to prefigure the whole event. But is that really what Husserl says here? Ferrer’s misunderstanding lies in his interpretation of “leading anticipatory memory” as an automatic process, or better said, as a process occurring at the same passive level as primal protentional prefiguring. But it seems rather clear that “possibility” here actually signifies the capacity of a forward directed re-presentification. Even though “analogizing process” partly coincides with what Ferrer says, this term merely specifies the mode in which this re-presentification takes place; it does not denote the fact that this occurs on the level of the originary process of perception.}

Protentions that are “pictured” define a specific protentional area. However, this ‘pictured’ intersection is itself the point of departure for further protentions. Protentions radiating from the ‘pictured’ protentional area, i.e., protentions that extend beyond it, do not only prefigure what-is-coming in relation to the momentary intuited as quasi-fulfilled protentional intersection; they are not only protentions with reference to this quasi-present. They also show themselves as modified protentions, to the extent that they are attached to that ‘pictured’ protentional intersection.\footnote{It is true that Husserl does not explicitly refer to this point in the passage above. The modification he is referring to when he speaks of modified protentions is actually the modification proceeding from the intuitive analogizing process, initiated by the “leading anticipatory memory” in which they appear both as protentions and as protentions undergoing the synthesis of fulfillment.}

Furthermore, it should be clear that when Husserl speaks of an anticipatory memory, he refers neither to a kinesthetically forced “premature” fulfillment (closing our eyes when a glass falls because we “expect” the sound of the breaking glass) nor to protention’s impulse to subsume what-is-coming in advance in an anticipatory image.\footnote{Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 70.} Even though the intertwinement between protention and kinesthesis is worth investigating, one should reject the idea that this occurs by means of the “leading anticipatory memory.” The forced character of kinesthetic urgency does not allow for a transposition to “any one” position of the mediate protentional intentionality; it monopolizes the immediately following position; it actually constitutes the “immediacy” of this next position. The interconnection between kinesthesis and
protention occurs at the level of protention’s own experiential ground and through it, and not by the performance of a re-presentifying making-intuitive.

§4.4.2. Synthesis of fulfillment in ‘picturing’ making-intuitive

Now let us examine another feature of ‘picturing.’ As a mode of making-intuitive, it also attests to the original experiencing of the transition from empty intending to a certain intuitive fullness. Even though this is an essential feature of the confirming making-intuitive, i.e., the synthesis of fulfillment proper, we encounter at this point a peculiar case of the fundamental experience of transition. How should we understand this?

Following what Ferrer calls his first hypothesis, one should grasp the relation between protentional form and proto-impression as a continuously sensed contrast. Their coincidence can be described as the pre-reflective awareness of the transition from the former to the latter, an awareness that originates from the proto-impressional side of the relation and not the other way around. A question that naturally comes up next is whether the ‘picturing’ making-intuitive occurs proto-impressionally or not. Apparently, there is no impressional hyle fulfilling the empty protentional intention, yet it is imbued with a kind of fullness that not only ‘uncovers’ the prefigured contents but also renders intuitable, through the “mere filling,” this additional mode of

324 Ibid., p. 36.
325 Ibid., p. 37. Ferrer is trying here to describe the process of coincidence from two different points of view, namely from the side of protentional form (as a “subsumption” of proto-impression’s originality under protentional intentionality) as well as from the side of proto-impression (as a continuous consciousness of the contrast between “empty” prefiguring and “full” impressional presentation). He clearly rejects the first way of accounting for coincidence. What are the drawbacks of the first case, according to Ferrer? Adopting this view, would lead us to interpret coincidence as the absorption of proto-impression’s character of newness and originarity into the prefiguring function of protention. Yet, it is also possible to leave some room for interpreting this “subsumption” as a “process,” i.e., as a kind of transition that is experienced in par with the realizing process of transformation. This could further mean that proto-impressional originarity is also invested with a newness that is relative to the protentional prefiguring. We should thus distinguish between “newness” owing to its emerging and “newness” with respect to its concrete content. But this is a hypothesis that still needs to be worked on further, since this “layering” of novelty is an exceptional case that opposes the primarily conservative character of protention, i.e., its tendency to pretend what is currently hyletically/retentionally experienced.
fulfillment, their relation to what is not yet distinctively prefigured. In this context, the latter is a clear index both to the coherence and continuity of protention (a continuous tending toward fulfillment) and to the distinction of the various protentional functions. The point we should keep in mind is that this ‘sensing’ of transition or of contrast also occurs within the ‘picturing’ making-intuitive. Husserl was aware of that when he was writing that:

“With respect to protentions we can perhaps similarly say that a small piece of an ‘image’ of the future that is produced in advance is also there; there is also concrete similarity with a ‘rapid’ impoverishment. And so protention passes over into unintuitiveness even faster.” (Hua XXXIII, 74)326

Hence, given that ‘picturing’ involves a sort of ‘sensing’ of transition, in a sense it occurs proto-impressionally.

But we still have to concern ourselves with a few obscure parts that are related to the issue of fulfillment. One pending issue is retention’s involvement in this experience of transition. Another one has to do with the specific role of ‘mere filling’ in this same experience and a last, more general one, refers to the hypothesis of a relation between the modes of making-intuitive Husserl distinguishes in Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis and the general and particular fulfillment we examined earlier, discussed by Husserl in his Bernauer Manuskripte.327

With respect to the first point, i.e., to retention’s involvement in the experience of transition, we have to remember that retention modifies both the previous protentions as well as their confirming fulfillment. In light of the discussed distinction of modes of making-intuitive, we gain new insights into this modification. Through ‘picturing’ making-intuitive we are in a position to grasp in a more complete manner the essence

326 “Hinsichtlich der Protentionen können wir ähnlich vielleicht sagen, ein Stückchen voraus produziertes ‘Bild’ des Künftigen sei auch da, auch konkrete Ähnlichkeit mit ‘rascher’ Verarmung. Und so geht die Protention noch schneller in Unanschaulichkeit über.” What is at stake with this clarification is an issue that will be addressed later and which concerns the possibility of the transformation of our protentional horizon. At this point we are merely acquainted with the formal conditions of experiencing this transformation, albeit through a ‘picted’ regulation of this horizon. Below we will deal with its material aspect as well. Here we see clearly the methodological significance of ‘picturing’ making-intuitive: Husserl investigates the retentional modification of future through the ‘picturing’ of protentions.

327 See above, §4.2.
of our experience of transition. We afford an intuitive access to protention in its involvement in the synthesis of transition without falling prey to the delay imposed to our analysis by the structure of our reflective regard. Now it becomes easier to portray the retentional modification of the as yet unfulfilled protentions.

In the last citation from Husserl’s texts (Hua XXXIII, 74), the reference to the retentional function is patent: “rapid impoverishment” and “passing over to unintuitiveness” as a result of retentional ‘self-emptying.’ Remarkably, both processes are here referred to as undergone by protention and not by proto-impression. Accounting for protention’s retentional modification presupposes that protention remains protention in this modification, i.e., it can be thematized as such by our reflective regard. This indicates that we are faced with the danger of trying to clarify this modification while protention has been already fulfilled by ‘picturing’ and is consequently regarded as a higher-order phenomenon, namely the “anticipatory memory,” to which we referred above. Trying to avert this danger, it proves helpful to employ the distinction between the possibility of ‘clarifying’ fulfillment and its performance.\textsuperscript{328} Focusing on this distinction, one notices that while the former is traced in a purely protentional dimension, as an eidetic feature of protention itself, the latter is enacted by expectation (Erwartung). Thus, the possibility of ‘picturing’ lies already in the passive level of time-constitution. However, its performance is marked by spontaneity. Even though we may consider the starting-point of its performance as passively determined –‘picturing’ may be initiated by a passive association– performance itself is a spontaneous/active accomplishment.

Admittedly there is not enough textual support to lead such a claim further. Thus we will leave this matter open by simply pointing out two benefits we get from the distinction above.

\textsuperscript{328} Cf. Hua XI, 94: “Die Enthüllung der einen führt auf Selbstgebung; sie hat in gewisser Weise das Selbst schon im voraus, schon potentiell in sich. Die leere Erwartung aber nicht. Was in ihr als Potentialität liegt, ist nichts anderes als jene ausmalende Anschauung, die kein Selbst in sich gegeben hat.” DeRoo has already implicitly made use of this distinction, without however elaborating it further. While protention is the proper eidetic field where the distinction between “clarifying” and “confirming” intuiting applies, protention merely ‘enables’ expectation to realize the former mode of intuiting. Cf. DeRoo (2013), pp. 23 & 52. To our knowledge, DeRoo and Ferrer are the only ones so far who have tried to analyze protention by means of the modes of making-intuitive.
First, even though this “possibility” of clarifying fulfillment may indeed be an eidetic feature of protentional consciousness, as such it does not enable us to describe the experiential structure of the synthesis of transition; it does not provide us with any experiential bearing for analyzing it. By contrast, the overall benefit of focusing on the modes of making-intuitive is that we discover a formal reference to such an experiential basis. This restriction is dictated by the kind of ‘awakening’ that proceeds from phenomenological reflection itself: preserving protention’s essential indeterminateness within phenomenological reflection implies that we grasp its ‘picturing’ making-intuitive as not (yet) performed.329

Second, if ‘picturing’ is effected by expectation, then our experience of transition will already have an impressional basis, namely the intuitive ground of the representifying act of expectation occurring as a present act. But this openly overshadows the primordiality of the synthesis of coincidence taking place between empty intentions and their ‘picturing’ fullness. How can we then thematize the original accomplishment of such synthesis? Does the experience of this synthesis exhibit the same eidetic structure with the one taking place between protentional prefiguring and proto-impression in its impressional form, i.e., the confirming mode of fulfillment, or is it rather the experience of the coincidence between empty intending and an intuitive indeterminateness? Even though we do not have an impressional confirming, we still have a consciousness of the difference between protention and a kind of intuitiveness that is indeterminate and re-presentifying.330

329 Cf. Fink (1966), p. 24. Fink says that what is revealed by the intuitive mode of expectation or pre-memory (Vorerinnerung) is a “possibility” and this occurs in an imaginative intuitiveness through which a general vague prefiguring is given. Cf. Fink (1966), p. 39f. Husserl also says that the ‘emptiness’ of protention qua ‘empty presentation’ is the potentiality of what actualizes itself in corresponding intuitions and syntheses of clarification. Cf. Hua XI, 93f. It is rather obvious that the possibility/potentiality refers to the intended as such, to its modes of appearance and not to protention’s ability to be fulfilled, either in a synthesis of clarification or in a synthesis of confirmation. Concerning Fink’s description, many issues arise: what exactly is the role of imagination in experiencing the “possibilities” of determination? One also wonders whether one should lightheartedly accept the quasi-explanatory combination of the adjectives “general” (allgemeine) and “vague” (vage) as characterizations of prefiguring. We have already hinted at their problematic equation with respect to retention’s function. See above, p. 83.

330 One might say that the continuity signified by the experience of this transition denotes our pre-reflective awareness of the continuous connection of empty protentional prefiguring with its respective possibilities of being fulfilled. DeRoo describes this as a closer determination (Näherbestimmung) of the field of possibility of the intended object. Cf. DeRoo (2013), p. 23. Yet it seems that he has
that sense, the primordiality of transition is by no means endangered as it is still operative within and through ‘picturing.’

Be that as it may, we now have in our hands an important outcome: ‘picturing’ enriches protentional prefiguring by determining more closely the possibilities of fulfillment. Yet we have to take into account that this enrichment is essentially two-fold and has to be clarified in both its aspects: it is content-enrichment as well as fullness-enrichment. The former has to do with the prefiguring function of protention which produces a continuously refined content; the latter refers to the manner in which consciousness appears to itself in its primal tendency toward fulfillment. ‘Picturing’ can then also be regarded as an “active” presentation of this primordial tendency or striving.331

We are now in a position to point out some further essential features of the retentional modification of protention we discussed earlier, since ‘picturing’ lets us see protention in its dynamic character. First, a protention that is retained is retained in its inability to prefigure the present proto-impression in its intuitive fullness.332 What is retained is this experienced contrast between the emptiness of protention and the proto-impression that fulfilled it. Protention is retained as fulfilled, yet it is retained as fulfilled protention.

confused the two kinds of fulfillment with respect to this “closer determination.” The latter is possible only in the synthesis of confirmation, since Husserl, at the exact point to which DeRoo refers, contrasts it to the ‘excess’ of the prefiguring that is exhibited in the case of ‘picturing,’ i.e., to what exceeds the prefiguring and appears in the clarifying making-intuitive as a ‘mere filling.’ The “closer determination” presupposes the self-givenness peculiar to the confirming making-intuitive.

Concerning the possibilities of being fulfilled, regardless of whether these possibilities refer to the intuitive staging of the potential lived-bodily state and the correlative surrounding configuration or to the determinations of the object itself, they are experienced as coherent along the lines of the protentional prefiguring.

331 Ferrer has drawn the attention to this presentation of primordial striving. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 61. However, due to his different understanding of ‘picturing’ intuition as well as of “anticipatory memory,” we are examining it in a wholly different context with a view to considering it as a starting-point for a reductive process that can reveal the experiential ground of our awareness of this primordial striving. On a critical appraisal of Husserl’s view of “intentionality” and “striving” (Streben) cf. Theodorou (2015), §4.10.1.

Second, due to retention’s tendency toward self-emptying, we are now faced with a difficult and complex situation. We need to understand in what sense the retained protention has now become a “dying” content.\textsuperscript{333} Protention’s inability to prefigure proto-impression in its concreteness now appears through another kind of inability: namely, through retention’s inability to preserve what is given as new.\textsuperscript{334} More specifically, we must clarify how retentional modification of protention manages to retain the latter’s essential ‘emptiness.’ This retained emptiness should be seen in two ways: both as the character of the retentionally unmodified protention –to which the retentional modification implicitly refers– and as the emptiness of the protentional horizon apart from the synthesis of particular fulfillment. In other words, the difficulty lies in articulating this enfolding of protention’s original ‘emptiness’ within a ‘fullness’ that gradually dies out, i.e., that undergoes retentional ‘emptying.’ The complexity of this situation is solely due to the level of abstractness of our present description, for such an analysis cannot be properly performed without reference to the content that is involved in the primary temporalizing synthesis. We will see below what changes once we take into account the content-aspect of protentional and retentional consciousness.

\textbf{§4.4.3. Mere Filling}

Returning to what had been said earlier, we referred to two other points that need to be discussed with respect to protention’s modes of becoming intuitive, namely to the peculiar fullness denoted by the term “mere filling” and to the relation between, on the one hand, those modes of making-intuitive and, on the other hand, general and particular fulfillment.

With respect to ‘mere filling’ it was pointed out that in the course of a ‘picturing’ making-intuitive there is always a part of it which does not enter into a synthesis of coincidence, i.e. a residual emptiness. ‘Mere filling’ serves as the undifferentiated fullness through which this residual emptiness is integrated to the unitary fulfillment

\textsuperscript{333} Ibid., p. 38.

\textsuperscript{334} Ibid., p. 37.
of what is prefigured. We connected this peculiar form of fullness with two factors: a) protentional prefiguring’s inability to constitute the givenness of the proto-impressional self of what-is-coming and b) its parallel inability to include the hyletic amplitude of what-is-coming. ‘Mere filling’ is consciousness’s way to spontaneously compensate these two “weaknesses.” It contributes thereby to achieving the conscious coherence and continuity of protention in the process of an ‘anticipatory memory.’ Through this achievement it also offers us an experiential basis for examining the various protentional functions in a unitary fashion, i.e., in their inherent continuity. This will become clear below, once we will try to determine how protention functions and what contents it protends in the case of unnoticed background consciousness.335

Restricting our description to sense-perception and using noematic terms, ‘mere filling’ signifies the concordant reference of the actually experienced aspect of an object to its yet unseen aspects, i.e., to its inner horizon. By ‘picturing’ its back side we are not only ‘picturing’ its well-defined prefigured properties but also what eludes such predetermination.336 The fact that this residual emptiness is also somehow fulfilled allows us to understand that it is permeated by a protentional continuity. One can also consider it as the protentional horizon that lies ahead of the actually-now ‘pictured’ properties of the back side of the object. In other words, through ‘picturing’ making-intuitive, each prefigured aspect of the object is actually experienced as pointing to aspects that do not fully coincide with it. Suggestively, even the aspect I am now actually experiencing as self-given, i.e., as the proto-impressional origin of the protention of the pictured back side of the object, is not a fixed fullness but involves ongoing protentions too. The ‘mere filling’ of the back side of the object has an effect on such protentions.

At this point the role of protentional mediate intentionality attains great significance. We saw earlier that through this intentionality protention prefigures its continuous transition to next protentions.337 Each protention is directed to the

335 See below, §6.7.
336 This can be seen as the most primordial origin of what Husserl denoted with the term “open possibilities.” Cf. *EU*, 105ff.
337 See above, §4.2.
following one and through it to the one following and so on. We noted that this intentionality essentially undergoes only a “relative fulfillment.” What ‘mere filling’ does is to reveal this protentional implication in the context of a unitary particular prefiguration. Regardless of the hyletic determination of this prefiguring (remember: we are currently focusing on the synthesis of coincidence in abstraction from its content determination, which by no means entails that this synthesis can actually occur without it or that it is able to appear as a prefigured “objective” content),338 the unity of the protentional horizon is experienced in the ‘picturing’ of protention.339

What can be experienced as protentional on the ground of and beyond the quasi-present “image” mirrors in the residual emptiness proper to ‘mere filling.’

But let us see how Husserl describes the mediate intentionality:

“Expectation [here used in its broad sense] is headed for the following event <and/or> for what comes after the event. <It has> a fleeting event-horizon, a changeable stretch. Therein lies the fact that intentionality is directed in a mediate fashion toward everything that can be ideally distinguished in what-is-coming. If we think the continuum in phases, it proceeds from <a> phase to the next one, but through this to the following one, through this to the one that comes next and in this manner it proceeds to all the phases. We may as well say that in every inner limit-point it is headed toward any adjoining stretch of succession whatsoever, but through it toward any further

338 Likewise, this synthesis does not appear as a prefigured content. In terms of a distinction we shall discuss below, R-protentions (retentional-protentions) cannot be considered as “modifications” of H-protentions (hyletic-protentions), i.e., they can never be anticipated as a hyletic correlative of the retentional modifications. Paraphrasing Held, “the continuation of intentional retentional-protentional structure of life as such” is not a temporal event triggered by the emergence of hyletic qualities. “The continuation of intentional life is not necessarily such a single occurrence which can be objectively intended.” Cf. Held (2010), p. 103-105. Nevertheless, such an objectification is thinkable as an outcome of a reflective turning of our regard to this flowing continuation, so long as we have not carried out the relative reduction in its full degree. For instance, such a continuation may be ascribed to the proto-impressional overabundance in relation to protention as an inexhaustible affective source pulling consciousness forward. If one attributes this proto-impressional excess to the world or worldly objects, then our intentional life’s continuation is accessible through the same modes of givenness as any worldly event, something that would deprive the synthesis of transition from its primordial sensing character. However, affection per se is a possibly fruitful ground on which the variety of modes of givenness can be properly described.

339 This unity is nothing more than the formal unity of time. Cf. EU, 192. There Husserl says: “Oder: jede Anschauung hat ihren Horizont, der entfaltbar ist in eine Unendlichkeit von Anschauungen, denen Gegenständlichkeiten entsprechen, die durch diese Entfaltung als in einer Zeit gegeben bewusst werden; es ist eine Zeit, die nach der Entfaltung, also in der Gegebenheit, sich herausstellt als dieselbe, der auch die anschauenden Erlebnisse selbst und die Erlebnisse des Ich überhaupt angehören.”
following stretch, no matter how we think of the division of the stretches as ideally carried out.” (Hua XXXIII, 8)

In light of our abstraction from the content, we should not attempt to interpret this ideal division of stretches as depending on the particularity of the hyletic quality of each phase. Such an abstraction implies that our reductive regard is tentatively directed to the formal structure of the synthesis of coincidence and not to the hyletic ground on which it occurs. In that sense, in the context of a stepwise reductive method, “abstracting” can serve as a gradual delimitation of the synthetic function that is to be set out of play. In order to carry out an appropriate de-synthesizing that would lead us to this intuitive ground, it is necessary to examine this synthesis in its proper function.

“Ideality,” in Husserl’s text, denotes simply the thinkable possibility of primal synthesis as ongoing synthesis. In order for us to achieve a proper phenomenological

340 “Die Erwartung geht auf das kommende Ereignis, <bzw.> Kommendes vom Ereignis, <sie hat> einen fließenden Ereignishorizont, eine wandelbare Strecke. Darin liegt, dass die Intentionalität kontinuierlich mittelbar gerichtet ist auf alles im Kommenden ideell zu Unterscheidende. Sie geht, wenn wir das Kontinuum in Phasen denken, von <einer> Phase zur nächsten, aber durch sie hindurch auf die folgende, durch sie hindurch auf die wiederfolgende und so auf alle Phasen. Ebenso gut können wir sagen, in jedem inneren Grenzpunkt geht sie auf irgendeine angrenzende Folgestrecke, aber durch sie hindurch auf jede weitere folgende Strecke, wie immer wir die Streckenteilung ideell vollzogen denken.”

341 This is actually what Ferrer does. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 56. He explicitly employs the apprehension/content model as a means to explain how this ideal prefiguring division should be understood. Given the context of this employment (the relevant subchapter’s title is “Protention of the totality of a sensual datum”) his gesture seems justified. The unfulfilled protentional horizon becomes ideally divided through a non-objectifying apprehension of the contents that are ideally prefigured on the basis of what is really immanent given. Regardless of the countless difficulties tied with the application of the model in explaining the protentional function (What serves as intuitive basis for the relevant synthetic accomplishment? Is it the same for the protentional prefiguration both of the foreground and of the background of our attention? Does the indistinctive appearance of the background undergo the apprehension as sensual datum [Empfindungsdatum], sense-datum [Sinnesdatum] or as a more enriched intuitive content?), it is certain that what will serve as intuitive basis will have “already” been temporally “stretched” through the primal synthesis of transition. “Ideality,” in this sense, denotes simply the thinkable possibility of this primal synthesis as ongoing.

342 In light of this clarification and refining a relevant comment from Held, we can distinguish between abstractions that are simple preparatory thematic limitations and abstractions that are directed by an already progressing reduction. Cf. Held (1966), p. 21, n. 2.

343 Reduction as a de-synthesizing process involves minute methodological gestures that are responsible for its consistent performance.
understanding of this ideality it is better to refer it back to the possibility of ‘picturing’
intuition. For it is the very performance of the ‘picturing’ that reveals ideal
individuality as a source of eventual fulfillment.

‘Mere filling’ itself makes intuitive the continuity of what escapes the explicit
protentional prefiguration. It is through this continuity that the sensing of the
synthesis of coincidence between empty protention and ‘picturing’ maintains its
coherence as well.

§4.4.4. Modes of making-intuitive in their relation to ‘general’ and ‘particular’
fulfillment

This brings us straight to the next point: is there any kind of relation between the two
modes of protential making-intuitive, i.e. confirming and picturing ones, on the one
hand, and the two temporal kinds of fulfillment, i.e. general and particular one, on the
other hand?

When discussing the novelties introduced by Husserl in his later analyses of time-
consciousness, especially the ones that are closely related with his renewed interest in
protention, we referred to two kinds of fulfillment: “general” and “particular”
fulfillment.344 The latter signifies the fulfillment of the protentions intending the
following proto-impression and in that way it is the one responsible for the
constitution of what is currently given as present. The former denotes the fulfilling
process “occurring” between each protention and its following proto-impression along
the whole retentional horizon.

In the case of “general” fulfillment, consciousness of the synthesis of fulfillment
involves the retention of the previous protention along with its fulfillment across the
various degrees of retentional immersion. Since we have no complete fulfillment
attained by proto-impressional givenness, this means that each protention that accrues
to each retentional phase is fulfilled in two respects: a) as effecting the unity of a re-
presentifiable protention as part of an encompassing temporal stretch and b) as

344 See above, §4.2.
projecting the further retentional modification of itself and of the retentional modification to which it is attached at each phase. “Particular” fulfillment, on the other hand, refers to the synthesis of fulfillment taking place between an empty protentional intention and the corresponding proto-impression that fulfills it, either totally or partially. Contrary to what happens with “general” fulfillment, here proto-impressional hyle is a determining factor. Through this synthesis a single sensual datum is constituted as unitary and as enduring. To be more precise, restricted to its protentional aspect, fulfillment here signifies the fact that a protentional prefiguration initiates the retentional – proto-impressional synthesis of coincidence as a sensing of the proto-impressional emergence or change.

What one should ask now is whether these two forms of fulfillment are somehow related to the two modes of making-intuitive we examined above. Let us try to list the apparent commonalities and differences. First of all, particular fulfillment seems to describe in purely formal-temporal terms the synthesis that occurs in the case of confirming making-intuitive. In both cases an expectation / protention is involved in a synthesis of fulfillment with a following perception / proto-impressional givenness. This means either that we have a partial overlapping between the two phenomena or that Husserl refers to the same phenomenon in different terms and from different perspectives.

Nevertheless, once we focus on the details, important differences come to light. ‘Confirming’ posits the fulfilling part as ‘real,’ while at the same time it reveals a division of what, in this ‘real,’ undergoes fulfillment: we have a “primary” fulfillment and a “secondary” fulfillment, since not everything that is fulfilled is distinctively prefigured by protention. Beyond particular fulfillment, there is a sort of fulfilling ‘excess.’ It constitutes a sort of ‘excess’ precisely because it does not fulfill as a determinate image. It constitutes a ‘fulfillment,’ nevertheless, since a part of the empty protentional intention had somehow implicitly intended it in the widest manner possible. ‘Excess’ is experienced as somehow belonging to the object; it takes on the meaning “property.” Such an ascription now serves as a fixed experiential field in

345 In *Hua XI*, 79, Husserl says: “Für die Erwartung besagt das, dass sie in eine Synthese tritt mit einer entsprechenden Wahrnehmung, das bloß Erwartete identifiziert sich mit dem wirklich Kommenden, als die Erwartung Erfüllenden.”
which the process of expli
cation takes place. ‘Excess’ is what Husserl calls “closer
determination.”

“What occurs here beyond what is prefigured, beyond what is determinately expected, we characterize it not merely as filling [Füllsel], but rather as closer determination [Näherbestimmung]. As such the latter has the character of fulfillment. What first comes on the scene as coinciding with the prefigured element is a primary fulfillment. But the overabundance that intuition supplies is also a fulfilling, a secondary one, insofar as it is given as belonging to the object itself which is intended there and is now given to intuition as itself, precisely fulfilling the intention.” (Hua XI, 79f.; Steinbock’s translation, slightly altered)346

The other-side of the same coin is nothing else than the residual emptiness proper to “mere filling” we examined above. The latter is the component of protentional intentionality without which it would be impossible to describe ‘excess’ as a sort of confirming fulfillment.

That being said, we still need to explain in what respect the “particular” fulfillment differs from the “confirming” mode of making-intuitive, according to what has been said so far. As already pointed out, we are clearly referring to two different levels of constitution. In the case of “particular” fulfillment, it is proto-impression that fulfills the protentional empty intention. Proto-impression is through and through fulfilling in a fundamental sense. ‘Overabundance’ is a determination that can be attributed to proto-impressional givenness only from the perspective of confirming fulfillment. The particularity of ‘particular’ fulfillment does not mean that it is dependent on the concreteness of what is being constituted. Proto-impression is not individualized according to its hyletic quality; it is what individualizes the hyletic quality as pertaining to a temporal givenness defined by the tendency toward fulfillment. It is examined solely in its functional role, i.e., as the primordial emerging

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346 “Was hier über die Vorzeichnung, über das bestimmt Erwartete hinaus eintritt, ist nicht bloss charakterisiert als Füllsel, sondern als Näherbestimmung. Diese aber hat als solche Erfüllungskarakter. Das erstlich als Deckung der Vorzeichnung Eintretende ist das primär Erfüllende; sekundär ist aber auch das Superplus, das die Anschauung beibringt, erfüllend, sofern es gegeben ist als zu dem Gegenstand selbst gehörig, der da intendiert ist und der nun als er selbst zur Anschauung kommt, die Intention eben erfüllend.”

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of hyle. Ascribing to it, qua functional, an instance of ‘surplus’ would lead to a
rather paradoxical situation: the culminating point of fullness is reached regardless of
the protentional tendency leading to it.

The “enriched” view of protentional tending toward fulfillment we get thanks to
the distinction of the modes of its making-intuitive does not imply that we are merely
examining protention in its role within a higher constitutive level. We are also
introducing a distinct level of description. This can be easily discerned if we turn our
attention to the ‘picturing’ mode of making-intuitive in its relation with ‘particular’
fulfillment. We referred earlier to ‘picturing’ as the act which reveals possibilities of
fulfillment, as relating to what is prefigured, and as contributing to its further
determination. Something particular will arrive but we are expecting more than just its
proto-impressional specific mode of givenness, which was already implied by the
fulfilling task of ‘confirming’ making-intuitive. Unlike the latter, ‘picturing’ lacks
the intuitive fullness proper to confirming fulfillment; whatever appears in picturing
does so as an eventual determination in an open range of other unmotivated
determinations.

It should be noted that the mode of givenness of what is expected through
‘picturing’ – once it is connected with empty presentations in general – is not a

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347 Proto-impressional emergence may refer both to impressional hyle and to another, “weaker” kind of
intuition that is the basis for the experience of more “transitory” or “elusive” phenomena, such as
instincts, drives or even tradition. On that, cf. Brudzinska (2010). We will try to examine how this kind
of “weaker” intuition is involved in the formation of protentional consciousness and how this formation
can actually be experienced through this kind of intuition.

348 Nevertheless, such an ascription is not irrelevant once we consider the hyletic aspect of proto-
impresion. Here prefiguration plays an important role. Synthesis of coincidence occurs between a
‘formed’ protention (i.e., formed with respect to the anticipated hyletic quality) and the hyletic
givenness that fulfills it, either partially or totally. Formation of protentional prefiguration is motivated
by the ongoing retentional process and it follows a specific typology that we will examine below, once
we will explicitly turn our attention to the content aspect of protentional consciousness.

349 Schematically, this can be expressed through the distinction between the “that it is” (Daß-Sein) and
“how it is” (So-Sein). The proto-impressional “that it is,” nevertheless, is not yet experienced as
“reality.”

350 Cf. EU, 107. The designation “unmotivated” highlights the universality of this structure, i.e., its
independence from the instances of experiencing an inhibition of the process of fulfillment. ‘Picturing’
is not necessarily motivated by a state of uncertainty. I can freely (choose to) picture how a situation
will proceed without being motivated by a strenuous or extraordinary state of affairs.
temporal modality: ‘picturing’ as such does not posit the content as a future real content, i.e., it does not bestow it with the sense ‘futurally real.’ This is carried out by expectation, i.e., in the ‘picturing’ proper to protention. Its role is to uncover the predeterminations by means of a quasi-fulfillment (understood as quasi-‘confirming,’ so to say).

From a methodological point of view, the fact that, within the frame of our protentional consciousness, this quasi-fulfillment actually accomplishes a determination of the prefiguration and of what is prefigured, becomes accessible by restricting our reflective regard to ‘particular’ fulfillment. The reductive process reveals the relevant experiential ground that enables ‘clarification,’ i.e., a further determination of protentional intending. Protention is examined here through the experience of its fulfillment in the relevant synthesis of coincidence, i.e., in the intuitable proximity to the maximal point of fullness. Focusing on it brings to light the distinction between protention’s two modes of making-intuitive: confirming and picturing. Thematizing the essential possibility of protention’s ‘picturing,’ as a constant eidetic possibility, constitutes a more refined consideration of this proximity to fullness. In fact, either explicitly or implicitly, it is through the latter that the “not-yet” –thus already grasped as the experienced imminence of the determination of modes of givenness– offers itself to various modes of experience.351 Even though

351 We could as well point to this experience as the origin of any phenomenological variant of our relation with the future. As an example, we see Levinas almost explicitly inhabiting this strenuous proximity. Speaking about future and death he says: “This future of death determines the future for us, the future insofar as it is not present. It determines what in the future contrasts strongly with all anticipation, projection and élan,” Levinas (1987), p. 80. Earlier he had explained in what sense death contrasts anticipations and projections: “Death is the impossibility of having a project. This approach of death indicates that we are in relation with something that is absolutely other, something bearing alterity not as a provisional determination we can assimilate through enjoyment, but as something whose very existence is made of alterity” (Ibid., p. 74, emphasis added). Insofar as this “relation with something that is absolutely other” is to be regarded as a phenomenological fact, i.e., a relation in its givenness, we can read Levinas’s words as an attempt to unravel within this primal experience of imminence an allegedly underlying radical experience of impossibility. Evasion of the provisional character of determination is only possible and utterable if one thematizes it within the living dimension of protentional consciousness. With respect to its radicality, this experience would signify the escape from its subsumption under “the possibility of a re-turn ad infinitum,” i.e., under what Derrida describes as the basis for a relation with infinity. Cf. Derrida (1973), p. 67. In Levinas’s terms, this evasion is a component or a case of the evasion/escape he was envisaging in his essay On Escape, i.e., “the inner structure of the fact of self-positing.” Cf. Levinas (2003), p. 57. Interestingly, following the descriptions of On Escape, death can only appear to escape if escape reflects upon itself. Ibid., p. 67. Putting aside the admittedly important transformations of “escape” throughout Levinas’s work, if
‘confirming’ making-intuitive is also (and primarily) intuitive determination of modes of givenness, its accomplishment does not allow us to sketchily grasp in an original manner the determining process in its protentional tendency or, conversely, the determining character of protentional tendency. Our regard is carried away toward these realized modes of givenness qua realized. In that sense, we are once again confined within the limits of reflection and its “delayed” exposition of protention’s essential features. Nonetheless, we are always in a position to thematize this “imminence” of the modes of givenness as experienced within this fulfilling synthesis of coincidence through the ‘picturing’ making-intuitive, i.e., the quasi-presentification of the modes of givenness.\footnote{Naturally the experienced imminence can be traced at various levels and in noetic as well as noematic terms: kinesthetically, impressionally, sensibly etc. For instance, kinesthesis is always characterized by a tendentious readiness to change.}

We must now turn to a feature we have neglected so far. It concerns an issue that introduces us to the explicit investigation of protention’s material aspect. Does the performance of protentional ‘picturing,’ the uncovering of future possible determinations of what is prefigured, unfold along a \textit{concrete configuration} of protentional horizon? Does our restrictive reflective regard on the experience of the synthesis of fulfillment, as well as our current investigation of protention, impose upon the ‘picturing’ drama an exogenous and, as it were, artificial dependence from a proto-impressional fixedness of protentional formation? ‘Picturing’ of protention always follows determinate lines of possible fulfillment, yet they are not traversed as inescapable. But the question is whether these determinate lines of possible fulfillment are projected forward as fixed \textit{by the expectation} that actualizes this ‘picturing’ or, alternatively, whether they are already pre-formed, in a certain fixity, \textit{within the protentional proximity} toward fulfillment. Are they determined purely by the continuity of the latter or does ‘picturing’ impose upon what it pictures a distinct
kind of determination? In short, the main point we have to clarify is the following: is it possible to conceive of protentions that are not to some extent determined?\footnote{Montagova dismisses this question as rather speculative. Cf. Montagova (2013), p. 41. She seems to endorse Lohmar’s reluctance concerning the existence of what he will call “unspecific protention.” We will discuss this issue below. Such a clear-cut stance, nevertheless, can only be justified in the context of an explicit employment of \textit{genetic} analysis as the appropriate form of analysis of protentional consciousness.}

To offer a definite reply to these questions, first, one should obtain a clear view of the concreteness that is at stake. It is certain that within the protentional tendency toward fulfillment we cannot trace any kind of concreteness strictly analogous to the one stemming from proto-impressional fulfillment. Accepting such a concreteness within protentional consciousness would ultimately lead us to grasp our tendency toward fulfillment \textit{sub specie aeternitatis}. Ramifications of possibilities would be seen as simply “available” and reaching out to them would be a temporally “neutral” event, with no repercussion on their formation at all. Something like that would simply amount to an overall dismissal of our experiential life’s protentional dynamic. Thus, proto-impressional concreteness differs radically from the kind of concreteness that pertains to protentions.

Second, concreteness should be examined in connection with retentio

nal modifications. The latter contribute to protentional concreteness as long as they play an essential role in the sensing of continuity. Traversing protentions involves a kind of temporal ordering that is established by the active exercise of ‘picturing.’ We are here faced with a fundamental discrepancy between the temporal ordering of ‘picturing,’ on the one hand, and the temporal ordering of what is ‘pictured,’ on the other. Even though retentio
nal modifications continuously occur along the ‘picturing’ activity itself, constituting thus the continuity of its performance, the content they retain has not been given by a ‘confirming’ fulfillment, i.e., in an impressional mode of givenness. In a sense, the pictured temporal ordering does not obey to the same strict continuity peculiar to ‘picturing.’ The prefix ‘quasi-’ attains here an exceptional significance. It denotes the emergence of a quasi-duration which has the explicit character of ‘possible’ duration, as opposed to plainly ‘imagined’ duration which is detached from the temporal fixedness that stems from primal synthesis of
coincidence. If we abstract from the impressional basis of the ‘picturing’ event, i.e., the temporal ordering established by the actual performance of the act, we are in a position to discern that, at the level of pictured temporal ordering, even though no strict continuity is necessary for the determination of the possibilities of fulfillment (it may be achieved by a sporadic quasi-confirming), each episode bears with it the aspiration for a possible continuous traversing connecting those sporadic incidents of determination.

We can clarify what this aspiration entails by pursuing a tentative iteration of representifying acts: we can ‘picture’ a possible recollection of the determinations surrounding a possible quasi-confirmation, a quasi-recollection within the protentional horizon traversed by this same ‘picturing.’ Even though the relevant surrounding determinations may have never been ‘pictured,’ i.e., were not accomplished by the ‘picturing’ act, they are always correlatives of a possible future recollection. Once again we must stress the fact that these essential moments are instilled to the ‘picturing’ event by the expectation that accomplishes it. We have to bear in mind that this possible future recollection is correlated to possible future determinations (which are past in relation to the moment of quasi-recollecting), not only with respect to the open undetermined range of inner and outer horizons (of the relevant object-to-be-perceived), but also with respect to the open range of the possible “routes” of determining those possible horizons. The future possible recollecting act is directed toward an act-to-be-recollected as well as to its object, both situated within our currently futural horizon.354

Despite this “volatile” correlation, the aspiration for temporal continuity belongs to the eidetic structure of each event and hence is independent from its actual performance and what correlates to it. The peculiarity of the protentional ‘picturing’ rests on an additional condition that somehow restricts the range of variance of possible determinations: each possible future recollection of the determinations that

354 The fact that we can vary these iterations indefinitely is an indication that we never experience the future (even in the straining protentional proximity) as exhausted in this possible iterations or, more precisely, as articulated solely by the indefinite possibilities of these iterations. That being said, it is always through this protentional proximity that this more “radical” indeterminateness is somehow given.
have not been envisaged in the ‘picturing’ has a horizon of indeterminacy that touches upon the currently realized determinations. No future recollection is able to enforce its fluctuation backwards, beyond the limit of my currently sensing synthesis of fulfillment. The actual synthesis of fulfillment poses a limit to future’s indeterminateness. When we ‘picture’ protentions we are bound by this indeterminateness to such extent that we cannot recognize in it the source of determination of those protentions that are ‘pictured’ in it. From a phenomenological perspective, the variability that pertains to possible determinations can be founded only on the experience of the protentional proximity toward maximum fullness.355

At this point we should reformulate the important question already posed before: is the limitation that we brought to light, through a specific case of re-presentifying iterations, somehow connected with the concreteness of protention and thus set essentially by protention itself? Or is it rather an eidetic feature of expectation (the “hosting” underlying re-presentification that performs the ‘picturing’), i.e., something originating from expectation’s own intuitive specificity?

This dilemma forces us to put to test a provisional distinction of how the “style of the past is projected into the future.”356 Is this concreteness, i.e., the limitation of indeterminateness, achieved by the just-past retentions through an immediate influence on the proximate protentions? Or does this projection rather radiate within an undifferentiated retentional horizon, from a quite “articulate” expectation? The former case amounts to a mode of protentional determination that pertains to protentional consciousness without any implicit recourse to a higher-order act. The

355 This protentional proximity toward fullness does not appear solely as a limit for future’s fluctuation; it is also the field which makes this fluctuation appear, for it constitutes the “dative” of its appearance as one of future’s modes of givenness. Protention’s double intentionality becomes accessible for description within the field of proximity to maximum fullness. Future’s boundedness by the “dative” of its appearance cannot be shattered by any kind of recourse to phenomena that exhibit the essential limitations of transcendental-constitutive subjectivity, such as death, birth, sleep, unconsciousness etc. Noematic modes of givenness are able to serve as ground for determining the corresponding experiences of the future, only if the accompanying transformations of this “dative” are themselves experienced in a coherent manner. Otherwise appearing becomes an inherited ontological category whose history we are unable to retrieve.

356 Hua XXXIII, 38.
latter case allows us to account for the inner coherence of protentional prefigurations as parts of more refined and determinate expectations.

§4.5. Protention and its double intentionality

The previous question will later find its proper place in the material account of protention. Before we move, however, on to the material aspect of protention, it is necessary to briefly examine to what extent the new account of time-consciousness in the Bernauer Manuskripte also shows an interest in protention’s double intentional structure.

We saw that Husserl now considers proto-impression in its role as fulfilled protention.\(^{357}\) A living-experience is temporally constituted along the modification of the previously empty intention into a primal presenting perception.\(^{358}\) This modification is experienced through our sensing of the synthesis of coincidence taking place between what was emptily intended and what is primally present. The primally present datum appears proto-impressionally as an already apprehended content. What emerges proto-impressionally emerges in the context of a protention that is directed forward toward the coming phase. In virtue of what Husserl calls “mediate intentionality,” this directedness is never exhausted to the following phase and to what is intended in it. The content is experienced as already apprehended in the context of a continuous formation of the protentional horizon. This means that the hyletic nexus in which these contents are to be integrated is not defined by a fixed sense-giving apprehension. The fact that the content is experienced as already apprehended attests to the past status of this apprehension, i.e., to its own unfolding within this process: one was already waiting for the following content in a specific mode and it is retained along with the content that emerged under its scope. The retained experiences influence its formation by forecasting the range of its possible

\(^{357}\) Hua XXXIII, 7.

\(^{358}\) Hua XXXIII, 4f.: “Zuerst ist eine leere Erwartung, und dann ist der Punkt der Urwahrnehmung, die selbst ein intentionales Erlebnis ist. Aber dieses Erlebnis wird doch im Fluss erst durch Eintreten der Urpräsenzen als füllende Inhalte in die vorhergehende Leerintention, die sich damit wandelt in urpräsentierende Wahrnehmung.”
forms. Even though a content is *proto-impressionally* present as a fulfilled protention, protention’s fulfillment and subsequent retentional modification enriches the proto-impressional apprehension. What is implied in this genetic relation is that sense-formation precedes the presence of the corresponding data in a strictly temporal sense.\(^{359}\)

Retentional and protentional modifications are not only responsible for the constitution of temporal objects. As we saw earlier, consciousness is permeated by a two-fold intentional directedness. We discussed above the important role of longitudinal intentionality with respect to our pre-reflective self-awareness.\(^{360}\) As one can easily understand, the same two-fold intentionality is also at work within protention. Protentional prefiguration does not refer to a protentional content detached from the consciousness to which it will be given. Thus, except for the various content-determinations, consciousness also protends its own continuation. That was already implicit in the discussion of mediate intentionality: the fact that protentional continuity is not limited to bringing about the determination of the following phase but goes through it to the following etc. shows that consciousness protends its own synthesis of transition. The following phases will be experienced through a transformation of the empty protentional horizon into a protentional proximity toward fullness; this transformation will be experienced as a furthering of protentional prefiguration or, as we shall see, as a transformation of the protentional horizon qua horizon. Consciousness undergoes this change by being consciousness of this change.

\(^{359}\) Whether or not this temporal priority applies to every aspect of our experiential life is a matter that needs to be examined thoroughly. Honghe Wang suggests that this model does not apply to certain aspects of our sense-perception. Ascribing it to a specific protentional function that will be discussed below, he claims that the background sphere of our perceptual field (the one consisting of the spheres of the noticed and unnoticed but not of the attended) is inevitably constituted in a static manner, i.e., through the founding of the sense-giving upon pre-given sense-data. Cf. Wang (2016), p. 61. We will see that this claim calls for further specifications that have to do with how the continuity between the background and the foreground is established. See below, §6.7. We shall deal with this issue in terms of the interrelation between various protentional functions. To anticipate what will follow, we fully endorse his point that “the constitution of the perceptual field in the life-world often proves to be a complex of static and genetic constitution.” Nevertheless, we will try to undertake a more detailed investigation of how this exceptional interweaving takes place from a protentional point of view.

\(^{360}\) See above, §3.3.
through and through. In protentional terms, we have an ongoing sense of the coming closer of what we anticipate. With respect to the following phases, one could say that longitudinal intentionality is directed at them as future ‘protentional’ phases, as future ‘proto-impressional’ phases, and as future ‘retentional’ phases. This means that longitudinal intentionality goes through the whole process of transformation of a future phase of consciousness. The protentional aspect of pre-reflective self-awareness is particularly dynamic. The “protentional having-in-advance of our protentional having-in-advance…of future contents” unfolds through the whole process of modification of the correlative protentional phase.

In view of this distinction along consciousness in all its temporal modes, one can also pose a question with regard to the invariance of this two-fold intentional form.

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361 Cf. Hua XXXIII, 48f.
364 By comparing the different points of departure of Hua X and Hua XXXIII, Stefano Micali poses this question quite explicitly, challenging the commonly held view that this form remains invariant in all experiences. Cf. Micali (2010). His main assumption is that of a “plurality of time.” According to his position, we should follow the project of a “de-formalization” of time by seeking out the vast variety of specific temporal experiences in which one can trace the dimension of a common or universal time. Cf. Micali (2008), p. 218, n. 135. He is aware that Husserl is expressly based on the “paradigm” of an intentional analysis of time. Nevertheless, his thorough analyses reveal many peculiarities of different modes of temporalization. Ibid., p. 223f. It has to be kept in mind though that all those different modes of temporalization in Husserl’s phenomenology are revealed as such only through the fundamental implicitness of their origination from primal temporal syntheses. Each temporal phenomenon (recollection, expectation, time of the world, temporality of ideal objects, fantasy etc.) is revealed through a different mode of implicitness of this origination. Now, if one were to carry out such a de-formalization, one would have to take into account the variability of the temporal structure (not necessarily in exceptional/pathological forms of experience). In the case of protention, a suitable example would be to consider that it is already at work in proto-impressional emergence in a way that exceeds its mere participation to the fulfilling synthetic function. Even in its primary flowing form, hyle would thus exhibit a kind of “openness” that can be described in primary material terms. Steinbock seems to support a similar view, although not in a direct reference to hyletic flow. He says that if we were to attribute to perception an impressional status, then we would find a givenness/datum, which would inevitably contain a protentional orientation, “before” it would be retained. Cf. Steinbock (2002), p. 251. If we interpret this “before it would be retained” as “before its enduring unity is constituted through retention,” then we are led back to the primal hyletic flow as the only experiential ground of givenness to which Steinbock’s claim would somehow apply. Nevertheless, we would not go so far as to claim that this would occur through a retentional grasp of “the emotional coloring of the protentional present,” as he does. Cf. Ibid. Even though he refers explicitly to association and not to primal temporal syntheses, Landgrebe also makes a similar claim when he says that: “So ist das einzige
Even though such a distinction is necessary in order to differentiate the temporal order of the temporal object from that of the absolute flow of time-constituting consciousness, it does not follow “that the relation between the inner-moments of the absolute flow is fixed in an invariant form.” This invariant relation does not necessarily depend on the distinction between the temporal orders. Thus, one may assume that the differences in the temporalization that takes place in the transversal intentionality leave untouched the longitudinal intentionality. We will see that the appeal to radically distinct modes of experiencing does not undermine consciousness’s two-fold intentional structure but rather enriches it.

§5. Transition to a material analysis of protention

If we confine ourselves to these formal characteristics of our consciousness’s temporal expanding, we are simply dealing with its temporal formal structure, regardless of its hyletic temporal aspect. Proto-impression appears thus as the non-independent function of the primary emergence of our primary sense-content, partly pre-delineated by the protention it fulfills. Each protention enters into a synthesis of coincidence with the immediately following proto-impression which fulfills it. Following a strict reading of Husserl’s time-diagrams we notice that, even though


366 For a questioning of this point, cf. ibid., p. 181. Micali contrasts the temporalization of a melody, in which the flow is characterized by an essential continuity, to the temporalization of obscure or unclear phantasy, in which temporalization involves transitive, intermittent and proteiformal appearances.

367 This intentional distinction intersects with another distinction that concerns the sources of our experiential life, namely that between impressional and phantasmatic orders of experience. Cf. Brudzinska (2010), p. 106ff. But this points us straight to the subject-matter of the following sections.

368 This chapter is part of a paper presented at the “Contemporary Research in Husserl” Workshop that took place at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Patras on April 29, 2015. The title of the original paper was “Husserl’s Reductions to Inner Time-Consciousness and their Relation to Protention.”

369 Its partiality is still an undecided matter. We are merely hinting at the essential possibility that protentional anticipations can be “falsified.”
(deficient) modalities of this fulfillment are always possible, there can never be a total falsification of our protentional anticipations: our experiential life requires that a proto-impression will always “emerge,” immediately afterwards it will “sink down” retentionally, and another proto-impression will replace it. Even though the fulfilling proto-impression may deviate from the narrow protentional predetermination, it will still fall within a broader protentional scope. In a sense, exceptions seem to be unthinkable.

No matter how self-evident such a formal conception may be, many essential aspects of protentional consciousness are excluded from it. Once one decides to take those aspects into account, it becomes easier to understand the motives which lead to a more detailed phenomenological analysis. Focusing on these neglected elements is not an arbitrary reorientation of our phenomenological interest. We should be reminded of the fact that Husserl himself, while sharpening his genetic descriptions, evaluated the intentional analyses of time-consciousness he had carried out so far as abstract. They were exclusively concerned with the constitution of a universal temporal form, totally disregarding how unity with respect to content comes up, i.e., how a perceived object appears as distinct from another object or, respectively, how a part is perceived as such, differing both from other parts and from the whole to which it belongs, within the same impressional present.

In light of this shift of focus from temporal form to temporal content, these neglected aspects come to the surface. Proto-impressional function correlates to proto-impressional content, bearing its specific mode of givenness that differentiates it from the corresponding content given as just-past, i.e., retentionally, and as immediately-following, i.e., protentionally. These latter contents appear as peculiar modifications of what is given proto-impressationally. What is constituted by means of this expansive synthetic accomplishment is hyletic content’s unity and duration. The intertwinement between retention and protention is what renders content’s unity conscious; the living-experience (Erlebnis) of fulfillment is unthinkable without the manifestation of content’s primal duration. In its turn, this living-experience of fulfillment is constituted along the lines of mediate protention, i.e., through the protentional horizon.

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370 Hua XI, 128.
which is articulated by protentions of protentions and, more specifically, by longitudinal intentionality. This mediate protentional structure is the formal ground on the basis of which we can try to define the lawfulness of protention’s modification. Apart from that, and from a material point of view, we can also try to specify the content-modifications which serve as the experiential ground on which these protentional transformations occur. Since proto-impressions are given as fulfillments of preceding protentions, we must also address the issue of the modes of fulfillment through which this mediate protentional structure is experienced as continuous. Following this line of thought, Husserl has introduced the distinction we discussed earlier between particular fulfillment and general fulfillment. Summarizing what has been said, the former refers to the synthesis of fulfillment taking place between a not-yet fulfilled protention and the correlative proto-impression which it intends; it contributes to the constitution of immanent temporal objects. The latter mode of fulfillment constitutes a synthesis of fulfillment that signifies the continuous fulfillment of each retained protention both as the “fulfillment” in its proto-impressional form as well as the “retention” of the fulfilled protention.

Nevertheless, as we already saw earlier, if we turn our attention exclusively to the syntheses of fulfillment taking place in the purely unfulfilled protentional dimension (above the horizontal line of Husserl’s diagramms), we can only speak of a ‘relative fulfillment’ of this mediate intentionality: we never encounter a correlative proto-impressional content. However, we do have a living-experience of protentional and continuous “coming closer.” To describe it in material terms, one should trace the kinds of contents or content-modifications which serve as the experiential ground for this protentional synthesis. We encountered an exemplary case of living-experience in which protentional continuity becomes vividly experienced in our discussion of the ‘picturing’ making-intuitive.

But things get more complicated once we expand our research toward more ‘concrete’ experiential fields where the affective texture of this experiential ground
plays a dominant role.\textsuperscript{371} We have to evaluate affectivity as a source of temporality and, in particular, as the ‘origin’ of our protentional consciousness.

But such an analysis will be carried out in the last section of the present study. Let us see, for the moment, what exactly the material aspect of protention is and what exactly the term “protentional content” denotes.

§6. Elements of a material analysis of protention

We have seen that proto-impression is responsible for the emergence of the hyletic material, i.e., for our consciousness’s originary intuitiveness. This is consistent with Husserl’s well-known position concerning the primacy of the model of sense-perception as the determinative proto-form of all intentional life.\textsuperscript{372} Our intentional life can be described only on the basis of original self-giveness. Husserl applies this principle on his analysis of time-consciousness, especially in the double meaning of perception: a narrow one, referring to the non-independent moment of proto-impressional givenness and a broader one, referring to the more “extended” experience, spanning the whole presence-field.\textsuperscript{373} It is rather obvious that the narrow proto-impressional self-givenness is not suitable to accommodate our experience of retentions and protentions, even after Husserl’s renewed understanding of it in the \textit{Bernauer Manuskripte} as “fulfilled protention.” We saw that this understanding consisted in thematizing proto-impressional datum as an already apprehended datum. It brought to the surface proto-impression’s specific pertinence to the retentional-protentional interweaving: it is already determined with respect to its content, yet never reducible to consciousness’s intentional synthesis. Even though proto-

\textsuperscript{371} This entails dealing with general problems that are connected with any attempt to define the level and structure of this affectivity, problems such as: determining the constitutive status of the content from which it is exerted (e.g. a single datum or a “complete” object), recognizing the kind of ego which is affected by it and, in fact, discovering whether affection presupposes a (pre-thematic) ego being affected by it or whether the ego is primordially established by it as a concrete ego.


\textsuperscript{373} Generally speaking, to proto-impression qua sense-datum is ascribed the transcendental function of fulfilling, materializing and concretizing the intentional structure. Cf. Brudzinska (2010), p. 94. Also, cf. \textit{Hua} III/1, 198f.
impression cannot be encompassed by the protentional prefiguration of its givenness, our pre-reflective sensing of the synthesis of coincidence between the two is always experienced in the mode of fulfillment (or disappointment).

Now the issue of protentional material is linked directly with this synthesis: proto-impressional “intending” and protentional intending become synthesized and sensed as such through the content-material; without the latter the sense of this transition and of the interconnection between consciousness’s longitudinal and transversal intentionality would be impossible. Since protention is essentially accomplished by consciousness and its content can never exhibit the character of primally present hyletic multiplicity, we have to attribute its material to consciousness’s own productive capacity. This is the functional dimension of “protentional modification.” It goes without saying that, even though we can abstractly distinguish between functional and material aspects of modification, they are never involved in the process of temporal synthesis separately. The same is also true for the distinction between modification as such and the synthesis of coincidence that occurs between the protentional modification and its fulfilling proto-impression. Seen on the background of modification, this synthesis attains a two-fold dynamic meaning: a) it “pushes forward” the modifying process (especially with regard to the shaping of emptiness)\(^{374}\) and b) “establishes” the definiteness (or “concreteness,” to link back to what we referred earlier) of the prefiguration which serves thus as fulfilling or not. As we examine protention in the narrow field of its particular tending toward fulfillment, we are here limiting our view on modification as merely one of its dynamic aspects.\(^{375}\)

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\(^{374}\) *Hua* XXXIII, 9: “Im Prozess setzt sich stetig dieses Leerbewusstsein fort, das schon am Anfang inszeniert war, nur sich durch stetige Erfüllung verkürzend”.

\(^{375}\) Other such aspects are, for instance, “projecting the style of the past,” “prefiguring,” the “tendency toward fulfillment.” When we will move further with the investigation of protention’s materiality, it will be shown that these aspects also include some modes of our affective life as essential components.
§6.1. Protentional modification

In Husserl’s phenomenology the term “modification” tends to be quite ambiguous and can be used in various ways, considered freely either as a process or as the product of this process. Our intention here is not to offer an exhaustive account of its importance for the whole project of Husserl’s phenomenology nor of the ways in which its ambiguity can be interpreted as the source of deconstructive reverberations threatening, in Derrida’s way, the coherent systematic exercise of phenomenology. We will confine ourselves to a brief discussion of its meaning for Husserl’s analysis of protention.

In the context of the analysis of our time-consciousness, modification refers either to the operation of modifying or to modes of givenness that are relevant to and dependent on something original. For example, with respect to retentional modification it can be said that it constitutes a peculiar formal character that maintains a reference to an original form of givenness. In that way, the emphasis is placed on the past aspect of present experience and it consequently signifies a manifest transformation of an original givenness. Similarly, with respect to protention, we focus on the future aspect which realizes a peculiar projecting transformation of what is originally given. The original givenness to which all temporal modification refers is proto-impression. In Husserl’s words:

“Proto-impression is the absolutely unmodified, the primal source for all further consciousness and being.” (Hua X, 67)

376 Cf. Hua XXXIII, 144: “Die ‘Modifikation’ bezeichnet dann gleichsam eine Operation, die in einem immerfort gleichen Sinn vonstatten geht. Das Operieren ist das lebendig kontinuierlich sich abwandelnde intentionale Leistung, ein kontinuierliches Hervorströmen noematischer Bestände, deren jeder seiner ‘Form’ nach stetige Modifikation der früheren ist und das seinem eigenen Sinn nach ist.”


378 “Die Urimpression ist das absolut Unmodifizierte, die Urquelle für alles weitere Bewusstsein und Sein.”
In both cases, this transformation should be examined from two perspectives, i.e., with respect to: a) its kind and b) the relevant hyletic components.  

§6.1.1. Protention as a distinct kind of modification

Retention unfolds as a continuous transformation, unlike recollection, which consists in a clearly discrete differentiation from original givenness. In strict analogy to retention, protention also modifies in a continuous manner, in contrast to expectation—in the sense in which the term was used in the context of “picturing”—: not only are we continuously anticipating hyletic material (modification as projecting in a non-originary manner what is given); this anticipation also occurs by an essential continuous reshaping of prefigurations, i.e., of “empty consciousness” (modification as this reshaping). But how should we understand this two-fold modification? Husserl says that:

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380 Cf. Hua X, 47.
381 This “given” that is being projected is not limited to what is primally or retentionally given. As we shall see, it may be drawn by other regions of our experiential life.
382 See above our discussion of “empty constitution” in §4.3. Ferrer too refers to this modification (relation of modification) as an empty constitution. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 36. In an attempt to avert the danger of misunderstanding the relation between proto-impression and protention as a kind of “generation” that would bind proto-impression to the generative function of consciousness, he cites a very important passage from Hua X, 100. The passage is the following:

“[…] ist nichts Bewusstseins-Erzeugtes, es ist das Urgezeugte, das ‘Neue’, das bewusstseinsfremd Gewordene, Empfangene, gegenüber dem durch eigene Bewusstseinsspontaneität Erzeugten. Die Eigentümlichkeit dieser Bewusstseinsspontaneität aber ist, dass sie nur Urgezeugtes zum Wachstum, zur Entfaltung bringt, aber nichts ‘Neues’ schafft” (Hua X, 100).

The key terms of the passage with respect to Ferrer’s understanding are the words “Wachstum,” “Entfaltung” and the phrase “nichts ‘Neues’ schafft.” Given the context, one can conclude that Ferrer understands the relation of modification only in the direction from the protended toward the proto-impression. This relation can take on the form of “Wachstum” or “Entfaltung” through the intuitive fulfillment. But this renders incomprehensible the fact that, according to the cited passage, the spontaneity of consciousness (retention and protention) only brings what is primally generated to growth, evolvement. What “evolves / unfolds” is what is “primally generated” and not what is protended or retained. In order for the primally generated to be able to grow, it must be, as it were, “detached” from its initial status as primally generated in both directions: retentionally and...
“The new protention is in a sense modification of the previous one, namely, an alteration. But the previous protention is also modification with respect to the following one, in this other sense in which a re-presentification is modification of a presentification, a ‘mere intention’ [is a] modification of its total or partial fulfillment, a mediate intention [is a modification] vis-à-vis a less mediate intention that nevertheless corresponds to it.” (Hua XXXIII, 9f.)

The second sense of modification in Husserl’s text (i.e., a kind of re-presentification, mere intention or mediate intention) corresponds to the non-originary manner of protentional projecting, while the first sense (i.e., alteration) corresponds to the reshaping of prefigurations. The investigative reversal of protentional sequence (new protentions qua modifications of the previous ones, in the first case, previous protentionally. Retentionally, it must recede and be preserved by consciousness’s spontaneity. Protentionally, it must be prefigured as being “more” of itself. In the first case occurs a retentional modification of what was previously “generated,” while in the latter case transpires a protentional modification of what is now being “generated” in the sense of protending “more” of itself (anticipating its enrichment, even if that only means its duration as being the same). This confusion arises because we have not clarified what is generated or modified, i.e., from where does the relation depart and where does it lead: is it the protentional form that appears as the result of modification of proto-impression or is proto-impression the outcome of the modification of the protentional form? Either way, we have to realize that the process of modification is not limited to expressing the process of transition from the unreality of the future to the intuitive reality of the present.

Husserl refers to this reshaping in abstraction from the content-determination, even though he mentions that the systematic form of the future-horizon is always “filled” with constantly new content. For example, cf. Hua XXXIII, 150: “[A]ber in der Form ‘strömt’ ein immer neuer Inhalt, das, wenn auch unbestimmt, als ‘unmittelbar’ kommend Bewusste wandelt sich in die noematische Form der aufleuchtenden Urgegenwart, das als nächst-mittelbar kommend Bewusste ist ein unmittelbar als kommend Bewusstes und so stetig fort, während doch immerfort ein voller Horizont verbleibt.” The alteration is denoted by the transformation of what is conscious as lying ahead of the immediately following phase into what is conscious as immediately following. We can also discern his conception of modification as a kind of mediate intention in the contrast expressed by the phrase: “in die noematische Form der aufleuchtenden Urgegenwart” – what is protentionally conscious is not “aufleuchtendes.” What is also remarkable is his reference to a full horizon, demarcated by the protentional range of a determined event. As he says immediately afterwards, this raises many issues concerning the starting and ending points as well as the horizon stretching beyond those points in both directions.
protentions qua modifications of following presentifications or less mediate intentions, in the second case) denotes a refined shift of perspective that enables Husserl to bring those two aspects to light.

No matter how one distinguishes this two-fold structure of protentional modification, it should be clear that it concerns protentional consciousness as such and not as an *already retained* protentional field. It does not solely refer to the fulfilled protentions, as one might think in virtue of the fixed state of a reflected-upon experiential temporal stretch. Our ability to freely “picture” any “link” (i.e., any possible synthesis of fulfillment and its correlate) of the protentional continuum shows that the protentional sequencing (previous protentions – following protentions) pertains to the essence of our protentional consciousness. Nevertheless, instead of attributing those two continuous operations of modification (mediate intending and altering) to protentional consciousness *in abstracto*, we should try and situate them in the narrow field of the synthesis of fulfillment. This is what Husserl explicitly does when, in this context, he refers to protention as a non-independent piece of an act that includes it.

“The fulfilled protention is fulfillment of a previous empty protention, which is itself only a non-independent piece of a broader act that has a phase of fulfillment. In the progress subsists steadily successive coincidence; by entering in the emptiness, the fullness brings off a modified act, an act which, nevertheless, as fulfillment with respect to the concerned new primally presenting phase (and through it it becomes primally presenting) coincides with the previous act regarding a component of the emptiness, while the rest of the emptiness coincides with the past emptiness.” (*Hua* XXXIII, 9)\(^{385}\)

Fulfillment signifies a partial coincidence between one component of what was emptily prefigured and what is now primally present. Nonetheless, coincidence does not concern only this component but also the rest of what is emptily prefigured. What remains unfulfilled, yet prefigured, coincides with a part of what was previously emptily prefigured. The unity of the unfulfilled protentional continuum that results

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\(^{385}\) *Hua* XXXIII, 9: “Die erfüllte Protention ist Erfüllung einer vorangegangenen leeren Protention, die selbst nur unselbständiges Stück eines weiteren Aktes ist, der eine Phase <der> Erfüllung hat. Im Fortgang besteht beständig sukzessive Deckung; das Volle, eintretend in die Leere, schafft einen modifizierten Akt, der aber sich als Erfüllung nach der betreffenden neuen urpräsentierenden Phase (und dadurch wird er urpräsentierend) mit dem vorigen Akt nach eine Komponente der Leere deckt, während die übrige Leere sich mit der vorangegangenen Leere deckt.”
from this synthesis of coincidence of unfulfilled protentions undergoes alteration. Altering modification transforms what is lying ahead of the immediately following phase into what is immediately following. The consciousness of “approaching” to fulfillment is continuous, in the sense of a continuous reshaping of prefiguration.

§6.1.2. Protention as content-modification

To be sure, this continuous reshaping does not necessarily entail the alteration of protended hyletic qualities. It may well be the case that the transformation of what lies ahead of the immediately following phase into the immediately following phase will “consolidate” the prefiguring, i.e., maintain the hyletic quality and bring it closer to original givenness. This means that what has been said so far concerns the clarification of the kind of modification that occurs through protentional consciousness and not the hyletic components that are involved in it.

Not unlike “modification” itself, talking about the content of protentional modification can be quite ambiguous. It can refer to two quite different things: either a) to its functional intuitiveness (i.e., what serves as its intuitive ground) or b) to the content of prefigurations (i.e., what they prefigure). Attributing to protention a kind of intuitiveness seems to contradict what we saw earlier with respect to empty constitution. How should we understand this sense of modification and to what extent can it apply to protentional consciousness? Restricting our view to the narrow tendency toward particular fulfillment, this modified intuitiveness can be seen as a component involved in the synthesis of transition and more specifically as contributing to its primal consciousness. The underlying intuitive layer of protentional

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386 If the unfulfilled horizon were objectifiable, then we would have to consider the possibility that the possible ideal fulfillments that comprise it are in fact encompassed in a closed totality.

387 Cf. Hua XXXIII, 150.

388 Cf. Hua XXXIII, 26: “Also die ‘Modifikation’ besagt Wandlung in eine neue Protention in eins mit dem Modus der Erfüllung, nämlich ein entsprechendes Moment der früheren Intention ist sich erfüllt, und die anderen Momente haben nur der Modifikation der Unerfülltheit, die sie der Erfüllung ‘nähert’. Das liegt aber im Bewusstsein selbst, nämlich das einzelne Moment ist auch in sich Erfüllung der früheren Protention und entsprechende Modifikation der unerfüllt bleibenden Momente derselben.”
prefiguration is a peculiar content-modification that renders experienceable this tendency. However, this does not imply that protention is regarded as an intentional living-experience that eventually coincides with another living-experience, an original one.\(^{389}\) Husserl describes particular fulfillment as an “insertion” (sich einfügen) of fullness to the form of protentional intention, a process that leads to the intuitive grasp of this intentional form.\(^{390}\) Despite the reference to this, rather mysterious, pre-temporal occurrence of “insertion,” one should not be entrapped in an abstractive conception of protentional consciousness. The latter is by no means experienced exclusively as fulfilled. We are always pre-reflectively aware of protentional modification in its mode of non-fulfillment. Otherwise we would never be conscious of the protentional tendency toward fulfillment as an “approaching” or as the gradual “maximization” of fullness.\(^{391}\)

In order to thematize our awareness of protentional content-modification, in both senses mentioned before, we have to be clear about the phenomena that point us back toward protention’s peculiar intuitive basis. We have already referred to the sense of “approaching” and “maximization of fullness.” To these one must also add the implicit sense of “imminence” of the modes of givenness. Of course our consciousness of the future is by no means restricted to these characters. We always experience them together with “indeterminateness,” “openness” or “unfixedness.”

\(^{389}\) Cf. Hua XXXIII, 4.

\(^{390}\) Schnell speaks of a synthesis the components of which are not experienced but rather they are the ones that constitute the intentional living-experience. We are not dealing with a coincidence but rather with a relation between form (protention) and content (primal presentation). Cf. Schnell (2002), p. 103f. Ferrer adopts this line of thought but adds a very important clarification: if we do not wish to interpret this relation as a relation of creation, then this relation between protentional form and proto-impression should be understood as a continuously sensed or experienced contrast between the emptiness of the former and the fullness of the latter. Even though he tries to keep it clear that this “sensing” and “experiencing” is dynamic (a “pre-reflective consciousness of change”), he sometimes alludes to a seemingly more “static” understanding of it, as is, for instance, attested by the hypothesis of an underlying consciousness of difference between the emptiness of the prefiguration and the fullness of the impressional presentation. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 36f. Our focus on the tendentious proximity of fullness and on the variety of modifications that take place in it brings to light a far richer dimension of the synthesis of transition.

\(^{391}\) All these experiential characters should be seen in strict correlation to the retentional ones, such as the latter’s accomplishment of gradual “weakening.” This correlation is, nevertheless, limited by the fact that protention as unfulfilled is never in a position to form the basis for a re-presentifying act that would approximate impressional self-givenness.
What provides us with the sensing of modification as “approaching” accomplishes a continuous “condensation” of the vagueness that pertains to non-fulfillment. We anticipate ourselves as experiencing of what is to come; therefore this vagueness is always a vagueness of our future experiencing. It is manifest as a character that concerns our experiential structure and therefore unfolds along that structure: it is the vagueness of the modes of being-given to a consciousness that will be pre-reflectively self-aware.

Gradual “clarification” of this vagueness, i.e., gradual “enrichment” of the prefiguration, may be manifest through the content-alteration (content-modification in the second sense), yet it is independent from the particularities of this alteration. Its process transpires by generating modifications of the hyletic qualities that are prefigured. This generation of modifications is our consciousness’s protentional accomplishment and the “enriching” factor of appearance that is independent from the particular protended qualities is its distinctively modified intuitiveness. It is thanks to the latter that “approaching” appears as a primordial experiential character within our sensing of the synthesis of transition. It should be clear that we are not falling back to a Brentanian account of our consciousness of the future, an account that Husserl has already criticized in his Vorlesungen. The modified intuitiveness does not consist in a present content to which a temporal character is added. Protention qua primal pre-

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392 We should be careful not to interpret this “clarification” or “enrichment” as an increase of intuitive fullness of single proto-impressions. Cf. Montagova (2013), p. 95. The vagueness of what is prefigured rests on its essential detachment from proto-impressional self-givenness. This detachment amounts to a primordial awareness of the inherent typicality of what is prefigured and should not be confused with the kind of detachment that is effected through the alternative sources of intuitiveness, whose proper “locus” lies in our proto-impressional consciousness. Montagova, at the same page, also speaks of a “distance” between modifying protention and self-giving proto-impression, denoted by the term “maximum” in Husserl’s description of protention as tendency toward maximum of fullness. We can conscribe this signification to the extent that it refers to a fundamental functional distinction and not to the temporal distance opened up by the accomplishment of protention itself. Nevertheless, her equation of “maximum” with this “distance” overshadows the experiential character of the “maximization,” i.e., it overlooks what she stresses a few lines later, namely that protentional tendency is a mode of consciousness.

393 We can find Husserl saying this almost explicitly with respect to retention. Cf. Hua XXXIII, 212: “Wie die Urpräsentation Kerndaten in sich hat, ‘reelle’, sofern sie diese Daten nicht modifiziert enthält, so hat jede Urretention Kerndaten in sich, aber nicht reell sofern sie diese Daten modifiziert enthält. Nämlich als Modifikation ist sie Modifikation eines anderen Bewusstseins mit Kerndaten und birgt also in sich die Kerndaten als solche des anderen Bewusstseins in modifizierter und nicht reeller Weise.” The verb “contains” should not be interpreted as implying any kind of presence. It is true that at this
objectifying intention is directed to our future experiencing, therefore it “intends” and respectively “modifies” my future intentional living-experience in all its components. What we have clarified is simply that particular fulfillment is experienced in a primordial manner and this is possible in virtue of a modified intuitiveness of what-is-coming that is responsible for the sensing of the protentional “approaching” and gradual “maximization” of fullness. Instead of defining protention as a mere “form,” a closer look to its modifying function reveals its involvement in the *primal experiencing* of the synthesis of transition.

From a methodological point of view, however, we have to keep in mind that none of these experiential characters (“approaching,” “maximization of fullness,” “vagueness”) are *thematically* present in our primal consciousness; their thematic delimitation is possible only through specific steps of a reductive process that starts from other levels of our experiential life.

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394 Husserl refers to this explicitly with respect to primary memory. Cf. *Hua* XXIV, 259.

395 This does not preclude the possibility of a supplementary account of other elements that reveal this experienceability. Ferrer gives us some clues as to what it would include. We have already referred to a) the *continuously* sensed or experienced contrast between the emptiness of protention and the fullness of proto-impression as well as to b) the (somehow more static) consciousness of their difference. To these one can also add c) the “primal memory” of protention’s inability to prefigure the present proto-impressions in their intuitive fullness. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 37. The merit of this last case is that the experienceability of the protentional aspect of the synthesis of transition is exhibited as essential within retentional consciousness, without thereby falling prey to a retroactive ascription to protentional consciousness of an appearing transformation that pertains to retention, namely the “fading.” The “inability” that is preserved as constitutive of protention does not originate from retention’s inability to preserve the “new.”
§6.2. “What does protention pretend?”

Let us now turn to the second sense of content-modification that has to do with the modification of the content of prefiguration. We employed the term “reshaping prefigurations” to denote the “altering” kind of modification and discussed it, following Husserl, in abstraction from the content that undergoes this alteration. Turning our attention to this task is a very important stage of our investigation. It signals our transition to a more concrete analysis of protentional consciousness, since the latter is possible only by explicating the direct contribution of protention within the various experiential fields.

A first step of this explication consists in discussing the typological structure of protentional consciousness, i.e., the various types of contents that it prefigures. Specifying the kinds of contents that protention prefigures goes hand in hand with revealing further fundamental functional aspects of protention. Lohmar’s article “What does protention pretend?” provides us with pathways for exposing those aspects of protention.\(^{396}\) In this section we will present the distinctions that are introduced by Lohmar.\(^{397}\) It is a fact that Husserl himself has not offered us a detailed analysis neither of the typological nor of the functional differentiations that correspond to the distinctions of the protentional content-types.

The attempt to direct our attention to the data that are constituted by the time-constitutive syntheses entails the performing of a crosswise analysis, which focuses on now-present hyletic content and heads towards the various retentional layers of its hyletic givenness. The primal-living expansion of originarity (the living-present), by constituting the datum as identical in its duration, also constitutes the primal temporal stretch of datum’s hyletic fullness. What is implied by this is that there are no punctual (point-like) hyletic unities disrupted by temporal stretches which would be

\(^{396}\) Lohmar (2002a).

\(^{397}\) The present section is part of a paper presented at the “Phänomenologische Werkstatt” at the Husserl Archiv of the University of Cologne on June 5th 2014. The original title of the paper was “Protention and its contents.”
somehow devoid of hyletic content. Now, if we wish to outline with accuracy the kind of contents that are involved in the protentional function, we will have to employ, so Lohmar, some fundamental distinctions corresponding to different protentional dimensions.

The first distinction is that between “R-protention” and “H-protention” (terms which stand for retentional-protention and hyletic-protention, respectively). The former delimits the part of protention which is directed toward the further sinking of the retentional contents in the next phases: what is past will sink further in the past. The latter denotes the protending of the coming hyletic contents. What we notice now is that protention does not only protend what is to come, but also the further retentional modifications of the contents. R-protentions are determined by the flow of the current retentions and therefore their fulfillment is certain. The protending of this continuous sinking reaches a limit, beyond which retentional modifications lose their intuitiveness. It is essentially impossible for me to expect that I will indefinitely retain a temporal event in its intuitive vividness. It is very important to note that R-protentions protend the respective retained content as further past.

The dependence on the current retentions explains the determination of the hyletic contents of protention; but this determination is possible thanks to the firm retentional ground of protentional prefiguring, regardless of the specific “origin” of its content. Consequently, “projecting the style of the past” is an accomplishment that is itself

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399 We have seen that this “further” does not signify just the already accomplished retentional modifications but also the future modifications of proto-impressional phases to retentional ones as well as of protentional to proto-impressional and retentional ones. Cf. Montagova (2013), p. 95, n. 140. Also, cf. Held (2010), p. 103.

400 How should we then interpret Ferrer’s assertion that R-protentions bear the apodictic certainty that the retentional continuum will proceed infinitely, despite its loss of intuitiveness? Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 4f. Perhaps it is a rash generalization stemming from a disregard of the functional aspect of the retentional continuum: its ongoing advance is not a mere “fact.”

401 Strictly speaking, R-protentions do not have a content, they do not protend hyletic qualities. What they protend is simply the continuation of the retentional continuum. Cf. Held (2010), p. 103.
included in the *protended* structure of consciousness as future pre-reflective self-consciousness. Advance of the retentional continuum is not protended merely as a transcendental fact (i.e., the fact that a content will belong to a further past phase) but rather as an operative component: further retentional sinking entails temporal fixity of the future prefiguration and more specifically of the corresponding motivation. It concerns the generation of the future retentional depth that will form the depth of the protention that in its turn will depart from it. But it also refers to the fact that this prefiguration will occupy a particular temporal position “mapped” by the correlative retentional “nesting.”

*H*-protention, i.e., the protentional part depicted by the upper branch of Husserl’s diagram, does not consist in the same rigid process as is the case with *R*-protention. Yet its content must also be somehow determined by the ongoing retentional process. Nevertheless, we encounter many cases of protentionally anticipating hyletic content that is not predelineated solely by the actual hyletic givenness and the recent retentional modifications. This happens, for example, when we are waiting for the red traffic light to turn green. While what is given is “red,” we are anticipating “green.”

Having outlined this differentiation we must also consider some further distinctions of protentional levels and functions, which come to the foreground once we examine the kind of content that is protended. Briefly, we have (at least) the following five cases:

- **Permanent protention.** This is the case in which we expect something to go on and on in the same way. The hyletic data are expected to remain the same as in the previous phases.

- **Typological differentiated protention.** What we expect can vary within certain typological limits –for example, brighter or darker red. This version, despite its

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402 It is only in this sense that one can claim that *R*-protention is the “rigid form” of a life that proceeds infinitely. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 55.

403 Cf. *Hua* XXXIII, 24f., 38.

flexibility, lies still within the framework of the motivation which is based on present hyletic data and present retentions.

- **Protention limited by the sense-field.** It allows something to vary within a certain sense-field—for example, red can become any other colour but still a colour, i.e., it is restricted to the variability of the visual field.

- **Unspecific protention.** This amounts to an “empty protention,” as we expect that “something in general” will appear, either in the same or in any other sense-field. This version of protention seems to imply an exceptional intending which eludes any particular typical pre-formation in the mode of familiarity.

- **Altering protention.** In this final case, we expect that something will come but not the same as what was given till now in our current experiencing. It may even cross the borders of the sense-fields. It depends on everyday experience and may constitute an intentional expectation, i.e., a higher order phenomenon than the one we are examining here. Nonetheless, we may consider this kind of protention as a lower-level modification of higher level expectation, a modification which may be seen as a “sinking down” of this intentional expectation to the level of protention. Thus, protention will be somehow independent from the present hyletic data and retentions.

§6.3. The phenomenon of disappointment and the role of hyle within the protentional continuum

The above distinctions of protention, seen dynamically, portray a scaling of differentiation of the protended hyletic quality.\(^{405}\) This differentiation follows a motivational structure that somehow originates from protention’s “conservative” function (i.e, its being based on retentional content). “Permanent protention” is, gradually and according to each experiential occasion, modified into the other kinds

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\(^{405}\) Husserl says: “Ein Differenzial des retentional behafteten Verlaufs modifiziert die Protention...”, *Hua* XXXIII, 13. Yet we should not grasp this “differential” directly as a variation of hyletic quality. Husserl also speaks about retention and protention as a “primal differential” (*Urdifferenzial*) (*Hua* XXXIII, 15f.). By this we should understand “primal modifications.”
of protention. This modification unfolds along a nexus of motivations that has its basis on the original experience of a sensual variation, i.e., a variation of the hyletic quality. In terms of synthesis, we have to presuppose that each stage of modification resulting in different kinds of protending, i.e., each motivating instance, is preceded by a relative “disappointment” (Enttäuschung). What does this experience of “disappointment” amount to? Must we presuppose a kind of (retained) protentional continuity that is “interrupted” or “cut through” by the hyletic divergence? The latter appears as an interfering emergence of a primal hyletic quality that was not included in this continuity. This seems to be the way Ferrer understands the phenomenon of disappointment.

The first question that comes to mind now is this: what is the role of hyletic qualities in the two-fold continuum of perceptual act and the object’s appearances?

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407 Ferrer has already pointed to this fact. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 87, n. 49. According to him, the phenomenon of disappointment is what enables the appearance of the variety of worldly objects, a variety that essentially exceeds the protentional prefiguring of a homogeneous continuum of appearances (or of typologically nuanced appearances). Cf. Ibid. From a methodological point of view, “disappointment” serves as an experiential basis for the phenomenological demarcation of protention. It can be regarded as a case of intuiting the limits of protentional prefiguring in the narrow field of fulfillment’s realization. Still one has to be cautious about “disappointment’s” own experiential ground: if the outcome of the conflict is, at least partly, decided by proto-impression itself, i.e., by the hyletic reality it conveys, depending on its intuitive “force,” then we will have to trace that level of intuitiveness on which “disappointment” itself is experienced. The conflict denoted by “disappointment” is eventually resolved but it can never be experienced as “already resolved from the beginning,” i.e., as a synthetic incident that has “always already” occurred in an essentially irretrievable past, nullifying the experienced “disappointment.” The retention of the “conflict” between what was protended and what was primally given is essential for the higher-level negation of the falsified expectation throughout our past experiential life. “Disappointment” manifests in a minimal experiential coherence and what serves as fulfilling material in the relevant synthesis of coincidence through which it appears as a phenomenon is what barely escapes “disappointment.” There is then a certain “area” of intuitive fullness situated “between” the empty horizons and the explicitly thematic fulfilling hyletic material, a “thinner” fullness manifesting the primordial coherence of hyletic givenness: that is the experiential ground of “partiality” that characterizes synthesis of fulfillment / disappointment. The transition from the implicit partial intention belonging to total perception to the explicit intention of particular perception is “noticed.” Cf. Lohmar (1998), p. 201. Without it there could be no “phenomenon of disappointment” whatsoever.


409 In what follows we are drawing from what was discussed earlier with respect to the idea of reduction, based on Lohmar’s account of it as he develops it in: Lohmar (2002b) and Lohmar (2012a).
Is the protended continuity of the perceptual act and the object’s appearances mediated by the protentional prefiguring of hyletic qualities and their contrasts? And does this mediation somehow extend to all the levels of constitution, from the constitution of a single sensual datum all the way up to the appearances of the object? Seen from that scope, sensing and retaining the hyletic variation is the basis for protending the “style” of hyletic givenness (red, lighter red, green, sound etc.). Hyletic qualities are determined as pertaining to the appropriate hyletic data that serve as experiential ground for the relevant positings. Repeating Husserl’s example, as it is used in *Logische Untersuchungen*, when we see a red sphere we see a *uniformly* red sphere. This “uniformity” of colour, however, is not included in what is hyletically given; it is prescribed by the sense “red sphere.” It is not included, since what is hyletically given are variations of the red (lighter or darker red) or even absence of “redness” (for example, where the sphere is covered by its own shadow). The corresponding hyletic qualities are expected as typologically belonging to the perception of a “red sphere.” They are those “regulated and determined” hyletic “anomalies” that pertain to its typical style of fulfillment as a posited “real” thing (more specifically as “this red sphere”). Uniformity of colour still belongs to the sense of the red sphere but as something prefigured by its intentional matter.

Now, in order to grasp the sense in which hyletic qualities are involved in protentional continuity we must regard protention as introducing a dynamic-temporal aspect in the components of the intentional act. This inevitably points to the advances of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology (even prior to its explicit employment). The style of fulfillment of the relative experience of the “red sphere” involves a reference to other experiences (for example, experiences of red, spheres, etc.), as it is already

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410 There are different ways of sensing this variation, such as “irritation” and “surprise.”

411 We are currently leaving aside the issue of a static or genetic understanding of intentionality. We are not considering here the problem of the reversibility of the founding relation between sense-data and sense-givings.

412 *Hua* XIX, 359ff.


414 Intentional matter (*Materie*), according to Husserl, is extra-temporal, defining the extra-temporal determinations of the intended object. In the continuous temporal modification a certain synthesis of coincidence takes place with respect to this extra-temporal matter. Cf. *Hua* X, 62-67.
implied by the typological prefiguring of the “red sphere.” In a more radical fashion, one notices that the sphere’s positing as something that “will still” exist as “real” cannot be accomplished on the ground of hyletic givenness alone. Hyle cannot ground the positing of a “substratum” of determinations. It does not constitute the criterion for a “successful” positing (for example, of that red sphere as “real” in its “real” duration), but only a “reasonable motivation” of a positing which is dependent on specific styles of fulfillment. In our example of the sphere, its style of positing includes a range of intuitive variation, comprising determined and ordered anomalies of hyletic givenness—for instance, regulated variations of red in different sides of it according to the light source.

Let us now take a step back and examine some rather subtle points of our description. We said that the orderly intuitive variations are included in the typology of a protention regulated, for example, by the sense “red sphere.” But variation implies multiplicity of hyletic data. This means that single hyletic data are already constituted or, at least, that the protentional prefiguration involves prefiguration of the unity of a sensual datum. It is necessary to presuppose the constitution of a unitary hyletic stretch along or through which a variation can take place. In that sense, no matter how idiosyncratic a style of fulfillment may be, it always maintains the formal universal character of fulfillment.

But to what extent can we ascribe to sense-formation the regulating, as it were, function of this basic level of protentional prefiguring? For instance, given that an absolutely “uniform” course of experience is excluded by the style of fulfillment that is proper to the sense “red sphere”—and this exclusion is dictated by the structure of

416 Lohmar (2002b), p. 759. In a relevant tone, it is interesting also to note Ferrer’s claim that the substratum as such delineates an infinity of possible modes of presentation and its exclusion from the anticipatory structure of perception would only mean that we would be left with an open infinity of possible variations (or “being-otherwise,” as Ferrer prefers to say). Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 82.
417 It is obvious that hyle’s acknowledgement as a “motivation” for a positing can only be understood as a weakening of our demand to ground a positing on experience. Hyle qua motivation in this context implies a prior understanding of it as a component of the various modes of fulfillment and thus to some extent is dependent upon our prior acquaintance with the correlative object.
418 Those two alternatives are expressions of two different kinds of precedence: formal-static and genetic.
our perceptual field and the essentially perspectival appearance of the objects of sense-perception, is it nevertheless possible to prevent the “uniform” course of hyletic data from taking place? And, if possible, how would this “prevention” be realized? And, more importantly, how would it be experienced? Furthermore, does it imply that the regulating operation of sense-formation consists in orienting our protentional consciousness, i.e., on determining which contents we will attend to? Thus, attending to the red sphere would dictate excluding from our prefiguring scope any tendency toward the uniform hyletic continuity.

But protention prefigures the possible hyletic givenness of an actual perceptual confirmation: we are able to attend to other aspectral “points” on the red sphere in order to fulfill the perceptual intention. It is those other aspects that are given through hyletic variations, even if they still belong to the side of the object that is given originally. Protending this hyletic continuity as uniform amounts to redirecting our regard from the sense-formation “red sphere” to the hyletic ground (i.e., sense-data or sensual data). Therein uniformity is essentially excluded in advance, i.e., it is inevitably “disappointed.” Regardless of what serves as motivation for this redirection and how one should integrate it in a properly carried out reductive process, such peculiar protentional prefiguration signifies our dwelling in a state of inhibition: no matter how, sense-giving is inhibited. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the

419 In general, this can be considered a case of discordant course of experience, which interrupts “the concordant process of sense endowment.” Steinbock (1995), p. 134. Wang offers a very enlightening account of how this inhibition of sense-giving serves as a means of access to the sensual data that ground this sense-giving. Cf. Wang (2016), p. 17ff. In order to reach sensual data (Empfindungsdaten) we must first go through sense-data (Sinnesdaten). The latter are accessible in those instances when we are unfamiliar (Unbekanntheit) with the sense-data that are given or when they are given to us in an ambiguous manner (Verschwommenheit). Both cases lead to a “delay” of the sense-giving and allow us to thematize them as such. Sensual data, on the other hand, as essentially immanent, become accessible by encountering another inhibiting experiential character that concerns a whole sense field, namely indistinctiveness (Unscharfe). What remains unclear though is how the experience of the “delay” of sense-constitution, through the unfamiliar, ambiguous or indistinctive data, manages to preserve the abrupt-momentary mutual belongingness between sense-data and sense-giving. Taking a step back, it still has to be made clear in what sense the inhibition of sense-giving provides us with access to sense data and not to homogeneous sense fields, as Fink claims. Cf. Cairns (1976), p. 14. Going even further, from a genetic point of view, one should also look into the way in which this inhibiting discordance of our experience is able to be integrated in a more encompassing concordance or to generate a new concordance. Cf. Steinbock (1995), p. 134f. This line of thought would also lead us to consider two further questions: a) to what extent are all these characters (unfamiliarity, ambiguity, indistinctiveness) defined by an all-permeating expectation of the concordant course of experience and b) conversely, how does the inhibition of sense-giving through these experiential characters influence the formation of
primal synthesis of transition is also inhibited. Protention protends the following phase and is still determined with respect to its content and as such it still contributes to the constitution of a sensual datum.

As just said, protending a continuity of uniform appearances always manifests “concrete” hyletic qualities or “concrete” variations thereof. But this does not mean that protentional prefiguring somehow “usurps” proto-impression’s functional character of giving something as a self, i.e., as being the source of self-givenness. Given that the “self” of an object given to sense-perception is essentially characterized by its being perceived in infinite modes of givenness, one should offer a refined analysis of the relation between protention and “infinity.”\(^4^{20}\) Such a grandiose task must, however, be postponed: much work needs to be done if we wish to secure an appropriate phenomenological understanding of “infinity” in its various contexts. In a far less ambitious vein, our goal here has simply been to show in what sense we should regard the relation between, on the one hand, protentional continuity and, on the other hand, hyletic quality as what is able to interrupt this continuity in the mode of “disappointment.” We will return to the issue of protentional continuity again below, since it is a vital element in every description of protentional consciousness. In fact, any reference to the phenomenon of “infinity” presupposes the experience of continuity.

§6.4. Hyletic protentions of expectation – A first approach: phantasmatic self-affection

We just referred to a content-modification proper to protentional consciousness that occurs regardless of the restrictions posed by the structure of a perceptual act, a modification that is traced in the synthesis of transition. Prefiguring a uniform hyletic course of givenness is always possible at this fundamental level of synthesis. Even if no transformation of protended qualities takes place we are still faced with a sort of content-modification. This level of synthesis exhibits its own possibilities of

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420 Ferrer seems to be overly concerned with this “threat.” For example, cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 41.

421 Such a task is explicitly undertaken by Ferrer in: Ferrer (2015), pp. 53-65.
prefiguring hyletic variations. But now one can reasonably ask: what is the ground for these prefigurations? If they are not regulated by a ready-made sense-formation qua sense-formation where is their determination derived from? Our attempt to clarify this point leads us to a further distinction of protention, a distinction that is found in Lohmar’s article.422

Returning to the distinctions of protentional functioning introduced by Lohmar, we should also distinguish between a kind of protention which is independent of the immediately preceding experience, on the one hand, and an anticipative “expectation,” on the other hand. The example of the traffic light makes that quite clear: waiting for the green light while we are seeing the red one, although it cannot be explained on the basis of actual and retentional hyletic givenness, should not be considered a higher level expectation. But it should be also differentiated from what one may call “rigid-H-protention” –the conservative-inductive kind of protending–, i.e., the one that is directed towards the coming hyletic data as they are motivated by the present hyletic data and the current retentions.

Hence, within the category of H-protentions, rigid-H-protentions are distinguished from this other kind of protentions which, despite their structural independence from actual experience, should not be regarded as “expectations.” Lohmar uses the term “H-protentions-of-expectation” or “protentional expectations” to denote this kind of protentions.423 Even though such distinction is prima facie rather easy to grasp, things become complicated once we take into account an additional feature. As already mentioned, what differentiates them from the other kind of protentions, i.e., rigid-H-protentions, is the fact that what they pretend does not depend on the current hyletic and retentional content. Of course, qua protentions they still have to prefigure what-is-coming as and through modification of hyletic content. But where does this modification start from, since it is not protending what is just-past? A possible reply would be that it must draw from “the hyletic elements that have

422 This section is also a reworked part of the paper “Protention and its contents” presented at the “Phänomenologische Werkstatt” at the Husserl Archiv of the University of Cologne on June 5th 2014.
presented the expected object in former experiences.” H-protentions-of-expectation originate from previous experiences of expectations. Depicting this origination in terms of the division of constitutive levels, we might say that these intentional expectations have “sunk down” to the level of primal time-constitution. However, it remains to be seen if and how this happens.

The question of how this orientation toward hyletic elements of former experiences becomes possible is closely tied to the issue of the “immersion” of expectations to the deepest protentional level. Lohmar suggests that we should attempt to explain the “sinking down” of intentional expectation by means of the phenomenon of “phantasmatic self-affection” and the kind of modification proper to it. Textual support in favor of this option can indeed be found in Husserl’s work.

For instance, in the *Bernauer Manuskripte*, while trying to deal with the issue of defining the kind of contents which fulfill retentions and protentions, he speaks of a “modification” of hyletic data. There Husserl says:

“It is clear that what is here called ‘modified data’ should not be arbitrary transformations of the data that serve as point of departure, but since they have the steady function of making possible the consciousness of relative past of different levels, it follows that each modification should be characterized as such and also characterized in comparison to every other level of modification.” (*Hua* XXXIII, 202).

Lanei Rodemeyer gives an account of how this is possible by introducing the structural model of far-retention / near-retention / near-protention / far-protention. In fact, she explicitly parallelizes “near-protention” to “rigid-H-protention” and “far-protention” to “H-protentions-of-expectation”. Cf. Rodemeyer (2006), p.161, n. 240. Despite this parallelism, she claims that there is a partial grounding of “far-protention” on current, originary experience. (Ibid. p. 161). Her understanding of far-protention seems thus to imply a peculiar founding relation between the contents of near- and far-protention. The emergence of H-protention-of-expectation partially depends on the phantasmatic ground set by rigid-H-protention: the content of a protentional expectation (e.g. of the green following red, in the example of the traffic light), can only be a second-order modification of the protended constant content, to the extent that this constant content already exhibits a protentional depth. DeWarren seems to endorse the same position when he speaks of far-protentions “layering-over” near-protentions. Cf. De Warren (2009), p. 196. We will discuss Rodemeyer’s distinction between near and far protention below in section 6.6.

“Ibid.”

425 “Dabei ist klar dass, was da ‘modifizierte Daten’ heißt, nicht beliebige Wandlungen von den Ausgangsdaten sein dürften, sondern, da sie die beständige Funktion haben, relative Vergangenheit verschiedener Stufe bewusstseinsmöglich zu machen, so müsste jede Modifikation als solche charakterisiert sein und auch charakterisiert gegenüber jeder anderen Modifikationsstufe.”
It is certain that the modification we are interested in differs from the kinds of modification pertaining to recollection and imagination. Nonetheless, in a broader sense, it seems that in both cases phantasmata play an important role. With respect to the reference of H-protention-of-expectation to past experiences, this implies that such orientation is also effected by phantasmata, which are thus regarded as the mode in which intentional expectation appears as protention on the deepest level of inner time consciousness.

Generally speaking, phantasmatic self-affection, the way Lohmar makes use of it, signifies our capacity to “sketch” phantasmatic forms of sensing (Empfindung) in all our sense-fields. For example, when we read a text or a letter written by a person close to us we seem to be able to “hear” his/her own voice articulating the words we read. Or, conversely, when we hear a persons’s voice talking to us through the telephone, someone we already familiar with, and close our eyes we can “see,” as it were, that person talking to us. These phantasmatic “sketchings” are relatively weak, involuntary and rather transient and hence, differ radically from the accomplishment of phantasy as re-presentification. It is not our task to discuss here phantasmatic self-affection as a separate transcendental function. Lohmar’s book Phänomenologie der schwachen Phantasie offers an extensive analysis of how it operates in all layers of our experiential life. We will limit ourselves in examining its involvement in the experiential structure of the protentional tendency toward particular fulfillment.

427 Cf. Hua XXIV, §43, 253-274, where Husserl is attempting a comparison between phantasy-consciousness and retention, in order to trace their analogies and differences. Although he distinguishes between the reproductive character of memory (Erinnerung) and the way retention relates with what is past, and characterizes this distinction as one which presents us with two different senses of phantasy (Hua XXIV, 257:1-4), he acknowledges that the retentional modification and the phantasy-modification operate in a similar fashion (Hua X, 68: 9-18 & Hua XXIV, 268: 24-32).

428 Lohmar (2008), p. 61 & 63, respectively.


Some further issues are connected with the previous distinctions. First of all, one should examine the process of “sinking down” of intentional expectations on the lower level of primal time-constitution. The retentional sedimentation of a conscious expectation may help us explain the formation of a tendency toward the reproductive associative awakening of that expectation as an expectation, on the basis of a relation of similarity. Yet this does not clarify what is (or can be) specifically and firmly protentional neither in this tendency nor in this expectation. One may consider that it could prove more helpful to describe this process of “sinking down” in terms of the interconnection of the aforementioned protentional functions, in terms of their modes of co-functioning. That is, we can pinpoint the protentional character of the “immersed” intentional expectations by focusing on the nexus of protentional functions at work. The process of “sinking down” is rendered traceable by defining the various formations that their co-functioning assumes.

In that context one can subsequently pose the question whether the process of “sinking down” admits of being analyzed genetically as a process which unfolds through all the functional layers of protention previously pointed out or whether it applies only to the case of altering contents. We might, for example, test the hypothesis that the protending of “more of the same content” in the case of rigid-H-protention is actually structured on the ground of an “already” functioning H-protention-of-expectation, i.e., a protention being directed to the content as a content that will be continuously protended within the range of a particular sense-giving, i.e., a content that will be rigidly protended. Its anticipated rigid continuation is awakened by the respective protention, which implicitly belongs to a protentional-expectation.

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431 Hua XI, 187. Rodemeyer speaks of “general expectations” motivated by “general memories” as distinguished from “specific memories,” brought about by acts of recollection. Cf. Rodemeyer (2006), p. 94. Nevertheless, as already mentioned above, one has to take into account Mensch’s observation that we cannot simply suppose without further ado that the gradual vagueness resulting from the running-off mode of the retentional process is equal or leads to a generalization, which characterizes the current expectation. Cf. Mensch (2010a), p. 211.

432 Even though we know that associations unfold along the protentional lines of primal time-constitution (Cf. Hua XI, §18, 77), we cannot identify their functions, despite the fact that we focus on the content-aspect of protentions.

433 This implicitness has the form of the mediate intentionality of protention but it is never totally empty of content, as it depends on the generality generated by the retentional sinking of the previous
In that sense, rigid-H-protention would already appear as an elementary form of H-protention-of-expectation.

This would lead us to a further assumption: namely, that there are certain stratifications (of motivational nature) of the protended phantasmatic contents. “More of the same” content, i.e., the particular hyletic unity in its specific mode of continuation, is motivated by the content of a protentional-expectation already at work. Therefore, following this hypothesis, we have to distinguish between two levels of rigid-H-protention: a) its mode of primal formal function, which can be considered as a direct contribution “to the overall constitution of the living present;” and b) itself as materially situated within the system of relations of a protentional phantasmatic content. In that sense, the pre-givenness of the horizons of protentional expectations is not confined to the “outskirts” of the living-present but is involved in its concreteness.

In the light of such an inquiry, one should likewise follow the opposite path and investigate –genetically– the performance of the phantasmatic “detachment” from the impressional content anticipated in the rigid-H-protentions as well as the “release” from the anticipative limitations set in each of the aforementioned protentional functions. Both of them contribute to the accomplishment of a synthetic continuity essential to the structure of H-protention-of-expectation. In that way, we might be able to explain how it is possible for a hyletic unity, which is not actual or just-past, to be part of a protended event. Nevertheless, we must thoroughly distinguish the kind of “detachment” effected by phantasmata in protentional consciousness. The inner intentional expectation. Even though generality does not stem directly from the gradual vagueness of retentional content, it is generated through retentional modification.

434 In the example of the traffic light, red is protended as red of a traffic light, i.e., as a content not only of a specific hyletic quality but also as a content with a definable continuity. “Defining” here cannot mean determining its duration quantitatively but simply being conscious of the gradual proximity of the rigid content to its own change within the horizon of protentional expectation.


436 The “impatience” with which my consciousness of the red traffic light is invested proves that protentional expectations are not always “asleep” in the “remote future,” as De Warren implies. Cf. De Warren (2009), p. 196.
continuity among the protentional functions and among the respective contents is the ground for the possibility of any kind of protentional transformation, i.e., of any correction or substitution of protentional anticipations by others. We can designate this continuity as the unitary form the protentional phantasmatic modification takes within the synthesis of coincidence of the presence-field. To characterize the broader context of our orientation, let us say that our goal is to describe the mode in which phantasmatic self-affection functions within the protentional continuum.

But how should one describe “phantasmatic self-affection”? We will try to describe it by addressing several accounts of protentional typology provided by Husserl commentators. In all of these accounts one stresses a number of inescapable tasks. First, it is necessary to understand what is meant by the term “self-affection.” Second, one should examine how phantasmatic self-affection relates to the two aspects of modification discussed earlier: a) content-modification and b) kind of modification, namely, the extent to which phantasmatic self-affection is responsible, on the one hand, for the mode of intuitiveness and the distinction of contents according to the abovementioned functional divisions and, on the other hand, for the continuity of protentional modification. Furthermore, we should understand how it relates to protention’s peculiar “emptiness.” In analogy to retention’s “weakening,” weak phantasmata should be the bearers of protentional accomplishment, i.e., of a sort of “strengthening.” Since, in protention, there is no self-giving function that would accomplish a proto-impressional distribution of fullness, it remains to be seen in what this “strengthening” actually consists. Finally, one should also explore the connection between phantasmatic self-affection and “picturing” making-intuitive. It is through the active realization of the latter that one is able to reveal the more concrete form of the protentional tendency toward fulfillment as the experienced imminence of determining modes of givenness.

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437 “Strengthening” is a more metaphorical term for what Husserl calls “gradual increase of fullness” or “intentional increase”. Cf. Hua XXXIII, 33.
§6.5. Ferrer’s version of protentional typology

We are now in a position to examine alternative accounts of protentional typology. Ferrer\textsuperscript{438} deals with protentional typology on the basis of an initial restricting condition phrased by Husserl himself: protention is directed toward the following phases of one (or more precisely, of \textit{this}) content.\textsuperscript{439} Thus, he sketches a first kind of protention that is directed toward a concrete hyle and, thus, whose tendencies toward fulfillment have a limited duration.\textsuperscript{440} Its primal function lies in the constitution of concrete sense-data and their duration. He equates this kind of protention with what Lohmar denotes as H-protention, i.e., hyletic protention. It is noteworthy to point out that Ferrer uses this reference to the concrete sense-datum in order to introduce a further “background” distinction within protentions: between protentions directed toward the phases of a (or, more precisely, of \textit{this}) single hyletic datum and protentions that refer to \textit{other} hyletic data. He divides accordingly the protentional functions we examined earlier: “permanent protention” and “typologically differentiated protention” are included in the sort of protentions which prefigure how a single datum will be given in its following phase (for instance, as the same “red” or as “lighter red”); the other protentional functions, i.e., “protention limited by the same sense-field,” “unspecific protention” and “altering protention” or “H-protention-of-expectation,” are taken to refer to “other” hyletic data, beyond the “concrete” hyletic presence.

With respect to the first category, Ferrer highlights certain features of protention with the view to bring to light a fundamental paradox that is supposedly inextricably tied to protentionality as such. Protention bears an innate generality, even in the case of “permanent protentions.”\textsuperscript{441} What is prefigured is not prefigured in its affective and qualitative concreteness; it does not substitute for the specific mode of the following

\textsuperscript{438} Cf. Ferrer (2015)

\textsuperscript{439} Ibid., p. 39f. Ferrer cites Husserl from \textit{Hua X}, 84: “In jeder Urphase, die den immanenten Inhalt ursprünglich konstituiert, haben wir Retentionen der vorangegangenen und Protentionen der kommenden Phasen eben dieses Inhalts, und diese Protentionen erfüllen sich, solange eben dieser Inhalt dauert.”

\textsuperscript{440} Ferrer (2015), p. 40.

\textsuperscript{441} Ibid., p. 41.
proto-impressions. However, this generality admits of certain grading on the basis of which “permanent protentions” lead us closer to the things than “typologically differentiated protentions.” According to Ferrer this feature of “generality” is what underpins protention’s inherently paradoxical status.

But let us first examine the terms of Ferrer’s division. In order for it to serve as a defining classification of protentional functions it should somehow be determined by the appearing course of protentional consciousness, i.e., by the process in which it becomes manifest as such. The prefigurations that are generated must bring with them a determination of their “range”: are they involved in the unification of a datum, of a whole event, or of a series of events? The confinement to the constitution of a single hyletic datum must be included in each protentional prefiguration as an underlying formal determination. But this is possible only with the contribution of retention, since it is through the latter that a hyletic datum is constituted in its unity and duration. The unity of the datum whose remaining phases are still pending has its formal origin in the synthesis of coincidence taking place between primally present hyletic givenness and its retentional modification. If this unity somehow regulates the variation of protentional functions (its scale extending between “permanent” and “typologically differentiated” protentions) within the lived range of consciousness’s tendency toward particular fulfillment, then it must be an element of the “style” of the retentional course that is protentionally projected. Protention cannot achieve this determination on its own terms for a simple reason: it lacks the proto-impressional fixity that is bestowed upon the retentional components in this synthesis of coincidence. The fact that protention is considered in its original unfulfilled state does not merely accentuate its “generality;” it also stresses its inherent indifference

442 Ibid., p. 42.

443 Cf. Hua XXXIII, 292: “Denn der Modus Jetzt wandelt sich stetig entsprechend der Wandlung des originär präsentierenden Bewusstseins in Retentionen, in eben ‘gewesen’ kontinuierlich verschiedener Gradualität oder Stufe, und durch alle diese kontinuierliche Bewusstseinserlebnisse geht das Bewusstsein vom selben Individuellen als Inhalt, der sein bestimmte Zeitstelle hat, aber sie hat in stetig fließenden Modis von Vergangenheiten.”

toward the regulating form of concreteness of what it protends (be it of a datum or of a sequence of data). It is not involved in the primal synthesis of transition as a delimiting accomplishment, i.e., it does not originally define the “stretch” of a single hyletic datum but the flow of hyletic qualities. The singularity of the (duration of the) datum is only collaterally protended through the prefiguration of the same hyletic quality. However, the unity of the hyletic datum is not something constituted by the (relative) hyletic homogeneity per se but by our capacity to passively intend the phases of this homogeneous hyletic givenness in their various degrees of fullness as it undergoes retentional modification.

445 Lohmar, in his account of protentional functions, refers to permanent protentions as protending the same hyletic data (in plural) and not the phases of a single datum. Cf. Lohmar (2002a), p. 160.

446 Instead of presupposing a hyletic datum as a hyletic substrate of the qualities that are protended, fixed as such in advance, we should avoid “substantializing” it, i.e. “individualizing” it independently from and prior to the synthesis of coincidence taking place between hyle and retentional components. We are in a position to do that by turning our attention to what distinguishes the imminence of its modes of givenness. This certainly calls for an extensive analysis, especially with respect to how we can differentiate this imminence from the one that corresponds to Ferrer’s second subpart of his division: protending “other data.” However, focusing on the imminence of the modes of givenness makes it possible for us to describe the same functions without recourse to the individuating “concreteness” or “otherness” of the hyletic data. The merit of such detachment is that it allows us to take into account more “medial” aspects of protentional consciousness, not only with respect to its alternative intuitiveness (phantasmatic instead of impressional) but also regarding its horizonality, i.e., the relative undeterminateness of the “rest” of the protentional continuity that remains such along the synthesis of fulfillment.

We are aware that the previous analysis calls for further clarifications with respect to its conditions. First of all, we have to trace a specific methodological course that leads to the uncovering or thematization of imminence qua experiential character of the tendency towards particular fulfillment. Are we attempting to define an accomplishment that is being tested upon its experiential ground? “Tendency” here does not denote a de-synthesizable accomplishment, thus the experiential characters we are indicating are not reducible, in the sense we discussed earlier. Secondly, how does “imminence” relate to medial intuitiveness (phantasmatic-imaginary), on the one hand, and to horizonality, on the other? Earlier, we used “picturing” to reveal this “imminence” of the determination of modes of givenness. It was the determination of the hyletic givenness to what we had been referring and determination occurs also protentionally. Are we here presupposing an experience of the imminence of protentional determination? But how can this be reconciled with the hyletic fullness of each temporal stretch? It does not mean that the experience of this imminence is hyletically empty, even though it is not an intratemporal imminence either: thus it does not exhibit duration. The problem is whether one should claim that it is impressionally experienced or in some other way that can be somehow distinguished. But this is not the end of it. We can also connect it with clearly genetic issues. Can we consider this imminence as able to appear in its experiential character originating from higher level accomplishments?
It is clear that Ferrer understands the “single datum” limitation of protention as conditioned by the manifest dependence of protentional content on the currently actual hyle and retentions. It is our contention though that this dependence should not be regarded as phenomenologically “neutral,” i.e., as a formal structure, but rather as bearing its own experiential character within protention itself, i.e., within its tendency toward particular fulfillment. In the terms we used earlier, through H-protention of a single and concrete hyletic datum, the imminence of the modes of givenness is experienced as an elementary kind of imminence. This is quite different from claiming that the corresponding tendencies toward fulfillment have a limited duration. In fact, it is only through this kind of imminence that it can be meaningfully claimed that protentional tendency toward fulfillment exhibits some sort of duration. This elementary imminence denotes a particular aspect of the experiential character of “approaching” we attributed to the altering modification undergone by the unfulfilled part of protention.447 We saw that “approaching” was a mode of experiencing the continuous reshaping of prefigurations and, hence experiencing the protentional “stretching” of a single hyletic datum in its fullness cannot amount to “approaching.” A distinct experiential character corresponds to it and this is what we just denoted by the term “elementary imminence.”

Once we abandon Ferrer’s confinement of “permanent protention” within the constitutive range of a single hyletic datum, we are in a position to discern its purely formal function. Protending more of the same is the primal mode of protentional motivation, which can be examined either as a universal form of protending or as a special case with a specific material composition. It protends a qualitative homogeneity without including any prefiguration of a possible typological variation, something that is achieved by the second kind of protention Ferrer deals with. Since this qualitative homogeneity is not protentionally quantified in terms of single-data-stretches but only through future hyletic phases, regardless of whether they pertain to a single or a multiplicity of hyletic data, one should consider it as what constitutes the basic hyletic structure that underpins any protentional function.448

447 See above, §6.1.1.

448 To that extent, Rodemeyer’s and DeWarren’s conception seems justified. See above, p. 153, n. 425.
possible change into lighter or darker red, when red is proto-impressionally given, presupposes that this typologically “other” red, even if its appearance signifies a disappointment with respect to the previous “permanent protention,” still holds a certain homogeneity. This means that typological differentiation must be projected on the basis of the temporal-hyletic density (homogeneous stretching) of “what” is prefigured as typologically varied.

We want to stress that “permanent protention” serves as a basic form of any protentional function. Even though neither Ferrer nor Lohmar make this point explicitly, one can trace it in both accounts. For instance, Ferrer’s claim that “permanent protentions” seem to lead us closer to the things (Sache) than “typologically differentiated protentions,” is a sign that he vaguely perceives the double aspect of “permanent protentions” both as a type of protentions and as a basic form. The latter is situated at the lowest level of the scale of generality, since it determines the “how” of these relations of intensity and quality.449 Having dismissed the idea of an arithmetic-identifying individuation of hyletic givenness through protention (Ferrer’s stressing the peculiar generality of protention seems to echo the same idea), the deictic form “these” (Ferrer uses italics to stress its significance) can only refer to the most elementary temporal homogeneity of hyletic quality, i.e., to the kind of concreteness that stems from it, always in the frame of protentional consciousness. In short, what Ferrer understands as “being closer to the things” is actually “permanent protention’s” formal function of projecting the current hyletic quality in an elementary fashion, i.e., in the mode of a formal hyletic continuity. Lohmar also seems to be implying this formal conception when he says that disappointment of “permanent protention” is not an actual disappointment in the strict sense of the word. It does not motivate other forms of sense giving acts; it is a simple change of protentional content, with no further effects.450 It does not motivate a

449 Ferrer says: “Diese Allgemeinheit lässt eine Graduierung zu, welche sich aber als relativ erweisen wird. Man könnte sagen, dass die ‘beständigen Protentionen’, die eben das ‘Wie’ dieser Intensitäts- und Qualitätsverhältnisse bestimmen, uns näher als die ‘typologisch differenzierten Protentionen’ an die Sache heranführen.” Ferrer (2015), p. 42. The relations he is referring to are no other than the relations between what is given and what is protended.

450 Lohmar (2002a), p. 160: “We see red, further red, and we protend the same ‘red’ hyletic data to appear on and on. But if we sense yellow this is no ‘big disappointment’, i.e., no form of
transformation of sense-giving acts since its role is limited to protending the most elementary hyletic continuity of what is proto-impressionally and retentionally given.\(^{451}\)

What we just said about “permanent protention” will become clearer if we turn our attention to the other version of single-datum protention: “typologically differentiated protention.” Ferrer sees in the latter a benefit in comparison to the former, which consists in the prefiguring of the potential differences that a single hyletic datum admits of. This implies that we are dealing with a modification of the primal protentional intention.\(^{452}\) But now one must ask: how does our previous dismissal of the arithmetic-identifying concretization of hyletic givenness through protention affect the conception of “typologically differentiated protention”? Is there a prefiguration of a stable substratum that manifests this differentiation? What confers to it its flexible identity as a hyletic type? Let us see Husserl’s, to our knowledge, only relevant reference to this:

“But, following a law of necessity, it is not only retention that is performed after the lapse of a ‘differential,’ but [also] protention is directed toward what-is-coming, which is very generally determined with respect to the content (if a tone starts to sound then it will also be in the future <a> tone, even if the particular ‘how’ of the relations of
disappointment that results in new forms of sense giving acts like negation; we merely change the protention to yellow.”

\(^{451}\) But does this not remind us of rigid-H-protentions, to which we referred earlier? Following the description we gave of the latter, one should normally consider “permanent protentions” as the most elementary version of rigid-H-protentions. Undoubtedly this is the case. However, formally regarded, it appears to be independent from the categorization introduced by the rigidity of rigid-H-protentions, i.e., by the restriction of its content’s determination from the actual course of experience and the variations to which it is open. We should also examine this distinction (“permanent protention” as a subcategory of rigid-H-protention and as formal protention, independent from the category of rigid-H-protention) with respect to the intentional components. Does the formally considered “permanent protention” correspond to specific components as its formal counterparts (to the intentional apprehension or to the apprehended sense-data) or does it consist of different layers that are determined separately (for instance, the “sense” may be protended as strictly the same and the data are protended as typologically variable)? We will discuss this case below, when we will examine the protentional structure of our perceptual field. See below, §6.7.

We see that a “differential” in the course of our experiencing is responsible for the formation of a protention. This is something with which we are already familiar. Husserl has already mentioned at the previous page that a differential that pertains to the course which has undergone the retentional process modifies protention. What should interest us in this excerpt is the protentional preservation of the tone in its typology and the range of protentional openness. It might seem that Ferrer’s inclusion of “typologically differentiated protention” under the category of single-datum protention is justified by this “fixedness” of the tone qua sensed. However, protention motivated by the sounding of a tone may exceed the limits of this tone’s particularity and be open to the arrival of any other tone (but always a tone, i.e., always bearing the restriction of belonging to the acoustic field). The editors of Hua XXXIII have quite accurately added the indefinite article “<a> tone,” pointing out the relativity expressed in this sentence. Thus, we can see the scale of generality extending from the indeterminateneness of the “how” of intensity or quality to the indeterminateneness of the tone itself qua individual bearer of this typological openness. And what does that tell us regarding Ferrer’s decision to subsume it under the category of single-datum protention? We merely pretend more “tone,” either as a determination of the further hyletic data (plural) that are able to exhibit the typological differentiation in the course of the flow or as the general delimitation of a “bearable” variability (the limits of a sense-field). As we already mentioned above, prefiguration of typological differentiation is possible on the basis of the elementary qualitative homogeneity secured by the involvement of “permanent protention.”

453 “Nach einem notwendigen Gesetz wird aber nicht nur nach Ablauf eines ‘Differenzials’ Retention geübt, sonder Protention richtet sich auf das Kommende, einem Allgemeinsten nach inhaltlich bestimmt (hat ein Ton zu erklingen begonnen, so ist auch künftig ein Ton, wenn auch das nähere Wie der Intensitäts- oder Qualitätsverhältnisse unbestimmt bleibt im Sinne der Protension usw.”

454 Cf. Hua XXXIII, 13.

455 Ferrer himself has actually paid considerable attention to the passage just cited. Based on it he came to the conclusion that protentional prefigurations do not duplicate the impressional presentation of the datum, i.e., they do not prefigure something in its affective and qualitative concreteness. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 41. Overall it is rather puzzling how he dismisses the idea of protention prefiguring something in its qualitative concreteness and yet he ascribes to it the capacity of intending the following phases of a concrete sense-datum.
Let us now turn to the second subpart of Ferrer’s division, i.e., protentions that pretend “other” data. The first kind of protention in this category is protentions that prefigure the following sense-data within a single sense-field. He characterizes them as “generic” protentions prefiguring no determinate quality of hyletic data but rather their belongingness to a specific sense-field.\footnote{Ferrer (2015), p. 42.} For some mysterious reason he borrows the name of the fourth kind of protention that we saw before (unspecific protention) and uses it as a general title for this protentional function. It is even more surprising that he ascribes this signification to Lohmar, even though Lohmar has explicitly distinguished between protentions limited by a sense-field and unspecific protentions.\footnote{Cf. Lohmar (2002a), p. 160. Our only guess is that Lohmar’s doubts concerning the existence of such a protention led Ferrer to collapse some elements from the two kinds of protention and borrow the name of the fourth protentional function from Lohmar’s list.} The “unspecific protention” seems to escape the confinement of specific hyletic types and also extends beyond the restrictions of a specific sense-field. Thus it permeates all the sense-fields. But Ferrer mistakenly identifies “generic” with “unspecific” by which he understands what is limited to the genus of each sense-field. The openness of the hyletic modes of what-is-coming is framed by the *sensual structure* (*sinnliche Struktur*) of what is primally and retentionally given. So despite the fact that protention here, according to Ferrer, does not pretend the following phases of a single concrete datum, it is still closely connected to the present field.

Ferrer’s “generic” or “unspecific” protention has its proper place within a single sense-field. The relevant prefiguration is independent from the concrete protoimpressional hyletic quality as well as from its type; nevertheless, it cannot reach out to another sense-genus and prefigure radically different hyletic givenness. The protentional “crossing” of sense-fields cannot be achieved on the same footing as the previous functions discussed above. Instead, this “crossing” is prefigured by some kind of protention that leaves undecided whether what will come next will belong to the same sense-field or to another one. Hence, it inserts a sort of “heterogeneity.” The heterogeneity of the hyletic data rests on the peculiar cessation of the “protoimpressional – retentional” continuous formation of protentional content. Yet, this detachment is not the origin of exclusively sense-genus heterogeneity. In fact, it may
give rise to an intrageneric heterogeneity or even to a kind of heterogeneity traceable within the (non-elementary) homogeneity prefigured by permanent protention. We can illustrate the latter kind of heterogeneity as a protending of the same hyletic quality through a different sense-giving (for example, the same pattern which might appear either as duck or as rabbit) or even through the transition to a sense-giving, while experiencing its delay (for example, while we are still unclear about what we actually see). We must keep in mind, nevertheless, that the cessation of proto-impressional and retentional continuum does not affect permanent protention qua protention of elementary homogeneity. If it did, we would be faced with the absurd possibility of a radical distortion of our consciousness’s primal future-directedness.

Ferrer grasps the problem we are faced with as the problem of the phenomenological exhibition of the imminent “being-otherwise” than what is retentionally and proto-impressionally given. And he examines this “break” by evoking Lohmar’s hypothesis of protentional phantasmata. According to this conception, higher-level experiences exert an influence on the passive level of protending hyletic contents in such a manner that they lead to the emergence of phantasmatic protentions of heterogeneous hyle. These protentions allow the ordering of multifarious phenomena into a protentional continuum. This is possible on the basis of our familiarity with everyday situations, natural, and cultural objects. We manage to integrate the experiential heterogeneity into a (concordant) protentional continuum through a habitual projecting. It is at this point exactly that Ferrer interpolates his interpretation of protentional phantasmata. He poses the question of

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458 We need to remind ourselves that we are dealing with the content of protention and not with how protention contributes to the constitution of primal process as a formal intertwine of primordial intentionalities. The “coreness” (Kernhaftigkeit) of protentional prefigurations is examined here not as a formal condition treated separately from what it conditions but as a condition that essentially retains its reference to the experiencing of what it conditions, even after its phenomenological exhibition. This reference is two-fold, referring both a) to the hyletic fullness of the core and b) to the peculiar sensing of the particular fulfillment.


460 As we saw earlier in §6.4., protentional phantasma is the modification that pertains to the protentional content, a modification effected by phantasmatic self-affection. We already discussed its important role for H-protention-of-expectation.

whether we actually constitute our factual world-experience only by means of an “illusion” or “semblance” (Ferrer’s understanding of “phantasmatic self-affection”).\footnote{According to Lohmar, retention and protention are both functions of phantasmatic self-affection. The latter is not restricted to the case of H-protentions-of-expectation, i.e., to the case of protending contents that are not currently given in a proto-impressional or retentional manner. Cf. Lohmar (2008), p. 94 & 97f.}

Let us follow Ferrer’s own reasoning. If we remain, he says, within the limits of rigid-H-protentions, modification of retentional and proto-impressional givenness amounts to a mere modification of its temporal direction, to a temporal “reversal.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 48.} This is, so Ferrer, an immediate modification as opposed to mediate modification that concerns our memories of previous world-experiences. The latter is carried out through phantasmatic self-affection and the correlative protentional phantasmata of following heterogeneous hyletic data. His reservations concerning the hypothesis of phantasmata on the level of protentional consciousness have to do with the (in-)ability of phantasmatic prefigurations to constitute an experience of new sensual data. If phantasmatic prefigurations emerge from memorial sedimentations, i.e., from hyletic elements that have presented the expected object in former experiences, it seems we should consider them as representations (Vorstellung) of past contents. What is more, in comparison with proto-impressions which give the new, protentional phantasmata are only “weak” and “vague.” The question Ferrer poses is how they are experienced as such in the moment of fulfillment or transition to impressional reality.\footnote{Ibid., p. 49, n. 20.}

Phenomenologically speaking, Ferrer’s account of immediate and mediate modification seems rather simplistic and abstract: referring to immediate modification as a reversal of temporal direction tells us nothing about how this reversal is experienced or how it is carried out as an accomplishment of consciousness. However, two of his objections seem to be worthy of further scrutiny: a) how do protentional phantasmata differ from their originating sedimentations, so that they can be regarded as contributing to the constitution of new sensual data? And, slightly rephrased, b) how are they experienced as “weak” and “vague” within the tendency
toward particular fulfillment? We will hold on to these questions and try to tackle with them in various occasions in what follows.

§6.6. Near and far protention

But before doing so we should first examine a slightly different account of protention. It is the account of “near” and “far” protention offered by Rodemeyer, as the exact correlative of her distinction between “near” and “far” retention. The terms “near” and “far protention” are introduced by Rodemeyer to describe two different functional aspects of protention and not to indicate a sort of distance from the immediate presencing of consciousness. Instead, the functions that are indicated are closely connected with the way she interprets protention in general. According to Rodemeyer, Husserl’s reappraisal of protention in his Bernauer Manuskripte offers us a renewed understanding of the whole structure of temporalizing consciousness. His discussion of protention in terms of fulfillment enables him to overcome the restrictions of a punctual conception of primal present. He now refers to a “zone” of fulfillment, delimited by the operative intersection between retention and protention. This signifies, so Rodemeyer, Husserl’s abandonment of the model of proto-impressional hylletic data, since fulfilled protention as well as fulfilled retention describe much better the content of experience. On the other hand, she criticizes Husserl’s terminology of “zero-points,” “halves,” “positives” / “negatives,” “maximum” and “minimum” as mathematical descriptions: Husserl’s use of them seems to attest to a moving away from a phenomenological analysis of temporalizing consciousness toward “a mathematical description of a visual aid.” For that reason she cautions us

465 We refrain from using the term “moment of fulfillment,” since it gives the impression of a formal distribution of moments, occurring prior to the fulfilling synthesis.

466 Rodemeyer (2006), pp. 133-175.

467 Ibid., p. 162.

468 Ibid., p. 142f.

469 Ibid., p. 142.

470 Ibid., p. 146.
to “be careful of the tendency to reduce the phenomenon to its model.” Thus, Rodemeyer delimits her view through a two-sided avoidance: of a hyletic conception of temporalization, on the one hand, and of a mathematical conception, on the other.

Three points are of particular interest. The first is protention’s role in providing the zone of fulfillment with its sense and frame. The now-phase obtains its meaning from protention’s moving-ahead of the current actualizing presentation, toward the intended object as a whole. In that sense, protention’s activity is the source of meaning for the now-phase. The “emergence” of this meaning, as what makes possible the coherent surpassing of the actual presentation, can only be described in the zone of actualization, following Rodemeyer’s terminology. We must stress the essential role that the mutual modification between retention and protention, discerned by Rodemeyer herself, plays with respect to the protentional emergence of the meaning. A closer inspection of the modifications occurring in this zone of fulfillment reveals that the emergence of meaning is actually a process articulated in various stages/forms of modification, as we saw above.

471 Ibid., p. 149.

472 Since our interest lies exclusively in her analysis of protention, we will not go into any details or more general comments on her methodology. Mensch has criticized Rodemeyer’s account of intersubjective temporality in his book on Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness. Cf. Mensch (2010a), p. 208-213 & 223-224. He also states his overall dismissal of Rodemeyer’s (and Kortoom’s) view that Husserl rejected proto-impressional hyle as an element of our primordial time-consciousness. Cf. Mensch (2010a), p. 183-184.


474 Ibid., p. 152. We will discuss this issue in the following chapter.

475 Rodemeyer says nothing about a “coherent” going-beyond. Yet, at page 143 she speaks of tendencies toward immediate linking “moments” and toward whole experiences. This clearly expresses the coherence of the surpassing.

476 Cf. ibid., p. 143.

477 On “modification,” see above §6.1. This openly opposes Ferrer’s position, according to which the empty constitution consists in a distant reference to a new sense-formation that escapes protentional prefiguration. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 31.
Following this line of thought, the kind of openness that Rodemeyer attributes to protention, and this is the second point we should keep in mind, is based on the openness toward experiencing the emergence of the meaning. Focusing on mutual modifications enables us to specify how we actually experience the openness inherent in our protentional consciousness. The experience of surprise is essentially grounded in it: what surprises us presents itself as having eluded any prefiguration and thus as already absent from this genetic course.

The third point is closely connected to what we have just seen. It concerns protention’s relation to our familiarity with types of objects as well as with sensory experience in general. This is directly relevant to Rodemeyer’s discussion of the structures “near” and “far” retention as well as “near” and “far” protention. That means that protention is responsible for relating together various dimensions of our passive experiential life. Linking back to the second point, the familiarity to which Rodemeyer refers can also be regarded as an element that contributes to the experiencing of the emergence of meaning.

Let us examine now the distinction between “near” and “far” protention and see to what extent it overlaps with the distinction between rigid-H-protention and H-protention-of-expectation.

Rodemeyer’s reference to this distinction is far from detailed and serves mostly her purpose of describing as accurately as possible the temporal structure of the

478 She also (probably more emphatically) refers to consciousness’s affective openness. We will postpone any discussion of the relevance of the affective aspect, until we will have explicitly turned to the relation between protention and affectivity.

479 Cf. Ferrer’s and Micali’s discussion on retroactive correction of missing protentions. Ferrer (2015), p. 88ff. & Micali (2008), p. 224ff. Nevertheless, this has to be distinguished from the correction of protentions, as it is described by Montagova. More will be said about it in a following chapter. See below §6.8.


481 In Rodemeyer’s words: “protention connects a consciousness of past experiences with an openness to what is coming.” Ibid.

482 We will not try to discuss this issue here, since it involves elements from higher-level experiences, such as associative synthesis.
experience of another person. In light of this observation, one should not expect an exhaustive exposition of these protentional functions as such. Nonetheless, she does offer us an innovative albeit terse theory of protentional consciousness. A propos of the protentional dimension that is of interest to us, she admits that Husserl has never made use of the term “far protention” and that it remains a hypothetical possibility.\footnote{Ibid., p. 161.} Granted this, a definitive account of the distinction cannot be traced in Husserl’s work. Nevertheless, we could distinguish them as follows. \textit{Near protention} is the immediate protending activity, based on the current constitution of the living-present. \textit{Far protention}, on the other hand, is a more extended anticipation in the living-present and is based not only upon current constitution but also on typifications that are sedimented through passive synthesis. Far protention is thus only partially based on current, originary experience, and is involved in current constitution through its protention of general types and habits. Differently put, protention toward what is not specifically in the immediate present, toward what is most often based upon sedimentations of types in far retention, would be called “far protention,” whereas protention toward what is immediately coming would be “near protention.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 161.} Both of these functions relate with present constitution. To be more precise, this implies that they both somehow take place \textit{within} and \textit{through} the range of living-present.

Rodemeyer expressly compares her distinction to Lohmar’s distinction between rigid-H-protentions and H-protentions-of-expectation.\footnote{Ibid., n. 240.}

To begin with, a brief remark on the terminology is necessary, since Rodemeyer seems to be equating, as far as we understand it, “far protention” with what Lohmar calls a “movable” intentional expectation. Lohmar explicitly distinguishes between what Husserl says about “movable intentional expectation” (see §6.2) and what he calls protention of intentional expectation. The latter is the kind of protention that results from the “sinking down” of higher level intentional expectations on the lower level of time constitution.\footnote{Lohmar (2002a), p. 162.} It is obvious that Rodemeyer takes movable intentional...
expectation to be the same as H-protention-of-expectation, i.e., the protentional function that accomplishes the prefiguration of the green of the traffic light while what is currently given is red. Rodemeyer ascribes this task to “far protention.” The point of Lohmar’s distinction is to claim that this kind of anticipation does not take place in an already constituted objective time as a higher-level intentional expectation. In the same way that Husserl distinguishes in Erfahrung und Urteil between retention and a still-keeping-in-grasp (Noch-im-Griff-Behalten), he also distinguishes between rigid passive protention and movable intentional expectation. Lohmar’s suggestion is that the change anticipated in the case of traffic light should not be considered as anticipated in the manner of high-order intentional expectation but protentionally. Given her employment of the term, this is obviously also what Rodemeyer means to claim.

Let us critically address Rodemeyer’s account. Far protention is described as a “more extended” anticipation based not only on the current constitution but also on sedimented types. In that sense, far protention is directed toward what is not specifically in the immediate present, i.e., toward what is “most often” based on these sedimented types. First of all, we have to understand what Rodemeyer means when she speaks of a “more extended” anticipation. Since she has explicitly dismissed the idea of grasping the designations “far” and “near” as signifying a distance from the immediate presencing of consciousness, extension cannot possibly mean the temporal stretching accomplished by it. What it probably means is that the anticipation has a much wider scope of prefiguration than the one stemming from what is currently given. From this point of view, “near protention” is grasped in strict analogy to rigid-H-protention and “far protention” as what escapes the former’s restrictions. One thing has to be made clear though: characterizing “far protention” as a “more extended” anticipation should imply that it is able to “include” what “near protention” anticipates. “Far protention,” for instance, should anticipate the change of the traffic

487 EU, p. 121f. Lohmar has also indicated the necessity of distinguishing between passive protentional expectation (protentionale Erwartung) and active pre-expectation that grasps in advance (vorgreifende Vorerwartung). Cf. Lohmar (1998), p. 227ff. We read Husserl distinguishing them explicitly:

“Ebenso verliert auch bei Unterbrechung eines Aktes, trotz des Fortwirkens der passiven Gesetzmäßigkeit der Protention, der Zukunfthorizonte den Charakter des aktive antizipierten, die Protention ist nich mehr wirkliche Aktivität im Modus des Vorgreifens.” (EU, 123)
light to the green, while also encompassing the anticipation of the red’s duration as that which will undergo the change. Yet Rodemeyer says explicitly that the protentional domains are clearly demarcated: “near protention” protends a continued red light, while “far protention” protends the change in the traffic light.488

This may become clearer once we turn our attention to the second point, namely to the fact that “far protention” is based not only on the current constitution but also on sedimented types. It is through the protentional projection of the latter that “far protention” exceeds the anticipatory extent of “near protention.” Broadly speaking, this would signify a rather clear overlapping of H-protentions-of-expectation with “far protention”: the change into green cannot be instilled into our protentional scope through what is currently given. In that sense, sedimented types of experiences guide the formation of our protentional anticipation. However, with this clarification we are merely referred to the source of the protentional formation at stake and not to the specific mode in which this guidance occurs, i.e., to the mode in which it transpires on the hyletic level. That is, far protention presupposes the function of near protention too. Rodemeyer’s use of the phrase “not only” may be taken to point to the same direction.

The question we are faced with can be put as follows: in what does this partial grounding of “far protentions” on the current constitution consist? We saw earlier, a propos of Ferrer’s account, that the heterogeneity of sense-data can only be protended through a cessation of the continuum of proto-impression and retention. Lohmar also refers to the different origin of hyletic givenness that is modified in H-protention-of-expectation, i.e., to the hyletic elements that pertain to former experiences. Even though Rodemeyer makes no reference to the constitution of hyletic data, we cannot fail to recognize the similarity as well as dissimilarity of those accounts. In all three cases protention has a scale of prefiguration that exceeds what is currently given. But while for Ferrer and Lohmar this is possible only through a kind of protention that has no bearing on what is currently given (proto-impressionally as well as retentionally), for Rodemeyer, there must be a partial grounding of the relevant protention on the

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One may assume that the role of this partial grounding consists in establishing the relationship with actuality inherent in “far protention.” This actuality is two-fold: a) it serves as the ground of motivation for the projection of “far protention” and b) it serves as the ground of motivation for the particular form that “far protention” assumes. Given the latter aspect of actuality, we should understand “far protention’s” detachment from current experience as motivated by that same current experience. It is its presence that facilitates the applicability of a certain type of experience on the current prefiguration.

Yet this leads to the issue of how this heterogeneity or detachment itself is integrated within the protentional prefiguration it motivates, i.e., how what is prefigured is experienced as different from what is now present. As to Rodemeyer, she gives no further clue except for the “parallel” operation of the two protentional functions (: “While my ‘near’ protention protends […], ‘far’ protention will protend […].”)490 How one should understand their parallel operation remains unclear. It is not unfair to assume that Rodemeyer could never be in a position to define their interrelation any further, due to her dismissal of the hyletic aspect of temporalizing consciousness. Even if one accepts the qualification that “far protention” protends on the basis of former typifications, we are still faced with the problem of defining on which basis “near protention” protends, if it is not hyletic. However, we have to take seriously her warning that we should not regard the designations “near” and “far” as denoting a certain distance from presencing consciousness, not only in order to satisfy the condition of examining protention within the range of living-present but also in order to avoid interpreting the difference between present givenness and typicality as a difference between terms that belong to the same level of experience: types of experiences (as well as of their objects) should not be understood as mere retentional

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489 Rodemeyer says that explicitly, with some reservation expressed by the adjective “probable” when she refers to the relation of “far protention” with the current presentation. Cf. Ibid. Lohmar does not specify explicitly whether H-protentions-of-expectation are generated through a radical cessation of the continuous formation originating from proto-impressional and retentional givenness. However, we can trace this thought in the introduction of the phantasmatic element at this level of constitution.

490 Ibid., emphasis added.
fusions, even though they admit of gradations ranging from types of experiences of individual things up to the one of something-in-general.⁴⁹¹

As it becomes clear Rodemeyer is not concerned with the issue of phantasmatic self-affection. Instead she correlates “far protention” with an “indirect originarity” similar to the one that is correlated with “far retention.”⁴⁹² To that extent any attempt to associate her account with the two issues that were raised at the end of our discussion of Ferrer’s account would seem rather artificial and far-fetched. Yet, in a more general vein, one could pose the question of how a phenomenological description of the distinction between “near” and “far protention,” as they operate within the zone of fulfillment becomes possible. Since they both contribute to constitution, it is hard to understand how she is in a position to differentiate between them, considering that the zone of fulfillment for her does not consist in a synthesis of coincidence between proto-impression and protentional prefiguration. If one abstracts from this, then there can be no primal experience of what is typical and what is not in the zone of fulfillment.

§6.7. Protentional typology of our perceptual field

In order to grasp how protention operates more thoroughly, it would be preferable to project some of the distinctions we have seen so far on the structure of our perceptual field.⁴⁹³ It is not our intention here to describe the primal associative constitution of our sense-fields and point out the role of protention in it. We will focus mainly on the

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⁴⁹¹ There is a last point. Rodemeyer says that far protention is directed toward what is “most often” based on these sedimented types. But to what exactly does this frequency refer? Her reference to frequency (as well as the implication that there are exceptions in this function: “most often” read as “not always”) is rather puzzling. More specifically, she links “far protention” not with the experience of repetition of the relevant experience but with the experience of the repetition of its grounding on already sedimented types. We will not insist further on this point since it may well be a matter of inaccurate formulation.


⁴⁹³ We owe the main idea of this chapter to Honghe Wang. He has attempted such an analysis as a subchapter of his dissertation. Cf. Wang (2016), p. 56ff. Here we depart from his thorough discussion of Husserl’s descriptions of our perceptual field in order to elaborate further on its protentional structure.
visual field and take for granted its division in the three spheres of: a) what is attended to (Aufgegnerktes), b) the noticed (Bemerktes) and c) the unnoticed (Unbemerktes).\textsuperscript{494} To the first sphere belongs what we are particularly attending to, to the second what is only co-intended or secondarily intended and to the third what is implicitly intended in a vague field of appearance. Respectively, we have three noetic modes of intending what lies in these three spheres: intending (meinen), co-intending (mitmeinen) and “non-intending” (“nicht-meinen”).\textsuperscript{495} In more general terms, we can say that our perceptual field (here: visual field), is divided in a foreground and a background. While the sphere of the unnoticed belongs to the latter, the sphere of the noticed may fluctuate and belong partly to the sphere of the attended-to and partly to the sphere of the unnoticed. There can be no clear borderline between these spheres.

As we return to the example of the traffic light, we are faced with the challenge of correlating the protentional configuration to the above structure of our visual field. We find a trace of this correlation in an expression that is, to our knowledge, rather unique in Husserl’s work, namely “attending protention” (in aufmerkender Protention) or “not attending protention” (in nicht aufmerkender [Protention]). More specifically Husserl says:

“The starting point of the phenomenological occurrence (as temporal object) arises. Being anticipated, it can be pre-interpreted through protentions (in attending protention or original expectation or in not attending [protention]).” (Hua XXXIII, 11)\textsuperscript{496}

When the traffic light lies in the centre of our visual field, occupying our attention, it is not that easy to determine what corresponds to the background. Not only because

\textsuperscript{494} Husserl seems to maintain this distinction from 1904/05 up to 1930’s with different terminology. For instance, one finds them explicitly in his Ideen I, with the exact same phrasing. Cf. Hua III/1, 268. Wang refers to Hua XXXVIII, 292 where Husserl uses the terms “Aufmerksamkeit,” “Bemerkbarkeit” and “Unbemerkbarkeit.” Cf. Wang (2016), p. 35. The text, according to the editors, is written in 1909. Following Wang, we also see Husserl employing this distinction in somehow different terms in Hua Mat. VIII, 353f. Here Husserl situates this division in our living-present. Now the structure takes on a different form based on the distinction between the active performance of an act, the affective cogitationes and a background of non-affective cogitationes.


\textsuperscript{496} “Der Einsatzpunkt des phänomenologischen Vorgangs (als Zeitgegenstandes) tritt ein, er kann erwartet durch Protentionen vorgedeutet sein (in aufmerkender Protention oder eigentlicher Erwartung oder in nicht aufmerkender).”
there are various modes in which the background appears as such in its relation to what lies in the foreground (for instance, as a background consisting either of visual sense-data or of vague visual appearances of objects, depending on the mode in which we are conscious of it), but also because we are additionally implicitly aware of the other sense-fields. Husserl was aware of the ambiguity that burdens any analysis of the perceptual background. According to him:

“The background field is a potential perceptual field; but it has to be left open, whether sense-data are always (and now with an essential necessity) apprehended in a thing-like manner. In general this is the case. But it should not be asserted that it would be unthinkable that the background is a mere background of sensation [Empfindungshintergrund] without thing-like apprehensions.” (Hua III/2, 605)  

In the same vein he also says:

“We can describe this by juxtaposing two possible cases: the first possibility consists in this, that in the background of consciousness a tone may sound which is indeed apprehended as an object but is not grasped; the Ego is turned toward something else. In the case of the second possibility, talk about a sounding tone denotes a state of sensation which in relation to the Ego does indeed function as a stimulus but which does not possess the property of an object-consciousness, in which a sounding tone comes to consciousness as an object.” (Hua IV, 23; translation by Rojcewicz & Schuwer)

Let us see how this corresponds to our protentional consciousness. The traffic light is intended as such, which means that protention here operates within the framework of a particular act with a specific sense-giving, i.e., the “traffic light.” The immersion of intentional expectation in the lower protentional level carries with it a trace of this Specificity, crystallized, as it were, through the sedimented repetitive instances of experiencing the change of red light to green as well as the active anticipation of this change. The traffic light stands now in the middle of our visual

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497 “Das Hintergrundfeld ist ein potentielles Wahrnehmungsfeld; es muss aber offen bleiben, ob immer (und nun gar wesensnotwendig) die Sinnesdata dinglich aufgefasst seien. Im Allgemeinen ist es der Fall. Es soll aber nicht behauptet werden, dass es undenkbar sei, dass der Hintergrund ein bloßer Empfindungshintergrund ist ohne dingliche Auffassungen.”

498 “Wir können das durch Gegenüberstellung zweier möglicher Fälle beschreiben: die erste Möglichkeit besteht darin, dass im Hintergrund des Bewusstseins ein Ton erklingt, der schon als Gegenstand aufgefasst, aber nicht erfasst ist; das Ich ist etwas anderem zugewendet. Im Fall der zweiten Möglichkeit besagt die Rede vom erklingenden Ton einen Empfindungszustand, der zwar in Bezug auf das Ich als Reiz fungiert, aber nicht die Eigenheit eines Gegenstandsbe bewusstseins besitzt, dem ein erklingenden Ton gegenständlich bewusst ist.”
field as the locus of the particular change that is protended through our H-protention-of-expectation. This fact alone shows that a quite complex mode of protentional anticipation is already at work. We are not only protending a change of sensual givenness, while there is no similar proto-impressional and retentional givenness, neither of green nor of change; we are also protending it as occurring on a specific hyletic stretch. The hyletic change will take place in a proto-impressional field that is determined by the sense-giving “traffic light.” A specific impressional datum localized within the perceptual field enters into a synthesis of coincidence with its own retentional modification and this hyletic stretch delimits an individuality: it is this hyletic quality that will change, a kind of “thisness” that exhibits itself in duration.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Hua Mat.} VIII, 144. Husserl says that in the proto-impressional field, each proto-impressional datum has its locality and that each impressional datum has its own retentional modification. Strictly speaking, we cannot speak here of locality proper, since this presupposes other elements and layers of constitution, such as primal associations that occur between data that have already been temporally constituted and the configurations that result from them.}

However, the determination provided by the sense-giving “traffic light” admits of a certain fluctuation with respect to the hyletic components that are able to individualize the change. It can be either the still dark traffic light that will turn into green or the already red light that will turn into dark. What should be made clear is that this limited fluctuation is an essential feature of a temporal event regulated by an unambiguous sense-giving. In our example, this amounts to the inner horizon of the traffic light when we attend to it. Regardless of this essential indeterminacy, the temporal individuation of hyletic stretch constitutes the most elementary intuitive ground from which the correlative protentional modification starts. Strictly speaking, it is its ground of motivation.\footnote{This is one of the ways we should understand protention’s dependence on what is proto-impressionally and retentively given. Except for the one we discussed earlier with respect to the determination of the content-modification, there is also the kind of dependence stemming from the determination of the projected sense-giving by what is proto-impressionally and retentively given.}

The relevant H-protention-of-expectation is primally experienced as protention, i.e., through the synthesis of coincidence transpiring, on the one hand, between the protentional intention and proto-impression and, correlatively, between what it prefigures and the current hyletic givenness. What differentiates H-protention-of-
expectation from the other kinds of protention, as we saw above, is the fact that what it protends is not bound by, i.e., not predetermined on the basis of what is currently given. Since we are here concerned with the role of protention in the constitution of our perceptual field, it is important to clarify the relation between the prefigured content and its situatedness in the temporal structure of the perceptual field. De-synthesizing what lies in the foreground, i.e., suspending the relevant synthetic accomplishment, leads to the level of temporal constitution, i.e., to the constitution of its duration. What is now at stake is to determine whether a radically carried out reduction can lead to the temporal stretching of the hyletic datum as detached from the correlative sense-giving. Applying it to our example of the traffic light the question is formulated like this: can we describe the constitution of the duration of the red as detached from its belongingness to the sense “traffic light”? If we follow the ABC of constitution, it seems that we can and should do so. This reveals the rigid functioning of retention as well as of protention. Both of them are responsible for the pre-temporal stretching: retention retains what was proto-impressionally present and protention protends (formally) the same hyletic quality, no matter whether it will be fulfilled or not. The point is now whether the proto-impressional hyletic quality is experienced as determined in the mode of a temporalized datum that has not yet undergone a sense-giving but is about to or of a datum whose primal presence is already permeated by this sense-giving.

Focusing on a hyletic datum that is present either as already-apprehended or as about-to-be-apprehended has an immediate impact on how we grasp the protentional structure of the perceptual field. Acknowledging the possibility of the former amounts to the recognition of its inherent relation to the preceding protentional prefiguration, i.e., to the situatedness of hyletic givenness in an already predetermined course of apprehension. In other words, the primal presence of the hyletic datum is experienced

501 Cf. Hua XI, 125.

502 It should be noted that we are not concerned here with the issue of the primal flow of consciousness but with the protentional structure of our perceptual field. Therefore the apprehension we are discussing does not refer to an apprehension that ascribes to present hyletic content the futural mode of givenness. It is not a tacit restitution of the apprehension/content schema at the level of experiencing future as a primal mode of givenness. Protentional content is experienced immediately as futural through the peculiar protentional modification, as it was explained above.
through the retained protention that it fulfilled. In terms of the corresponding modifications and syntheses, this means that the synthesis of coincidence taking place between the protentional modification and proto-impressional givenness is already experienced “through” the synthesis of coincidence occurring between proto-impression and its retentional modification and vice versa. We can understand this “through” as denoting a clearly genetic account: we are not examining an act in its abstract isolation from the flow of consciousness. Its structural layering (content as what grounds the sense-giving) is permeated by our consciousness’s temporally stretched intentional nexus with its correspondingly determined (unmodified and modified) content.

Focusing on a datum about-to-be-apprehended, we are facing the possibility of experiencing a temporal precedence of the presence of sensual data over the correlative sense-giving. The non-temporal static founding relation between content and sense-giving may be experienced in a temporal succession either (falsely) in virtue of the course of the reflective act that thematizes it or through various experiential characters. In the first case, the temporal structure of the reflective act is mistaken for the temporal structure of the sense-constitution. In the second case, we acknowledge the methodological significance and relevance of certain primal experiences in which sense-constitution is somehow interrupted. For instance, the “unfamiliarity” of certain sense-data may lead or amount to the experience of the absence of a sense-giving. Naturally, the kind of “unfamiliarity” that pertains to sense-data differs radically from the “unfamiliarity” of a perceived object, say of the chair we sit on for the first time. Even in this case, the absence of sense-giving is experienced as a “delay,” i.e., as always within the anticipation of a sense-giving. Depending on whether we take into consideration the genetic structure of this sense-giving or not, we have two distinct views of this anticipation. It can be either a materially concrete state of anticipation or a formal one. The latter case, however, should not be understood as a properly temporal event, extending along a temporal

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503 We currently leave out of consideration the kind of H-protention that is retained, i.e., it can be either rigid-H-protention or H-protention-of-expectation.


505 Ibid., p. 21.
stretch, but instead as an index of the eidetic mutual belongingness of sensual data and sense-giving accomplishment. The point is not to seek out whether one or the other part defines the way we experience each of them but to clarify whether exhibiting the structure of the perceptual field motivates a specific mode of accounting for its temporal structure, i.e., a genetic versus a static one.

This will subsequently help us define the distinct protentional functions or the complexes thereof that are at work at each part of the structure of the perceptual field. Let us return once again to the example of the traffic light. When we examine the temporal structure of its experience, the question that comes up is the following: do we experience the motivation of the protention by the hyletic givenness “red” in a unitary manner and if yes, how? More specifically, do we experience the continuity of the protentional prefiguring through the imminence of the following modes of givenness, even if what is protended is “green,” i.e., a hyletic quality that is not proto-impressionally or retentionally present? And does this at any rate depend on the fact that the red traffic light is what we are perceptually attending to? Experiencing the continuity of protentional prefiguration is a condition of possibility for determining the protentional content under the guidance of the already formed sense “red traffic light.” Now, attending to the red (of the) traffic light, we experience protentional prefiguration in a two-fold manner. While H-protentions-of-expectation pretend green, we are always also aware that red has an ongoing duration. This means that there is always a kind of rigid-H-protention that is responsible for the orderly experienceability of the appearing duration. There must already be a ground of primal experience of the “not yet green” and this can only consist in the continuity of the always given hyletic content “red of the traffic light.” Through this protentional continuity the persisting presence of red appears as a primal kind of fulfillment and only secondarily as a continuous disappointment of the correlative H-protention-of-expectation. That is the reason why the fact that “green” does not yet appear does not lead to the cancellation of the protention that prefigures it. On the contrary, the longer the duration of the red, the greater our “impatience” for the green. To that extent, we should presuppose this underlying rigid protentional function.

What we have to clarify at this point is whether this rigid-H-protention operates on the formal level, i.e., as the elementary permanent protention or is materially
dependent, i.e., dictated by the relevant sense-formation. Consciousness can direct itself protentionally to the same partial sphere at the same time either in the mode of rigid-H-protention or in the mode of H-protention-of-expectation. One may reasonably ask: is it possible that two protentional functions (rigid-H-protention and H-protention-of-expectation) relate to the same partial sphere of the field of appearance at the same time? It would seem more appropriate, so the objector might argue, to ascribe to rigid-H-protention exclusively the role of protending the background, since the modes of givenness of its contents are more likely to abide to the various forms of dependence on proto-impressional and retentional givenness we have seen –protending either the same hyletic content, a typologically differentiated one or a content that will belong to the same sense-field. A first reply to this objection may be given in the form of a counter-question: should we understand the operations of protentional functions as individual events that occupy a temporal stretch in such a manner that they cannot “co-exist” with each other? It may be the case that protentions belong to specific acts and this fact alone may provide them with a temporal particularity. This particularity may also obey the strict regulation of our perceptual field in the zones of attention. However, there are at least two ways in which one should consider a “pre-temporal” co-existence of protentional functions: a) no matter what protention protends there is always at work a formal dimension of protention, i.e., what we denoted as the elementary permanent protention and b) a materially determined protentional function may “imply” (or involve) another

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506 This question was posed by Honghe Wang. We are grateful to him for pointing out the necessity of clarifying this issue further.

507 Wang speaks of a corresponding differentiation of retentions and protentions. What is attended-to is retained in a less fluctuating manner than what in the same field of givenness is given as unnoticed. He uses a very instructive metaphor to describe this. What is retained does not “sink” like a stone in water but like a gradually dissolvable material: what belongs to the area of the unnoticed dissolves first into oblivion, after that the retention of what is noticed and finally the retention of what was attended-to as the retentional core. Wang (2016), p. 59. We have to keep in mind that even though we use the terms “first,” “after that” and “finally,” no proper temporal sequence is implied. The gradual dissolving follows the generation of retentional modifications, the latter being the continuous retentional givenness of all that is proto-impressionally given, unnoticed and attended-to alike. We should also keep in mind that the hyletic core of our living-present does not necessarily depend on the division of our attentive sphere, thus the retentional core itself can quite easily consist in retained hyletic material exhibiting one of the experiential characters that attest to the absence of sense-giving. This is easily seen in the case when we are directing our regard toward what has just been said in an attempt to make sense out of it because we misheard it.
materially determined protentional function. The first case should be rather simple to understand by now: it signifies the precondition for the futural homogeneity of a hyletic quality whatsoever. What is protended will not only sink retentionally (R-protention) and thus stretch out as individual; it will also be somehow hyletically determined as such (elementary permanent protention). Even if the latter protention becomes disappointed by an unanticipated hyletic change, it continues to operate in an orderly fashion with another content-determination, i.e., it does not motivate any other protentional function. With regard to the second case, the difficulty lies in explaining the relation of “implication” pertaining to the particularity of the materially determined protentional function. For instance, how can we delineate the potential implicitness of hyle-dependent permanent protention in H-protention-of-expectation? Is there a primal experience of anticipating “more of the same red” integrated in the anticipation of “green” through the latter mode of protention? The example of experiencing “impatience” while waiting for the light to turn green seems to speak in favour of this. If that is the case, we are then in a position to speak not only of a non-elementary permanent protention but also of a hyle-dependent permanent protention that operates under the guidance of a specific sense-formation and is determined by it through and through.

However, in view of what has just been said, it should be stressed that in the example of the traffic light, the implicitness of permanent protention within H-protention-of-expectation yields a peculiar experience: red is not merely protended as “more red” but also as red that is “not yet changed.” This shows that permanent protention qua rigid-H-protention may well be a component of a protentional “whole.” This last point can be easily grasped if we perform a “picturing” –i.e., the high-order quasi-fulfilment of protention by means of an “image” (Bild), as defined in §4.4.2.– on the basis of what is currently given, i.e., “red.” The modification of red that is quasi-intuited in the course of “picturing” is experienced as the origin of the protended change that results to “green.” Even though what we “picture” is the change into green and the fulfillment of the correlative protention, red is still part of the change as its point of departure. The re-presentifying character of “picturing”

\[508\] We should keep in mind that “elementary permanent protention” is the most basic form of rigid-H-protention.
includes the modification of what is currently experienced, i.e., “red.” However, despite this radical disruption of presentification, the “picturing” making-intuitive does not encompass “more red” as a content cut off from its temporal environment: it is essentially connected with the change into green.

Another way to grasp the implicitness of rigid-H-protention in H-protention-of-expectation is to assume that it functions merely “marginally” by establishing the concreteness of the field opened up through protention’s formal de-presentifying function. Needless to say, this scenario corresponds to the correlation between rigid-H-protention and background-sphere. Even though we can draw a strict dividing line between the formal/elementary and the material aspect of permanent protention, things become far more complicated once we examine them one “on top” of the other. While the one denotes the experiencing of the imminence of the modes of givenness (“more red” as the elementary presumptive determination of protentional content), regardless of the particular fulfilling outcome, the other is already in advance part of a protended hyletic stretch bearing its own experiential character (the impatient experiencing of “more red” qua “not yet changed” in anticipation of “green”), a stretch that is regulated by a relevant sense-formation. But what does this “coincidence” signify? Should we really be talking about “coincidence” here?

If one takes into consideration the distinction between permanent protention as a component of a protentional “whole” and permanent protention as connected to the background of the perceptual field, things become more complicated. For there is a fundamental difference between the way “more red” pertains to the protended “green” qua protended and the way the surroundings of the traffic light relate to the traffic light itself (to be more precise, to the protended “green traffic light”). “More red” is by no means part of the perceptual background of the protended green, i.e., it does not occupy a currently non-present position in an anticipated configuration of our perceptual field. It is the content through which “green” as the specific hyletic quality emerges in the protentional horizon; it includes the motivation of “green” as a determined hyletic modification. By contrast, the background of “red traffic light” is rigidly protended in a manner that does not contribute to the motivation of protending a concrete hyletic change. Concreteness of the field, in this case, stems from the peculiar homogeneity of the background experienced thanks to and despite the lack of a determined sense-giving. To that extent it is typically determined by the contents of
the background in their distinctive experiential characters (vagueness, indistinctiveness etc).

Here we stumble on a further essential aspect of our perceptual field that needs to be articulated in protentional terms, namely, the continuity between the foreground and the background or between the three spheres of the perceptual field we saw earlier. The transition from one sphere to another presupposes that contents pertaining to each of them may be orderly protended in their experiential character (indistinctive, sharp etc.).

Any attempt to investigate the protentional dynamic of our perceptual field on the basis of a (formal) similarity between the temporal-protentional continuity and the transitive continuity between the perceptual spheres, must be clear about the degree of their correspondence as well as about its particular limitations. From this follows a whole series of relevant questions. Does protentional continuity exhibit a structure that somehow correlates to that of our perceptual field? And how can we meaningfully speak of its phenomenality? Is there a reductive process that leads directly from the perceptual field to its temporal configuration? What should serve as our point of departure for examining this correspondence: the protended continuous duration qua duration that will be constituted or the future continuity of our sensing of the synthesis of fulfillment via the gradation of fullness? Or should we rather take into account both aspects? Do we have an application of the distinction between formal and material? All these and many more similar questions serve as mere indications that help us display the complexity of the tripartite relation between protention, continuity, and perception. The relation between the three can be displayed with far greater precision once we take into account the affective dimension of our living-present. The continuity of the transition from the one perceptual sphere to the other can then be analyzed in purely genetic terms with the help of the model of “affective relief.”

By inquiring into affection’s inherent relation with protention we will come

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509 One is inclined to wonder here: does the experiential character influence essentially the function of protention? For instance, can indistinctiveness motivate typically differentiated protention or protention within a sense-field? Better said: how can we define experiential characters as motivating specific protentional functions? In any case, we are still within the limits of rigid-H-protention. The influence of retained experiential characters on protention is a purely genetic element.

to see in §7 to what extent this “affective relief” also serves as a model for revealing the dynamic configuration of protentional continuity.

§6.8. “Corrective” transformation of protentions

We saw earlier that protention is characterized in an original manner as content-modification, i.e., as a primal accomplishment of consciousness through which we are primally conscious of what-is-coming. When discussing the kind of modification that protentional horizon undergoes, we distinguished “approaching” as the experiential character that describes the continuous reshaping of protentional prefigurations. However, as it was noticed, this change does not concern the particularities of protentional content. Instead it refers to the modes of givenness of protentional horizon as it is experienced in the flow of consciousness.\footnote{Cf. Hua XXXIII, 150.} The typology of protentional functioning offered us a ground for describing the various orders and levels of content-variations, in a manner that clearly involves a more concrete understanding of prefigurations and the kind of alterations they undergo. As we saw in the previous section, these alterations may exhibit a quite complex structure that implies some sort of cooperation between the various kinds and levels of protentional functioning, which should not be accounted for as distinct temporal events within immanent time-consciousness. Now we should consider a further dimension of protention, namely the \textit{modes of alteration} of protentional consciousness.

Normally, protentional alterations, i.e., variations of what is protended, transpire “smoothly,” being motivated by the course of our experience both in the fulfillment (or disappointment) of rigid-H-protentions as well as in the fulfillment of H-protentions-of-expectation. These alterations contribute to the formation of protentional modifications by enriching, differentiating, and specifying the prefigurations.\footnote{Montagova (2013), p. 39.} These modifications are an essential component of our experience’s protentional congruence, i.e., its further congruent course. However, there are certain occasions in which the differentiation takes on a more “radical” form. In some cases,
protentions are so radically transformed that the modifications generated by the relevant motivating fulfillment (disappointment) are not experienced as mere reconfigurations or readjustments of a congruent protentional horizon but as an absolute change effected by a substitution of the correlative protentional nexus by another. These cases of fulfillment (disappointment) are experienced as “irritations,” i.e., as hyletic changes that cannot be integrated within the current protentional horizon as changes fitting with the familiar configurations of protentional typology, be it rigid-H-protentions or H-protentions-of-expectation. To that extent they motivate a transformation of the relevant protentional field, with a view to restoring the experienced (in-)congruence, i.e., “correcting” it.

“Correction” is thus a concretization of the reshaping of pregifurations and entails the alteration of content. What is characteristic about this mode of reshaping is that it is motivated by the impresional confirmation that the corresponding pregifuration is proven to be false. Thus, even though there is always a continuous coincidence between what was previously emptily prefigured and what still remains emptily prefigured, fulfillment here exerts a formative effect on the synthesized protentional horizon. To that extent, “approaching” obtains a very distinctive character; it is experienced abruptly and intensely. Despite the fact that what serves as properly corrective is impresional experience itself, quasi-corrective transformation of protentional horizon is also possible through phantasy, when, for instance, phantasy “corrects” a series of subsequent protentions. However, the motivation for such a transformation must always have an impresional basis, i.e., we must first impressionally live through the hyletic change for such a motivation to be established. Experiencing the motivating deviation from what was prefigured as an irritation bearing witness to protention’s need for transformation implies that this can never amount to a total irritation, i.e., to a complete disappointment of our intentional life.

513 Ibid.

514 As Husserl says: “Damit ist schon sichtlich, dass wir mit der Erwartung zugleich das genetisch ursprünglichste Quellgebiet der Modalisierung betreten.” (Hua XI, 186)


516 Ibid., p. 40.
The transcendental value of this irritation rests on its partial character. Otherwise it would haunt our consciousness as a constant empirical threat. Our protentional horizon would be openness to a givenness whose facticity risks to undermine its own being-given.\footnote{Husserl himself explores this possibility under the rubric of “transcendental illusion” (\textit{transzendentaler Schein}). Cf. \textit{Hua} VIII, 53f. Ferrer based on this text attempts to explain the paradox possibility of a transcendental illusion of our world-experience. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 92ff.}

Given the reestablished concordance of our experiential life through the corrective transformation of protentional consciousness, there must also be a retroactive impact of “correction” on the \textit{retained} protentions which were sedimented and provided consciousness with a homogeneous protentional horizon.\footnote{Husserl speaks of the produced continuous concordance. If we returned to the “falsified” past perception, we would find explicitly the changed interpretation that ensures the concordance. Cf. \textit{Hua} XI, 27.} What differentiates this retroactive correction is that retained protentions are bound to self-givenness, i.e., to the irrevocable fixedness provided by the fulfilling function of proto-impression. Therefore, retained protentions do not exhibit the “plasticity” or “unfixedness,” as it were, of the yet unfulfilled protentional horizon. Naturally, this “correction,” as in the case of unfulfilled protentions, does not take place through an active intervention of consciousness: it is passive. We do not need to perform an explicit recollection in order to restore the appropriate (“corrected”) protentional determinations of the retained course of our experience. All the more so since concordance is not formed “occasionally” and sporadically but through the essential cooperation between protention and already typified experiences.

It should be noted here that the hyletic change motivating the corrective transformation of protentions can be experienced differently, depending on how consciousness relates to the previous course of our experience, both in hyletic and in protentional terms. More specifically, the “irritating” character of the change is sensed through the demand of a qualitative continuity or discontinuity. Briefly put, the materiality of the hyletic stretch ascribes to the hyletic change a specific mode of experiencing it. A qualitative change that is temporally stretched, no matter how abrupt, always appears in the backstage of the most elementary hyletic homogeneity,
i.e., it is always already experienced through a synthesis of coincidence with the elementary permanent protention. As it was noted earlier, this primal relation to the latter kind of protention cannot lead to the motivation of a different protentional function. However, it establishes an essential precondition for the experience of every kind of hyletic change.

To that extent, experiencing an “irritation” does not amount to a mere “surprise,” for they both affect our protentional horizon in quite distinct manners. The former implies an already operative protentional nexus that is relatively determined and lawfully formed, following the essentially mediate intentionality of protentional consciousness; “disappointment” of protention is always experienced in relation with a certain determination. The latter signifies a protentional field lying ahead of the surprising event, which was so undetermined that could bear no corrective transformation; the surprising event—for instance a sudden explosion—was part of no specific protentional formation and thus of no determined protentional continuity. Qua surprising, its impressional mode of appearance situates it in a context that has no pre-determined content-formation. Nevertheless, the hyletic aspect of “surprise” is such that its proto-impressional appearance presents an abeyance; its hyletic quality is sensed as the materialization of an undetermined horizon. In surprise, the phenomenon of “disappointment” reveals both consciousness’s proto-impressional function as well as its tendency toward particular fulfillment.

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519 One can say that protending “something whatsoever” admits of no corrective intervention.

520 From a methodological point of view, we can thus attribute to “surprise” an exceptional transcendental function. However, instead of tying it directly to the appearance of worldly objects in their amplitude, we must also consider the noetic aspect of surprise, especially in this deepest level of consciousness. The common impressional basis of the experience of surprise does not consist in sensing vaguely the range of hyletic qualities that could “disappoint” the preceding protentional prefiguration, but in sensing that a hyletic content emerges proto-impressionaly, that retentional and protentional modifications always relate to their unmodified origin. Surprise reveals the fact that we always experience the structural richness of our conscious life. In close connection to this, although not in the explicit context of “surprise,” Ferrer also speaks of protentional phantasmatic impulsion, the disappointment of which leads to its own pre-reflective and non-objectifying awareness as a mere anticipatory image. A necessary condition of this awareness is a “real” emotional and lived-bodily status. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 71. This awareness is a bodily pre-reflective proto-impressional self-awareness. In spite of its proto-impressional emergence, this experience occurs through another intuitive order. Brudzinska will characterize this other order as pre-reflectively realized proto-impressional phantasmatic experience that delimits the field of transitive consciousness. Within this
Correlatively, there is also a difference in the retentional aspect of correction. In the case of “irritation,” retroactive correction of protentions occurs as an overlapping of the transformed protentions over the “false” ones, while, in the case of “surprise,” retroactive correction denotes a reconstruction of protentions that were previously “missing.” We can easily understand that, depending on which experiential character of hyletic change one decides to ground the description of the phenomenon of corrective transformation on, one undertakes distinct kinds of genetic analysis of it. For example, starting from “surprise,” in order to thematize the “reconstruction” of previously missing protentions one must go through a peculiar “history” of absent protentions, as it were. On the other hand, “irritation” leads to the retrospective tracing of a primal mode of conflict between protentional formations. Our intention here is simply to point out that any systematic discussion on the motivation and process of protentional transformation must necessarily be conscious of its specific genetic perspective as well as of the phenomena that serve as its points of departure.

field fall our drives, instincts, the body and tradition, i.e., all those experiences that ground the experiencing of desires, strivings and prohibitions, without themselves becoming objects of experience. Cf. Brudzinska (2010), p. 106ff.

521 As far as we are aware, Husserl never spoke directly about an overlapping of protentions. Nevertheless, he referred to the retroactive cancellation of retained prefigurations. Cf. Hua XI, 30-33. Even though Husserl refers to an “annulment” of anticipatory intentions through a full proto-impression (Hua XI, 31), this “annulment” must not be considered without further ado as the same process that transpires through the overlapping of senses over senses and apprehensions over apprehensions at the higher-level of “negation.” Pertaining essentially to the originating structure of negation, “annulment” of retained protentions, like “correction” of not-yet fulfilled protentions, must necessarily manifest in a more primal mode of overlapping. Cf. Montagova (2013), p. 43.

522 It seems rather puzzling how such a “history” can unfold without an experiential basis. In that sense, “irritation” proves itself more appropriate as a guiding thread for the performance of a genetic analysis: it implies an immediate reference to the preceding hyletic manifestation, in relation to which the following appears as “irritating.” Naturally, one has to consider the cases of protentional differentiations, in which what is protended is not the same as what is now hyletically given (variations of rigid-H-protention and H-protention-of-expectation). “Irritation” should accordingly be seen as a deviation from what is protended and not from what is hyletically given, i.e., the experienced reference, in relation to which what subsequently appears is sensed as “irritation,” is a reference to the currently protended content. However, since the transition to “irritation” occurs impressionally, i.e., through the impressional character of what is proto-impressionally given, there is always a continuous intuitive ground on which a rigid reference to the primary retained is established. Qua sensed “irritation,” the hyletically given is always intertwined with its immediate retentional manifestations. Qua sensed “irritation,” it is always in direct reference to the retained protention that has “falsified” by its mere appearance.
Reconstructing previously missing protentions can actually be carried out, always passively, in a two-fold manner. It can restore retentional protentional continuity either as quasi-factual or as quasi-potential. The surprising element can motivate a retroactive reconstruction of protentions that integrates it in the retained course of experience as something that was to be expected. The “surprising” aspect is thus totally eliminated.\textsuperscript{523} Even though the newly established order of protentions has its origin in the “surprising” emergence of the proto-impression that “disappointed” the previous prefiguration, this order is experienced as already embracing the motivating proto-impression.\textsuperscript{524} It is an experience lived through a peculiar and primal mode of “as-if”: as if the event or proto-impression was already expected. In contrast to that, retroactive reconstruction of protentions may take on the form of quasi-possibility: as if I could have expected it. Instead of integrating the “surprising” event, proto-impression or hyletic change in our experiential continuity as something that was already expected, the reconstructed protentions may simply be added as past possible prefigurations that were already part of the retained protentional horizon, prefigurations that never became explicit, let alone actualized. This can be considered as a proper corrective transformation of the retained protentional horizon. Seen from this perspective, we are not passively “constructing” protentions that were radically “absent.” We are merely retroactively expanding our experiential life (always passively) through the lived “implicitness” of the retained protentional horizon, i.e.,


\textsuperscript{524} Micali describes this process of adding the protentional to the retentional as a “self-deception” of time-consciousness. Cf. Micali (2008), p. 225. Ferrer discusses this point by interpreting it as an attempt to subordinate the “surprising” character of proto-impression to the protentional prefiguration. Cf. Ferrer (2015), p. 89. He points out that the process of reconstruction does not lead to the new proto-impressions themselves, but to their retentions. Thus, the “surprising” character of proto-impressions remains intact. We need to be more specific about this though. What Ferrer means is that the motivating dynamic of “surprise” is not active when proto-impression undergoes retentional modification. Nevertheless, “surprise” itself as impressionally lived is also retained. Otherwise we would never be in a position to account for reconstruction and corrective transformation as experiential occurrences. Not being able to “suffer” it as originally given (and thus as originally motivating) is a restriction that stems from retention qua retention, i.e., from retention’s inability to give what is retained as self-given. In this case, what was given appeared in a mode that included more than itself as given; or, if we wish to be more precise, it included “less” than itself as given: it was its mere appearing, stripped off from whatever would enable its coincidence with what was prefigured. That being said, one still has to consider “surprise” in its peculiar mode of appearance in the phenomenon of disappointment and its unique effect on our time-consciousness, by far a very demanding task.
through an already temporalized “implicitness.” What appeared as surprising by “disappointing” our prefiguration could have been expected through a previously latent protention that was already part of the mediate intentionality of protentional horizon. Thus, retroactive correction in this case consists in the restoration of our experiential continuity through a primal imaginary explication of the retained protentional horizon.

In addressing the corrective transformation of protentional consciousness, we encountered the distinctively affective character of this primal experience, i.e., in irritation and surprise. Admittedly, this is not the first time we encounter affectivity in the course of our inquiry. Nevertheless, so far we have tacitly postponed a more extensive discussion of the affective dimension of our time-consciousness. Now the importance of affectivity becomes plain, given the variety of experiential characters with which our time-consciousness is endowed. It is not only “phantasmatic self-affection,” following Lohmar’s interpretative model, that necessitates an explicit investigation of the interconnection between affectivity and time-consciousness. Nor is it merely the inherently tendentious structure of time-consciousness that leads us to suppose their intimate relation. Many other aspects of our time-consciousness attest to its close connection with our affective life. And Husserl himself had expressly undertaken descriptions of our living-present in terms of affectivity, most notably in his C-Manuscripte in the 1930’s, but also already in the 1920’s, in his lectures on Logic (Analysen zur passiven Synthesis). We will now turn to this fundamental issue.

§7. Protention and affectivity – The affective relief

The task to describe our living-present in affective terms signifies an important shift of our methodological regard. The sheer formal analysis gives way to a description that takes into consideration the egoic (pre-egoic or primary egoic) aspect of time-consciousness. This new consideration is fueled by a different understanding of phenomenological “origin,” namely of the “genetic” origin that reveals the lawfulness of the various relations of motivation which result to the genesis of a concrete egoic flow. Through this genetic context, affection is seen as always exerted to an ego-pole and any attempt to delimit the affective structure of the living-present necessarily
entails an account of the ego’s relation to time-constitution, be it as pure ego, as pre-ego, or as primal ego. The underlying idea is that certain pre-egoic or primal egoic elements are already essential components of our living-present’s primal temporalization.\textsuperscript{525} Thus, it comes as no surprise that \textit{C-Manuskripte} are intensively occupied with the problem of the ego in its relation to the primal temporalizing flow. We already saw above that Husserl had dealt with this issue in his \textit{Bernauer Manuskripte}, in this chronologically intermediary stage of his investigation on time-consciousness, linking thus his earlier investigations (found in \textit{Hua X}) with his later ones from the 1930’\textquotesingle s.

What we notice here is that Husserl focuses not on the intertwinement between longitudinal and transversal intentionality, but on the relationship between the egoic and ego-alien aspects with respect to the standing-streaming living-present.\textsuperscript{526} His concern about the unity of our consciousness and the various kinds of ego from various perspectives (pure ego, pre-ego, primal-ego), was rather eminent in his analysis of longitudinal intentionality, as we saw earlier. Through the latter, we become intuitively aware of the unity of our streaming consciousness.\textsuperscript{527} Needless to say, we will not go into an analysis of the wider problem of Ego and primal-Ego in Husserl’s phenomenology,\textsuperscript{528} our analysis only concerns the relation between affectivity and protentional consciousness.

Before getting into the details of this relation, we must first clarify a few methodological issues that seem to burden any similar attempt. First of all, it should prove helpful to obtain a clearer view of the phenomenon of affection. In that respect, one has to situate it in its proper place within the course of a phenomenological

\textsuperscript{525} Depraz phrases it in a rather dramatic manner: “Is our temporal consciousness simply accompanied and coloured by affection, or does affection actually constitute us as temporal beings? Are we affected while living in and through time, or is time-consciousness in itself deeply affective? In even more drastic terms: Could affection be so powerful as to initiate or drive the lived flow of time itself? And moreover, what kind of affection can do this?” Cf. Depraz (1998), p. 83. We will see that our time-consciousness’s being-deeply-affective does not necessarily amount to an affective priority over time-syntheses but to a primordial intertwinement between them.


\textsuperscript{527} Lohmar (2012), p. 287.

analysis of protentional consciousness: how is the phenomenon of affection revealed to our phenomenological regard?\textsuperscript{529} Does it belong among the phenomena that become manifest in the experiential field which serves as the ground for a positing? Or should we rather count it among the functions of consciousness that become “dismantled” in order to reach the relevant experiential ground? Perhaps it implies a peculiar mode in which consciousness relates to its hyletic givenness, one that becomes accessible to description if we consider a different kind of analysis of the experiential field.\textsuperscript{530} In any case, offering a reply to this question is a condition for framing the relationship between affection and protention. Far from being a scholastic caprice, such a preparatory remark aims merely at emphasizing the phenomenological method of our inquiry and staying away from speculative assumptions.

By means of the reductive de-synthesizing process we reach the deepest level of time-constitution and encounter the primal synthesis of hyletic data through the interrelation between protentional, proto-impressional and retentional givenness. Strictly speaking, the duration and unity of a hyletic datum is constituted through the synthesis occurring between the proto-impressional hyletic flow and retentions. However, we have also seen that the protentional tendency toward particular fulfillment, when examined in regard to its materiality, takes the form of an \textit{elementary} permanent protention. The latter protends the hyletic homogeneity of what will fulfill it and does so in the mode of protentional modification. It is the counterpart of R-protention, i.e., the protention that protends the primal retentional sinking of what will be hyletically given \textit{qua} hyletically given. As we have repeatedly seen, it

\textsuperscript{529} For instance, considering affection in its close relation to association, we read Holenstein ascribing our ability to access them to a specific way of performing the transcendental reduction traditionally denoted as the “path through ontology.” Cf. Holenstein (1972), p. 19. By contrast, Lee claims that the general method of genetic phenomenology, one of the most basic tasks of which is the analysis of affection and association, is the “path through intentional psychology.” Cf. Lee (1993), p. 74. On the paths leading to transcendental-phenomenological reduction, cf. Kern (1962), Bernet-Kern-Marbach (1999), p. 65ff. and more briefly Luft (2011), p. 247ff. Husserl had consistently tried to thematize and explore those paths throughout his life. Cf. \textit{Hua VI}, \textit{Hua VIII} and \textit{Hua XXXIV}.

\textsuperscript{530} Kortooms, for instance, claims that Husserl in his later Manuscripts makes use of a whole different model of analyzing time-consciousness, what he calls the model of the “horizontal structure of consciousness.” Cf. Kortooms (2002), p. 241. Among the changes introduced by this other model is the replacement of the domain of sensuality by the universe of pre-being (\textit{das Universum des Vor-Seienden}) and of the constitution of hyletic unities by the constitution of pre-ontic (\textit{Konstitution des Vor-Ontischen}). \textit{Hua Mat.} VIII, 187f.
does not bind the course of protentional modification with respect to its content. Now the question that arises is whether the hyletic concreteness must also be taken into account in order to understand: a) how the proto-impressional and retentional flows attain their unity through a nexus of motivations and b) how the various protentional functions stand in a similar relation of motivation to proto-impressional and retentional content as well as among them, i.e., how a protentional content as such is able to motivate another one.

Husserl’s shift of focus toward more concrete analyses is accompanied by a reappraisal of his theory of time-consciousness. In his words:

“And in this way, the entire doctrine of time-consciousness is a product of conceptual idealization! Even this idealization would have to be described Constitutively, and the point of departure would thus be the realm of concrete and discrete phenomena – and in fact, taken as primordial phenomena.” (Hua XI, 387; Steinbock’s translation)\(^{531}\)

In view of this reappraisal, the synthesis of transition is now seen as a form of unification that concerns the “abstract” manifold phases.\(^{532}\) The unity of a tone-datum is ideally dissolvable in tone-phases,\(^{533}\) time-consciousness is an abstract form. Quoting Husserl again:

“If, now, time-consciousness is the primal place of the constitution of the unity of an identity or of an objectlike formation, and then of the forms of connection of coexistence and succession of all objectlike formations being given to consciousness, then we are still only talking about that consciousness which produces a general form. Mere form is admittedly an abstraction, and thus from the very beginning the analysis of the intentionality of time-consciousness and its accomplishment is an analysis that works on [the level of] abstraction.” (Hua XI, 128; Steinbock’s translation)\(^{534}\)

\(^{531}\) “Und so ist die ganze Lehre vom Zeitbewusstsein Werk einer begrifflichen Idealisierung! Diese müsste selbst konstitutiv beschrieben werden, und der Ausgang wäre also das Reich der konkreten und diskreten Phänomene –und zwar genommen als Urphänomene.” Also cf. Hua XI, 126, where Husserl speaks about the necessity of an investigation of the syntheses that concern the content, which extend beyond the transcendental syntheses of time.

\(^{532}\) Lee (1993), p. 103.

\(^{533}\) Hua XI, 141.

\(^{534}\) “Ist nun das Zeitbewusstsein die Urstätte der Konstitution von Identitätseinheit oder Gegenständlichkeit, und dann der Verbindungsformen der Koexistenz und Sukzession aller bewusst werdenden Gegenständlichkeiten, so ist es doch nur das eine allgemeine Form herstellende Bewusstsein. Blöse Form ist freilich eine Abstraktion, und so ist die intentionale Analyse des Zeitbewusstseins und seiner Leistung von vornherein eine abstraktive.”
By contrast, the aim of a concrete analysis that unfolds in the deepest layers of constitution consists, first of all, in the eidetic determination of the associative principles that are at work in our flow of consciousness (similarity, contrast, contiguity), on the basis of the universal unifying forms of coexistence and succession.\textsuperscript{535} However, given that we are not concerned here with ready-made prominences that become associatively synthesized, unified and contrasted with and to each other, this is not enough. The temporal-intentional structure of our living-present admits of an affective analysis, through which the primal time-constituting phenomena themselves are described in affective terms.

But what does that mean and what changes in our view of them, when regarded through our living-present’s affective dynamic? In view of such a radicalized approach one must necessarily pose a number of questions. For instance: does this affective dynamic somehow explicate our consciousness’s synthetic structure? Should the running-off phenomena (\textit{Ablaufspphänomene}) be examined through the change of affective force and affective wakening (\textit{Weckung}) or even through the model of affective perspectivity? Does affectivity provide us with a more concrete material basis for the description of the phenomenon of tending toward fulfillment, while at the same time the division of constitutive levels is taken into account? What does “concreteness” amount to here and what does its compatibility with the static division consist in?\textsuperscript{536}

Narrowing our investigative focus, we must also see how this shift applies to specific aspects of our analysis. For example, should we examine the proto-impressional function in parallel with impression’s primal affective force? What motivates the displacement of our phenomenological regard from proto-impression as the emergence of proto-impressional hyle to its affective counterpart, i.e., to itself considered as the source of affective force?\textsuperscript{537} In methodological terms, what is the


\textsuperscript{536} A more general reply would be that “concreteness” here marks the chain of motivations through which the tending toward fulfillment is experienced as a primal striving (pre-egoic or primal egoic).

\textsuperscript{537} As Husserl says: “Die Urquelle aller Affektion liegt und kann nur liegen in der Urimpression und ihrer eigenen größeren und minderen Affektivität.” (\textit{Hua XI}, 168)
phenomenological status of the problems that motivate us to take on a genetic attitude toward the primal time-constituting phenomena? By affirming this methodological shift we should ask about it more generally: which aspects of affectivity serve as descriptive basis for revealing our consciousness’s affective structure in the distinct cases of retention and protention and why these? All these and other similar questions help us achieve a coherent view of the transition into a genetic analysis of our time-consciousness in affective terms.

It should be kept in mind that, within the phenomenological attitude, all questions of origin are initially posed within their own horizon, i.e., they are always articulated bearing a provisional, presumably concrete enough, ambiguity that calls for a clarification of their essential pertinence to certain “stages” of inquiry. Overcoming such ambiguity means overcoming an instance of transcendental naivety. In our case this ambiguity starts to dissolve once we take into account the following distinction: living-present exhibits a different kind of originarity when examined in its affective structure than when it is considered in its function of synthesis of transition. Adopting a distinction introduced by Nam-In Lee, we can describe the latter kind of origination as “origin of validity” (Geltungsursprung) and the former as “origin of genesis” (Genesisursprung). Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how far this distinction can lead us and to what extent it is in line with the details of our analysis. What will interest us is whether the origination of H-protention-of-expectation can be traced on the affective structure of our living-present, i.e., whether we can discern in our living-present’s affective tendencies a capacity of determining the content of our protentional prefigurations. And in an even more radical tone, we must examine whether the affective pull itself is somehow experienced as the protentional presence.

538 In that sense, questions like “why do we pretend?” serve as motivation for a different kind of analysis, in our case an affective analysis. Mensch poses this question explicitly as means to turn to an examination of the relation between affectivity and protention. Cf. Mensch (2010a), p. 215ff.

539 Lee (1993), p. 24ff. In Bernauer Manuskripte we already witness a clear recourse to a genetic analysis, in Lee’s terms. It is only in a genetic sense that an empty anticipation precedes a primal presentation and not in a static one. Cf. Hua XXXIII, 4f. In any case, it is through a static perspective that protention and retention are considered as “modifications” of an original unmodified proto-impression.
of a content. Affective configuration would then either contribute to or be experienced as protentional determination.

To begin with, we must see what “affection” is. Husserl defines affection as:

“the conscious stimulus, the peculiar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego.” (Hua XI, 148)

The object exerts an affective pull toward the ego, calling it to turn toward it. In that sense, one can describe affection as “the fundamental relation between the noetic and noematic moments of passive synthesis.” As long as this affective pull is addressed to the ego, the latter is continuously in a tendentious relation with what affects it; it is always in a state of readiness to follow this pull, i.e., it has “the tendency to give way.”

Reading Husserl:

“What from the side of the hyletic data is called affection on the ego, from the side of the ego is called tending-toward, striving-toward.” (B III 9, 70a – E III 9, 16a)

This subjective state is an inseparable moment of our living-present’s affective structure and plays a very important role in the process of determination of the protentional content. What we must also pay attention to is the fact that, in the aforementioned passage from Husserl’s manuscripts, what bears the affective force is the hyletic datum or the hyletic data (plural). Since proto-impressional givenness is the primal mode in which hyle manifests itself, the source of the affection exerted by

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540 Cf. Mensch (2010a), p. 223. In that sense, we can also interpret phantasmatic self-affection not only as generating protentional phantasmata, but also as analyzed in the affective force of the phantasmata that are generated.

541 “Wir verstehen darunter den bewusstseinsmäßigen Reiz, der eigentümlichen Zug, den ein bewusster Gegenstand auf das Ich übt”.

542 EU, 82: “b) vom Ich aus die Tendenz zur Hingabe, das Gezogensein, Affiziertsein auf das Ich selbst.” The giving way to this tendency marks the transition to the “active” aspect of consciousness. The genetic character of an analysis that deals with “affection” rests on the acceptance of a continuous unity between affection and activity. Cf. Landgrebe (2010), p. 139.


hyletic data can be no other than proto-impression itself.\textsuperscript{545} The living-present itself should be regarded as an affective unity. Husserl uses a very vivid term to denote this kind of affective unity: “affective relief” (\textit{affektives Relief}). He tries to explain what is meant by it:

“The one hand, this alludes to a unity, on the other hand, to a difference of ‘peaks’ for the different particular moments, finally, too, the possibility of entire augmentations or entire diminutions insofar as the affective relief can arch out more prominently or become more flattened depending upon the alterations of the living present.” (\textit{Hua XI}, 168; Steinbock’s translation)\textsuperscript{546}

Thus, the affective unity consists in a nexus of affective moments that differ from each other in terms of affective force, i.e., it consists in a \textit{gradation} of this force mapped accordingly on the structure of our living-present.\textsuperscript{547} The model of the affective relief should be seen as Husserl’s way to emphasize the dynamic-affective unity of our living-present on the level where the affective prominences (\textit{Abgehobenheiten}) have not yet acquired the meaning of object-presentation.

The affective relief is based on the structural relations of our living-present.\textsuperscript{548} Its grounding on the structure of our living-present shows that, as such, the affective relief belongs to a different level of constitution, i.e., to the B of the ABC of constitution. Nevertheless, even when we read Husserl ascribing affective force to a prominent already constituted datum\textsuperscript{549} – leaving thus open the possibility of a distinction between affective force as primal phenomenon and \textit{temporal constitution of a hyletic datum} – we should not be led to the assumption that the hyletic components can actually appear without bearing primal affective force. What is at

\textsuperscript{545} Cf. \textit{Hua XI}, 168.

\textsuperscript{546} “Damit deutet sich einerseits die Einheit an, andererseits Höhenunterschiede für die verschiedenen einzelnen Momente, endlich auch die Möglichkeit von Gesamterhöhungen oder –erniedrigungen, sofern das affektive Relief sich je nachdem im Wandel der lebendigen Gegenwart stärker herauswölben kann oder mehr abflachen.”

\textsuperscript{547} A first division we should take into consideration based on this mapping would then be: a) gradation resulting from retentional modification and b) gradation within the proto-impressional sphere.

\textsuperscript{548} Cf. \textit{Hua XI}, 168: “Das affektive Relief hat als sachliche Unterlage die Strukturzusammenhänge der Gegenwart.”

\textsuperscript{549} Cf. \textit{Hua XI}, 163.
stake is the possibility of tracing the function of primal affection within the primal
temporalization and describing how this is expanded and distributed upon the
temporal intentional organization of our living-present. The continuous unity of the
latter does not merely expose the primal constitutive sphere as a dynamic “whole” in
which all affective moments are implicitly or explicitly interconnected: it also bears
witness to the continuous emanation of affective force from the proto-impressional
primal source: if proto-impressional affective emission is interrupted, there can be no
transference of affective force.

Now, except for the gradation of affective force in the configuration of the
affective relief, there is also another important aspect of it, namely, the peculiar inner
distinction between subjective and objective dimensions of the relief. For the most
part, what has been said so far refers to the objective dimension: the configuration of
the affective relief can be seen as the distribution of the affective pull exerted upon
the ego and calling it to turn toward what exerts it. This is the affective configuration
that has “prevailed” over others that have thus been “overshadowed” while remaining
interconnected with the former within the affective relief. But there is also a
subjective side, i.e., a tendency to allow oneself be affected. Husserl’s general title
of this subjective dimension is “interest.” This broader aspect of our consciousness
and its relation to protention will be discussed in a separate section below. In the
present context, what we have to keep in mind is that the unity of the affective relief
does not merely rest in the distribution of affective force along the temporal
intentional unifying form of our living-present. It also concerns the productive
interdependence of its two aspects: its subjective aspect denotes the continuous
possibility of “being-affected” that results to an actual affective pull within a certain
scale of determination, while the objective side defines, redefines and modifies the
subjective “readiness to be affected,” namely its tendencies and habitualities.

Restricting ourselves within the boundaries and tasks of our investigation, we
will not settle for a mere sketching of this division. Instead, we should seek the origin

552 Cf. Ibid., p. 155.
of this distinction between subjective and objective aspects of affection. However, we should not examine it by employing the model of noetic-noematic polarity, which is proper to act-intentional analyses. Affection’s proper field of inquiry lies in the deepest layers of constitution and, thus, our research should be conducted with the aid of elements that are involved in time-constitution.\footnote{Brudzinsk\'{a} already warns us not to interpret the relation between subjective and objective aspects of the affective relief by means of a primordial split, as it is implied by Husserl’s understanding of the noesis-noema correlation in his \textit{Ideen}. Brudzinsk\'{a} (2010), p. 157, n. 263.} What is implied by this methodological choice is an incitement \textit{not} to consider that the inner distinction of the affective relief consists in a distinction articulated in terms of temporal delay; we do not \textit{first} experience an affection radiating from the objective (or ego-alien) side and \textit{subsequently} turn toward it as an egoic response to this affection. On the contrary, we are dealing with a primal “being-with,” articulated in this affective distinction, whose origin lies in our primal temporalizing life. Reaching back to this origin presupposes a clear understanding of the role of primal hyle and of primal affection within the process of primal temporalization. Briefly put, the appearing of the former is a mere “showing-itself” of the primal hyletic manifold, i.e., of the hyletic material that becomes synthesized in the synthesis of transition. This is what Husserl in his 1928 published \textit{Vorlesungen} called “primal generation” (\textit{Urzeugung}).\footnote{\textit{Hua X}, 100.}

There are at least two ways in which we can approach this issue. A first alternative would be to begin by sketching an initial division between the egoic and ego-alien aspects of our experiencing, following Husserl’s later investigations in his \textit{C-Manuskripte}.\footnote{This approach is based on Lee’s analysis. Cf. Lee (1993), especially p. 97-125.} From this point of view, the subjective side of the affective relief corresponds to the egoic aspect. After that, one can distinguish between the various egoic elements (presenting intentions, feelings, and kinestheses) and examine closely how each of these elements operates within the unity of the affective relief, i.e., as components of its unity. Naturally, such an investigation could only be developed by regarding the affective relief as a dimension of the primal passive temporal flow, in which no temporal distance intervenes between its egoic and its egoless (i.e., primal hyletic) moments. Accordingly, the various egoic elements should be treated in their
primal unity. Such investigation has surely many benefits, some of which we will highlight below. However, it does not enable us to trace the origin of the distinction between the subjective and the objective aspects of the affective relief back to the primal temporal syntheses. Thus, one should turn to a second option.

This alternative approach can be initiated by posing a question that will help us elucidate the primordiality of affection: what kind of self-awareness is involved in the subjective as well as in the objective aspect of the affective relief? Can we trace it back to that kind of self-awareness that is accomplished pre-reflectively at the level of our time-consciousness via the longitudinal intentionality and through the sensing of the synthesis of fulfillment? Focusing on the subjective aspect of the affective relief, can it be considered as a modification of a primordial “impressional self-affection of one’s own conscious life which [...] is combined with a ‘unique’, and likewise impressional, form of intentionality”?

Experiencing the affectivity of this subjective side qua subjective implies that the experiencing itself exhibits a deeply affective structure. Needless to say, this impressional-intentional self-affection differs significantly from the subjective affectivity proper to the affective relief. The latter affectivity, a kind of modification of the former, already moves beyond the self-affection of the sheer proto-impressional function. It does not accomplish a mere pre-reflective self-awareness: it involves the interrelation between subjective and objective affectivity.

But first we have to work through an initial distinction, more precisely a possible reversal, which is defining for any view of the relation between affection and temporality. One can speak, on the one hand, of affection’s temporal structure, i.e., its temporal stretching within our living-present. On the other hand, one can also try to describe our time-consciousness through experiential elements that pertain exclusively to affectivity qua primal phenomenon. An exemplary case of the latter kind of description is the attempt to exhibit retention’s dependence upon affectivity. This task is taken up explicitly by Mensch. According to this view, the loss of affective power is “the loss of the ability to hold fast to the retained” and any increase

of the affective power of the retained material would entail that the process of “clouding over” would be slowed, but not the retentional process itself.\textsuperscript{558} Granted that Mensch is trying to show that (object-)constitution itself depends on affection and not the other way around, slowing down the “clouding over” process that stems from the continuity of retentional modifications is indeed an indication of retention’s dependence upon affective power. The “clouding over” is understood as a shrinking-together of the affective perspective of the retained.\textsuperscript{559} Its reversal is accomplished by the addition, i.e., transference, of affective power to the retained, transference which leads to a prolonged sharpening or preserving of the vividness of the retentional content. Nonetheless, what remains unaccounted for is in what sense this “retentional process itself” escapes the “slowing down” process. As it becomes obvious, affection does not motivate the retentional process; it unfolds through it: emission of affection is temporally stretched. But it is exactly this affective-temporal stretch we must analyze: is there an aspect of affection that is directly involved in the retentional-protentional synthesis of transition as a necessary component? More precisely, in terms we have already encountered, what we should do is try to describe the affective force of the loss of affective force, i.e., analyze the process of retentional modifications as a peculiar primordial affective background on which affective circulation occurs.\textsuperscript{560} Considering retention as a case of phantasmatic self-affection, as Lohmar does, may be a key to such an approach: consciousness affects itself by accomplishing the diminution of retentional content’s affective power.\textsuperscript{561}

\textsuperscript{558} Ibid. It is interesting to note Mensch’s choice to employ different aspects of affection in order to analyze retention and protention. Retention, on the one hand, is described in terms of affective “perspectivity,” while protention, on the other hand, is regarded in terms of “tending” or “stretching forward.”

\textsuperscript{559} Cf. \textit{Hua XI}, 172.

\textsuperscript{560} Husserl attributes a kind of affection to the syntheses of coincidence that accomplish sensual prominences in different sense-fields: “Es sind aber nicht einfach passive Vorgänge im Bewusstsein, sondern diese Deckungssynthesen haben ihre affektive Kraft” (EU, p. 79). Naturally, these syntheses are not time-syntheses. Nonetheless, the fact that these syntheses themselves exert affectation may serve as indication that time-syntheses also exert affectation. Granted that affective loss is experienced as continuous through syntheses of retentional modifications, one can suppose that the synthetic-accomplishing life of our consciousness is experienced affectively.

\textsuperscript{561} Cf. Lohmar (2008), p. 94. We have to be clear that Lohmar does not refer here explicitly to retentional content’s affective power but to its intuitiveness, which is provided by weak phantasmata.
ground of this passive accomplishment is the intuitiveness of weak phantasmata. They are the bearers of the process of de-fulfillment along the chains of modifications of primally present hyletic data.

Following this line of thought, we can examine the protentional dimension of our consciousness, i.e., inquire whether affection somehow serves as a ground for our consciousness’s future directedness. Naturally, “grounding” here does not have the meaning of reaching an experiential ground by gradually de-synthesizing the founding constitutive layering. Instead, we should think of it as what serves as the immediate motivation for experiencing the fundamental protentional tendency. Mensch has offered a clear analysis of how one should understand the relation between affection and protention. The initial question he poses with a view to articulate the problem is the following: “why does the process of temporalization, which results in contents becoming past, include a thrust towards acquiring new contents?” It is precisely this question that introduces us to the kind of grounding to which we just referred. It is clearly a question asked within the context of a genetic analysis.

Mensch departs from a passage from Hua XI, where Husserl describes the process of affective transfer to a datum that is not yet present. A long digression is, however, needed here. Before going through the details of this process, we should note that Husserl acknowledges the distinction between the phenomenon of expectation he is examining in this section, on the one hand, and protention, on the other hand. He does so by affirming the analogy of their structures. He says:

“Let us examine the situation in the sphere of the living present more closely. The occurrence of something futural is expected through its similarity to what has occurred

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562 Mensch (2010), p. 215. Also cf. ibid., p. 222f.: “We are now in a position to present Husserl’s initial answer to the question of why we anticipate on the basis of our past experience.”

563 Concluding his comments on Rodemeyer’s conception of the relation between protention and affection, Mensch states it unambiguously: “Rather the [affective] pull is the genesis of protention.” Ibid., p. 224.

564 Hua XI, 187.
in the past, like already happens in the most primitive case of a steady protention.”
(Hua XI, 187; Steinbock’s translation)\textsuperscript{565}

Similarity to what has occurred in the past is something common in both levels of time-consciousness: expectation and protention. As is well-known, “similarity,” along with “contrast,” is a fundamental phenomenon with the aid of which Husserl attempts to clarify the level of passive associative synthesis. Even though he has often referred to the primal temporal synthesis as a primal associative synthesis, mainly in his later writings on time, we prefer to avoid referring to it as an associative synthesis for it incites confusion with respect to the levels of analysis.\textsuperscript{566} Despite the fact that similarity is a phenomenon operative on both levels: passive-associative and primal temporal, we should not attempt to describe them in the same terms. Similarity of the former level presupposes similarity (or dissimilarity) of the latter level. What is accomplished at the former is a material unity of \textit{already temporally unified data}, while the latter brings about temporal unification via the temporal stretching of a hyletic datum or of a hyletic variation. When we turn to the content aspect of protention we are not analyzing the causality of motivation that leads to the formation of an “inductive” association, i.e., an expectation as higher-order phenomenon. Rather, we are examining the lawfulness of content-unity, as well as content-variation, within the process of primal temporalization itself. The motivation that is at work at this level is responsible for a determination of the content that occurs in the context of the tendency toward particular fulfillment, i.e., in the synthesis of coincidence between protentional prefiguration and fulfilling (or disappointing) protiompression, and not for the constitution of sensual prominences that will serve as material for perception.\textsuperscript{567} Husserl understands this perfectly:

“The future, however, which as a more or less prefigured horizon belongs to the constituted objectlike formation [Gegenständlichkeit], arises from the continuous and

\textsuperscript{565} “Sehen wir uns die Sachlage in der Sphäre der lebendigen Gegenwart näher an. Das Eintreten des Künftigen wird durch Ähnlichkeit mit dem eingetretenen Vergangenen erwartet, wie schon im primitivsten Fall der stetigen Protention”.

\textsuperscript{566} For example, cf. Hua Mat. VIII, 189.

\textsuperscript{567} Thus, we have to disagree with DeRoo when he claims that particular fulfillment is achieved by passive (associative) synthesis as a level of synthesis which is distinct from time-consciousness. Cf. DeRoo (2011), p. 8.
Protention, as continuous and discrete, is the origin from which the future that pertains to constituted objectlike formation arises. Every protentional expectation arises according to a specific lawfulness that regulates the relations among the various protentional functions and their respective contents. Regulating those relations implies, furthermore, determining the relations between the primal temporal intentionalities. Thus, we realize that by examining protentional typology, we were not investigating a *concrete* motivation of a particular protentional function or of a concrete configuration of protentional functions, but the temporal-intentional preconditions for any such motivation, i.e., the essential relations between retention, proto-impression and protention on which every determination of the latter’s content depends.

We are now in a position to see how Husserl tries to account for the concreteness of a motivation of expectation. To do so, we must examine how he describes the relation between affectivity and protention in his *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, in the passage Mensch’s analysis also starts from.

As Husserl initially says, we must take as our basis unified data connected through “community.” For example, we should suppose a sequence of data that has already been constituted temporally. Their “community” is their mutual belongingness as elements of the unified sequence, for instance, p q. The sequence has been retained as such. Then a content p’ appears, i.e., a content that is uniform (*Gleiches*) with the content p, differing only with respect to its temporal position. This repeating content reminds us of the retained p. What happens in this case is that the retained p acquires additional affective force due to its similarity with the primally

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568 “Die Zukunft aber, die als mehr oder minder vorgezeichneter Horizont zur konstituierten Gegenständlichkeit gehört, entspringt aus der stetigen und diskreten Protention, nach Gesetzen der Erwartungsbildung.”

569 Cf. *Hua XI*, 128: “So gibt sie [d.h. die Zeitanalyse] auch keine Vorstellung der notwendigen synthetischen Strukturen der strömenden Gegenwart und des Einheitsstromes der Gegenwarten, die irgendwie die Besonderheit des Inhalts betreffen.”

appearing p’. However, since p is retained as element of the sequence p q, the added affective force is also transferred to the retained q, thus awakening it. The sequence itself is awakened and brought to mind, leading to a kind of repetition. In a sense, the sequence p q and the primally present p’ are co-present, so that the affective force that is transferred from p to q as its temporal “neighbour” does not merely result to a tendency to recollect q but also to a tendency to expect q’ similar to the retained q. Mensch explains this process with the phenomenon of “merging” (Verschmelzung) occurring between the retained sequence p q and the primally present p’. “The merging […] results in the projecting forward of the q as the anticipated q’.” What needs to be explained is how this transference of affective force to the retained q that belongs to the sedimented sequence p q leads to the anticipation of q’. Mensch seems to imply that this “merging” provides q with a kind of presence that serves as a basis for an “indicative” function, namely, the recalled presence of q serves as indication for the not yet experienced q’.

The combination of q’s recollection, on the one hand, in the coherence of the respective sequence, and q’’s absence, on the other hand, sets the scenery for the establishment of the affective pull that is experienced as anticipation. The absence of q’, primally experienced through the reproduction of the sequence p q, acquires the character of “not yet.” What the recalled sequence does by means of its merging with p’ is to motivate a modification of the recalled q. We could say that it leads to the constitution of an empty presentation of that q. However, pace Mensch, the mystery still remains: how does the transference of affective force from primally present p’ to retained p and from the recalled p to the recalled q result to experiencing the affective pull of the recalled q as the protentional presence of q’? How is this experienced absence, imposed by the merging occurring between p’ and the sequence p q, imbued with an affective force that is experienced as our consciousness’s forward-thrust and not specifically as a tendency toward recollection? What complicates things is that we are already somehow experiencing that there is a “place” of the not-yet experienced q’, for which the recalled q serves as indication. More precisely, there is already a “place” for q’ to find its place as “not-yet”

571 Mensch (2010a), p. 222

572 Ibid.
experienced. Future is already sensed through the affective pull itself as being ahead of the pull. Affection has its own mode of stretching its pull beyond itself.

This can be confirmed if we take a look at a specific aspect of affectivity, that is, affective propagation (*Fortpflanzung*):

“In the living present the primordially impressional emergence has *ceteris paribus* a stronger affective tendency than what is already retentional. For that very reason, affection has a unitary tendency toward the future where the orientation of the propagation is concerned, intentionality is predominantly oriented toward the future.” *(Hua XI, 156)*

Husserl says that affective propagation is always directed to the future, i.e., affection continues to propagate by following the direction of proto-impressional givenness through fulfillment of protention. Thus, strictly speaking, protentional anticipation is not the affective pull exercised by hyletic data but the tension of propagation, i.e., a tension that follows (or coincides with) protention’s tendency toward particular fulfillment. In a sense, this is the mode in which we experience future in this primal affective level of our experiential life. If protention operates in a primordial manner through affective propagation, then we should also look for affection’s most primal contribution to our protentional consciousness. No matter which content will be awakened, it will be a content that concretizes the imminent experience, i.e., the experience that constitutes the particularity of the “not yet.” In other words, affection’s function seems to consist in enriching the protentional prefiguration by “sharpening” the protentional content, i.e., by enabling us to experience its ongoing determination. It continues forward by disseminating, distributing, and multiplying or decreasing the affective force, leading to a constant reformation of the affective relief.

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573 “In der lebendigen Gegenwart hat *ceteris paribus* das urimpressional Auftretende stärkere affektive Tendenz als schon Retentionales. Ebendarum hat die Affektion hinsichtlich der Richtung der *Fortpflanzung* eine einheitliche Zukunftstendenz, die Intentionalität ist vorwiegend der Zukunft zu gerichtet.”

574 This helps us explain in affective terms what was denoted earlier as “altering modification.” See above, §6.1.1. In other words, affection offers us a more concrete characterization of our experience of this altering modification of protention.
It does so through: a) the enhancement of parts of it that were previously either unnoticed or in the state of a null-grade affection and b) the parallel weakening of parts that were prominent. Thus, the density—not fixity(!)—of the relief as a unitary field—a field that is continuously reconfigured through the transference and propagation of affective force—finds its ultimate conscious ground on the experience of the continuous modification of our protentional horizon. More precisely, the dynamic of this modification performed through the relevant synthesis is the experiential ground of the affective relief qua the field of affective propagation. Thus, it is the experiencing of the ongoing determination of protentional content by means of affective propagation that allows us to contend, along with Mensch, that this intentional “stretching out is also an interpretative intention. In drawing consciousness forward towards the anticipated q’, it makes it look for some data and ignore others.”

§8. Protention and instincts

The last remarks refer exclusively to the form of tendency that is motivated by the object-side of the affective relief. Propagation of affections was regarded only in terms of the continuous proto-impressional hyletic givenness and as a mere change of the relative “size” of contrast. Thus, future-directedness of consciousness was examined only in the primitive state of being ready to respond to the affective pull. In order to have a more complete view of how affection and protention relate to each other, we should also turn our attention to those phenomena that are encompassed in the subjective side of affectivity, i.e., in our consciousness’s readiness to be affected. In that sense, we should examine how the intertwinment between


577 Cf. Hua XI, 150.

578 It is crucial not to hypostasize this “readiness to be affected” as belonging to a subject “prior” to its affection from hyletic data. Phenomenologically speaking, consciousness is always described in its relation to its contents. Resorting to the model of affective relief provides us with a dynamic field in
affection and protention manifests on the level of the subjective or (pre-)egoic moments of our experiential life. A provisional and guiding task can be the investigation of the subjective aspect of affective propagation, something that is already implicit in Mensch’s words just cited, namely that consciousness is made to look for some data and ignore others. We will now turn to this point by examining the relation of one of those egoic moments to protention, namely “instinct.”

Husserl became increasingly concerned with the role of instincts or drives (Trieb) in the constitution of the world. He had already briefly dealt with the issue of “natural instincts” in his V. Logische Untersuchung, presenting us with a concise characterization of natural instincts. According to it, they are strivings or impulses that, at least at the beginning, lack any conscious presentation of their goal (Zielvorstellung). Husserl will return to this characteristic in his later writings that deal with instincts and analyze it far more thoroughly. At the beginning of 1930’s, he distinguishes two senses of the word instinct:

“Here the word ‘instinct’ is used in an uncommonly wide sense, first only for every drive-intention that is initially not revealed with respect to its sense. Instincts in the common sense [of the word] refer to far and initially hidden goals, being impelled to them in a linking of partial drives, and they serve the preservation of the species as well as the self-preservation of the individual of the species.” (Hua XLII, 93, n. 2)

which this unitary relation can display both aspects: correlation as well as pure appearing. The only prerequisite is that our shift of focus from the one to the other should be accompanied by an explicit description of how this is carried out.

579 It goes without saying that this process also involves other (pre-)egoic moments such as kinesthesia and feelings. Cf. Lee (1993). On Husserl’s concept of kinesthesia and its development, cf. Ferencz-Flatz (2014). Since our investigation of instincts aims merely at bringing to the surface dynamic aspects of the subjective side of the affective relief, in order to examine their relation to protentional consciousness, we will limit our scope to them alone. Undoubtedly, kinesthesia and feelings both exhibit a similar dynamic and they are possibly also involved in a primordial manner in temporal constitution. An attempt to encompass them in our investigation would not only lead us too far astray from our current task; it would also imply that we disregard our investigation’s clearly tentative character.

580 Hua XIX/1, 409. Also cf. Hua XLII, editors’ introduction: XLVI.

581 For example, cf. Hua Mat. VIII, 326.

582 “Hier ist das Wort ‘Instinkt’ in ungewöhnlich weitem Sinn gebraucht, zunächst nur für jede Triebintention, die ursprünglich noch nicht enthüllt ist in ihrem Sinn. Die Instinkte im gewöhnlichen
As we can see, the hiddenness of the goal is an essential part of instincts in both senses of the word. However, despite this essential lack of goal-presentation—a defining characteristic of instincts traceable throughout Husserl’s work on the topic—he will try to analyze instincts on the model of intentionality, i.e., he regards them as instinctual tendencies that strive toward their fulfillment, no matter if their goal is revealed or not. In the *V. Logische Untersuchung* he had attempted to interpret this lack of goal-presentation in two ways: on the one hand, considering the instinct to be a state of sensing, lack of goal-presentation is taken to be a characteristic of a non-intentional experience; on the other hand, it is taken to be a mere lack of determination of the objective direction of the instinct. These two alternatives gave Husserl the chance to claim that there are instincts of both kinds, i.e., intentional and non-intentional instincts. The latter are drive-feelings that exhibit no conscious relation to objects, for instance, the drive of hunger as feeling of the lack of nourishment. The former include a conscious relation to their objects, for instance, the drive of hunger directed towards means of nourishment. As one would justifiably expect, in the context of his static phenomenology, Husserl places instincts in a relation of foundation on the basis of presenting intentions (*Vorstellungsintentionen*). Every instinct bears with it an implicit presenting intention, one that is responsible for establishing the instinct’s relation to its object. However, once he started developing his genetic phenomenology, Husserl seems to change his view on the matter. He is now in a position to refer to instincts as *instinctive intentions*, without presupposing any implicit presenting intention, no matter how indeterminate it may be, as a necessary component of instincts. This will play a very important role in the way we will determine protention’s intertwinemment with instinctive intentionality.

Husserl aims at emphasizing the transcendental significance of instincts. He means to show that their contribution to our constitutive life is essential. In his words:

Sinn beziehen sich auf ferne, ursprünglich verborgene Ziele, in Verkettung von Partialtrieben auf sie hintreibend, und ‘dienen’ der Arterhaltung bzw. der Selbsterhaltung des Individuums der Art.”

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584 Lee (1993), p. 44

585 He explicitly examines them in a transcendental attitude: “In den Innenbetrachtung, die nicht die des physischen Naturforschers ist und seiner induktiv-theoretischen Tendenzen und Interessen, sondern die
“Transcendental instinct – in a sense, the universal tendency that goes through the totality of ego’s intentionality – the continuous universal teleology.

In the unity of the teleological, of the constitutive life is continuously constituted and keeps on being constituted the world, in which the constituting subjectivity always finds itself enworlded.” (Hua Mat. VIII, 260)586

In light of this appraisal of our consciousness’s drive or instinctive intentionality, Husserl will describe perceptual experience as eminently permeated and guided by this drive-intentionality. Our tendency to continuously move from one perceptual intention to another is determined by a whole system of drive-intentions. Thus, it should not surprise us to read that perceptual intention is in fact a drive towards perception, which is responsible for the transition from one perceptual phase to the next.587 Even though Husserl recognized that there is a significant difference between a tendentious striving and a drive, namely with respect to the fact that the latter is directed to what is pleasing, he gradually acknowledged tendentious striving itself as a form of drive-intentionality.588

Fulfillment of this instinctive intentionality entails an additional function we have not encountered so far. This function is no other than the “revealing fulfillment” (Erfüllung-Enthüllung), i.e., the revealing of the goal of a drive in its fulfillment. As Husserl says:

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586 “Transzendentaler Instinkt – in einem Sinn die durch die Totalität der Intentionalität des Ego hindurchgehende universale Tendenz – die ständige universale Teleologie.


588 Ibid., p. 89.
“Striving is instinctive and instinctively (thus, at first secretly) ‘directed’ towards what in the ‘future’ will first be disclosed as worldly unities constituting themselves.” (A VI 34/34b; Mensch’s translation)⁵⁸⁹

This “disclosure” occurs in steps that may take longer or not so long time to reach its fulfillment. In that respect, instincts –for instance, hunger as the feeling of the lack of nourishment– unfold in an empty horizon without thereby being led by a preceding empty presentation of a specific object. This empty horizon cannot be a horizon of prefigured possibilities of fulfillment, so Husserl, since the hiddenness of an instinct’s goal amounts to its initial privation of any kind of familiarity that would motivate its horizon’s configuration in a system of practical possibilities and of possible re-presentifications.⁵⁹⁰ The emptiness of a secretly instinctive consciousness is not the emptiness of an empty presentation.⁵⁹¹ Revealing the goal of an instinct –for instance, revealing that bread is a means of nourishment– leads to the motivation of new levels of instinctive intentionality; fulfillments on one level provide the material for instinctive intentions of the next.⁵⁹² Those levels of instinctive intentionality correspond to levels of constitution. Husserl claims as much:

“In view of our experiential life’s constitutive tendency, one is tempted to consider the force of instinctive intentionality as what pushes the constitutive process forward.⁵⁹⁴ Whether this “pushing forward” should be considered as the dynamic transition from lower-level syntheses to higher-level ones or as the primal striving toward the

⁵⁹⁰ Cf. Hua XIV, p. 334.
⁵⁹¹ Ibid.
primally affecting hyletic material is open for discussion. The former alternative opts for the model of a vertical structure of constitutive layering and a “vertical,” as it were, function of instinctive intentionality. The latter alternative can be approached through the primal difference of contents, as we encounter it in the function of phantasmatic self-affection, a difference that is portrayed in the primordial division of the affective relief in its subjective and objective dimensions. 595

If we return to the metaphor of affective relief, a primal form of instinctive intentionality is to be traced to its subjective aspect. Husserl himself tries to explain primal affection as instinctive, as a mode of striving that lacks goal-presentation. 596 Examined from this perspective, hiddenness and disclosure of instinctive goals denote relative states of the overall structure of our “readiness to be affected.” The transition from a hidden instinct to a disclosed one manifests the situatedness of our “readiness to be affected,” i.e., its primal dependence on already sedimented moments of affective subjective-objective interrelation. Instinctive striving towards an undisclosed goal, though the latter is experienced as such after its disclosure, remains operative as a primal sedimented instinctive tendency. Its revealing-fulfillment does not lead to its disappearance. On the contrary, the instinct is preserved and takes on new modes. 597

Focusing on instinctive striving, we must also take into account a division, which was already anticipated by the division of instincts into those bearing a presenting intention and those that do not bear such an intention. It is the division between “objectifying” (objektivierende) and “non-objectifying” (nicht-objektivierende) instinct. The former is the genetic predecessor of what was denoted as “drive towards perception.” 598 Its ultimate fulfillment is met in the constitution of the perceptual


596 Hua Mat. VIII, 326. In Husserl (1940a), p. 31, a very important point is made by Husserl when he claims that in the stage of blind instinctive reaction, the “being-directed-toward” which pertains to activity is directed hyletically and through the appearing thing toward the optimum. One should try to understand this in its details. Firstly, one must clarify the proper relation between blind instinctive drive and hyle, secondly, explain what a “hyletic direction” is and how one can expose this feature and finally, one should investigate how this optimum comes to function as a pole of the instinctive drive, both statically and genetically.

597 Hua Mat. VIII, 253.

object. We can consider it as the unitary dynamic of our synthesizing life. It is this kind of instinctive intention that performs the “pushing forward” of the constitutive process: it shapes its continuity by impelling the transition from lower-level passive syntheses to higher-level passive and active ones. However, this kind of continuity should not be identified without further ado with the continuity that is constituted through time-syntheses or synthesis of transition. The latter kind of continuity consists in the continuity of the formal phases of our stream of consciousness. The “pushing forward” accomplished by the instinct of objectification, on the other hand, is the origin of the constitutive process, examined from a purely genetic-phenomenological perspective. It is a drive towards synthesis. Following the constitutive order, the transition impelled by the instinct of objectification departs from the primal synthesis of transition and leads to associative syntheses, and from there to active syntheses. An essential feature of this instinct is that it has a general directedness, i.e., it is directed to sensual data in general, regardless of their specific contents. Its primal goal is object-constitution and the means to do so is by turning toward hyletic data, regardless of their specific content.

Husserl refers to this instinct as an “interest in sense-data in sense-fields,” which is not directed to an object that will fulfill it but to contents in their typical determination. More specifically he says:

“Interest in sense-data in sense-fields – before the objectification of sense-data as core of desires of nourishment – this instinct as the first in the order of instinctive activities has no object as thematically actualizable [object].” (\textit{Hua Mat.} VIII, 258)

\footnote{Hua Mat. III, 258}

\footnote{Let us remind ourselves the relevant passage cited earlier: “Das Streben ist aber instinktives und instinktiv, also zunächst unenthüllt ‘gerichtet’ auf die sich ‘künftig’ erst enthüllt konstituierenden weltlichen Einheiten” (A VI 34/34b). This confirms the fact that the drive toward perception is responsible for the transition from one perceptual phase to the next. Thus, the ascension to higher levels of constitution may be regarded as a kind of “future.” The constitutive process itself unfolds in time.}

\footnote{Lee (1993), p. 109.}

\footnote{“Interesse an Sinnesdaten in Sinnesfeldern – vor der Objektivierung Sinnesdaten als Kern von Begehren nach Nahrung – dieser Instinkt als erster in der Ordnung der instinktiven Aktivitäten hat keine Objekte als thematisch zu verwirklichende.”}
Unlike the objectifying instinct, determination of the contents plays an important role in the case of non-objectifying instincts. The “being-directed-to” that pertains to them amounts to a primal mode of “being-there.” As Husserl says:

“The ‘address’ of the content is not a call to something, but rather a feeling being-there of the ego [...] The ego is not something for itself and the ego-alien something separate from the ego; between them there is no room for a turning towards. Rather, the ego and its ego-alien are inseparable; the ego is a feeling ego with every content in the content-interrelation and with the whole interrelation.” (Hua Mat. VIII, 351f.; Mensch’s translation, slightly modified)\(^602\)

This non-objectifying relation between instinctive intentions and primal content is a necessary condition for experiencing primal hyletic content as material for our synthesizing life.\(^603\) Non-objectifying instincts determine which types of contents will serve as material for our instinct of objectification and ultimately what kind of object will fulfill it.

Returning to the model of the affective relief, we realize that both kinds of instincts, i.e., objectifying and non-objectifying, belong to its subjective side. One could claim that they correspond to two different levels comprising the unity of the subjective side of the relief; they explicate our “readiness to be affected.” It should be noted though that considering objectifying and non-objectifying instincts by means of a level-distinction indicates a certain vertical hierarchy between the two. Indeed, Husserl seems to be claiming this explicitly in the few lines following the passage we cited earlier: instinct of objectification is a “second primal instinct.”\(^604\)

Performing a reduction that leads us back to the primal hyletic material as the ego-alien core of our living-present is a reductive process along which we gradually de-synthesize our consciousness’s synthetic accomplishments, i.e., the accomplishments that are the tangible traces of the continuous function of our

\(^602\) “Das ‘Ansprechen’ des Inhalts sei nicht Anruf zu etwas, sondern ein führendes Dabei-Sein des Ich, und zwar nicht erst als ein Dabei-Sein durch Hinkommen und Anlangen, Das Ich ist nicht etwas für sich und das Ichfremde ein vom Ich Getrenntes, und zwischen beiden ist kein Raum für ein Hinwenden, sondern untrennbar ist Ich und sein Ichfremdes, bei jedem Inhalt im Inhaltszusammenhang und bei dem ganzen Zusammenhang ist das Ich führendes.”


\(^604\) Hua Mat. VIII, 258.
objectifying instinct. The unity of our primal non-objectifying instinct with primal hyle can only be delineated as a preparatory level for the initiation of objectification, a level of anonymous experiencing of undifferentiated hyletic material. Given its position in phenomenological reflection, this mode of “being-there” denotes a specific way of examining primal affectivity: the latter appears in our reflective regard as a “feeling being-there.” Since primal hyle does not have the form of an objectlike formation, the “feeling” that characterizes this “being-there” and corresponds to the undifferentiated hyletic material is feeling through and through.\(^\text{605}\)

Let us summarize the important points of Husserl’s doctrine of instinct intentionality and trace their relevance for the project at hand. Instincts and drives are essential parts of our transcendental lives. Having discussed in the previous chapter affection’s role and its relation to protention, we came to view instinctive intentions as moments of the subjective side of the affective relief, i.e., of the unitary affective dynamic of our living-present. The subjective side we are referring to does not amount to the egoic response\(^\text{606}\) to the affection exerted by primal hyle, but instead to our “readiness to be affected.” Primal instincts are characterized by their initial lack of goal-presentation, i.e., they are initially “blind.”\(^\text{607}\) Their fulfillment takes on the specific form of “revealing fulfillment,” i.e., a fulfillment that discloses the hidden goal to which the instinct was originally directed. Disclosure of the goal is an indication of the situatedness that characterizes our “readiness to be affected.” Naturally, our situatedness is not restricted to the transition from an instinct’s hiddenness to its disclosure, since the subjective side of the affective relief also

\(^{605}\) Lee (1993), p. 121f. In any case, the immediacy denoted by this total feeling “being-there” does not leave room for a total irritation or a “leveling” of our affective relief from the objective side. However, even this radical immediacy seems to be subject to the leveling effects of a sudden affective prominence that monopolizes the affective relief. The case of a sudden explosion is a very fit example. On this, cf. Micali (2008), p. 212ff. It should be clear that the subjective-objective unity of the affective relief must not be understood on the basis of this “feeling-being-there” with primal hyle.

\(^{606}\) Egoic response is only considered as the primal striving toward what exerts affection, as identical to this affection, regarded from the side of the ego. Husserl says: “Was von Seiten den hyletischen Daten Affektion auf das Ich heißt, heißt von Seiten des Ich Hintendieren, Hinstreben” (B III 9, 70a-70b). Cited in: Mensch (2010a), p. 232, n. 27.

\(^{607}\) Cf. Hua XLII, 85
involves other aspects of our subjective life. In any case, this change of our instincts’ state may be regarded as an experiential feature that can help us account for their temporal structure. We also saw that instincts may be divided in objectifying and non-objectifying instincts. The former is responsible for the transition from the lower levels of synthesis to higher ones, achieving the constitutive continuity between them, without determining which contents will be involved in the process. The latter are directed to specific sense-data within sense-fields, without leading to their objectification and thus to a thematic turning-toward an object. As moments of our “readiness to be affected,” they both contribute to the configuration of the affective relief.

There are several issues that need to be addressed in order to secure a smooth transition from the field of primal affection, drives, and instincts to that of primal temporalization and, ultimately, to protentional consciousness. To begin with, a critical issue concerns our general point of view and whether we can still uphold the phenomenological perspective of our analyses while referring to drives and instincts as “sources” or “basis” with regard to our consciousness’s constitutive tendency. As to the phenomenological relevance of instincts, it should simply be noted that Husserl himself acknowledged their transcendental role, as can be seen from the passages cited above. It is true that Husserl was far from clear about how one should describe the relation between primal instincts and drives, on the one hand, and the essential time-constitutive structures of our consciousness, on the other. This becomes even more apparent in the fact that all the relevant material that is available to us is drawn almost explicitly from unpublished manuscripts. It should not, nonetheless, discourage us from attempting to reconstruct it as consistently as possible.

In broad terms, the relationship between the two levels may be understood in many ways. Depending on which aspect of the time-syntheses we are focusing on, we

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608 For instance, one should also speak about the kinesthetic dimension of our lived-body as well as the various cultural prohibitions or commands.


610 See above, pp. 212 & 213.
should be in a position to define the kind of instinct that is primally involved in it. For example, retention can be regarded as a striving to hold fast.\textsuperscript{611} The goal of this striving can be attributed to a certain kind of instinct, i.e., the instinct of self-preservation qua transcendental instinct.\textsuperscript{612} Husserl spoke explicitly about “levels” of self-preservation, even though his reference to these levels was restricted to self-preservation within a pre-given world, i.e., he was far from concerned with the kind of connection we aim to examine.\textsuperscript{613} Now, if this instinct manifests itself originally in a non-objectifying manner, i.e., if it is initially “blind” and it discloses its goal through its fulfillment, then one could grasp retention as this instinct’s primal manifestation. This implies that our attempt to clarify the primordial interconnection would necessarily have to take into account and follow the instinctive striving toward its peculiar modes of fulfillment. The latter would ensure the phenomenological character of our investigation. But what does this mean for retention itself? How is retention implicated in the process of revealing-fulfillment of the instinct of self-preservation? Does it also undergo a state alteration analogous to the one undergone by the instinct in its transition from goal-hiddenness to goal-disclosure? Retention holds fast the previously primally appearing proto-impression constituting consciousness’s self-appearing. As we know, retention accomplishes this in a non-objectifying manner. The previous phases of hyletic givenness are experienced in their continuous modification and interconnection through the “longitudinal intentionality.” Considering retention in its longitudinal function as a manifestation of the primal non-objectifying instinct of self-preservation implies that the transition to a disclosed instinct of self-preservation does not lead to the obliteration of the instinct in its “previous” undisclosed state. Much like retention that is continuously at work throughout our experiential life in all its constitutive levels, so too non-objectifying


\textsuperscript{612} Mensch (2010a), p. 239. As Mensch says: “[m]y drive for self-preservation, thus, necessarily embraces the whole of the constitutive life that is directed to my world.” Ibid., p. 238.

\textsuperscript{613} Cf. \textit{Hua Mat.} VIII, 89. See also, \textit{Hua Mat.} VIII, 430f., where Husserl speaks about the single-personal and total-personal invariant forms of self-preservation as well as about the “universal self-preservation of the absolute.”
instinct of self-preservation is always at work. This instinctive striving to hold fast does not lose its non-objectifying character once it has accomplished its goal.

The transition to goal-disclosure denotes the continuity of this non-objectifying instinct with the objectifying one through the level of retentional consciousness. The latter kind of instinct corresponds to what we called “transversal intentionality.”

The synthesis of transition, accomplished through the coincidence between what was proto-impressionally given and its retentional modification, yields the unity and duration of hyletic data. The latter serve as the material for the higher-level mergings that constitute prominences, which, in their turn, will serve as presenting material for an object-presentation. Transversal intentionality can then be considered as manifestation of an objectifying instinct that pertains to the instinct of self-preservation. In a sense, by following the instinct’s transition from goal-hiddenness to goal-disclosure, we have a genetic account of the transition from our pre-egoic consciousness to egoic life. It is a transition from a hidden instinct of self-preservation that unfolds on a purely hyletic level to a disclosed instinct that permeates the whole objectifying line, up to objects that belong to an egoic environment.

Thus, in the case of non-objectifying instinct of self-preservation, longitudinal intentionality is restricted to the experiencing of hyletic presence, i.e., it accomplishes consciousness’s self-presence through the striving to hold fast the hyletic material that appears proto-impressionally. In the case of objectifying instinct, transversal intentionality “expands” throughout the whole constitutive chain, without, however, abandoning its role of constituting this primal experiencing of hyletic presence.

In an analogous way, protention too is a basic mode of our instinct of self-preservation. The striving to hold fast, characteristic of our retentional consciousness, finds its protentional correlate in the striving to have something in advance. Through this anticipatory striving, the new contents to which our consciousness is directed, in order to make them present, are initially instances of pure hyletic givenness. The disclosure of the instinct enriches the anticipatory striving by being directed to the contents as contents that will constitute objects. Remembering Husserl’s words:

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“Striving is instinctive and instinctively (thus, at first secretly) ‘directed’ towards what in the ‘future’ will first be disclosed as worldly unities constituting themselves.” (A VI 34/34b, Mensch’s translation)615

Thus, disclosure of the goal leads to a transformation of the anticipated contents: consciousness is striving towards them as contents that will contribute to the constitution of worldly unities. Correlatively, consciousness anticipates its self-presence throughout the continuation of the constitutive ascent to worldly objects surrounding the ego.

Examining the transcendental-genetic interdependence between instincts and time-syntheses from a different point of view leads us to a whole different way of accounting for it. For instance, we can now focus on protentional consciousness in its various functions that we delineated above and point out various functional features that can be recognized as manifestations of different instincts. In a more basic level, it seems quite reasonable to assume that the instinct of objectification plays an important role in the constitution of objective time. By establishing the tendency toward the higher constitutive levels, it achieves our consciousness’s transition from subjective to objective time. It is suggestive that the instinct of objectification exhibits a certain generality with respect to its orientation. It is not directed to a particular object but to objectlike formation (Gegenständlichkeit) in general.

This generality is a feature of protention too. Protentional functions were defined on the basis of the kinds of contents that are each time protended. Since the instinct of objectification does not result to the determination of the objects that each time fulfill it,616 we are not in a position to assume that it plays any role in the determination of the contents that are each time protended. But what then does it determine? Corresponding to its generality, there are certain functional features that can indeed be regarded as its manifestations. A fitting example would be the essential “range” of protentional determinations, i.e., the fact that the contents that are protentionally determined are always determined within the range of a certain generality. Protentional content is always protended as a content that belongs to a general field,


616 We saw that this orientation to particular objects is achieved through non-objectifying instincts.
be it the generality of its sameness (more red), its typological differentiation (lighter red), its sense-field (colour) or its radical variation. Thus, granted that we are already regarding protentional content as a content that will serve as an experiential basis for the constitution of objectlike formations, the sole contribution of the instinct of objectification to the determination of protentional content is the establishing of this very generality. The further determination of protentional functions that are each time motivated by the course of our experience should be attributed to other instinctive intentions. In any case, concretization of protentional contents cannot be attributed to the instinct of objectification.

§9. Experiential elements of the affective relief and the role of protention

The above indications help us orient our investigation regarding the transcendental-genetic interrelation between instincts and time-syntheses. Nevertheless, they are still too abstract. By contrast, so we believe, it would be more appropriate to apply our analysis to the model of affective relief. The benefit of doing so lies in specifying the above interrelation by locating it in the affective structure of the living-present. Admittedly, such a methodological step brings us beyond Husserl’s own investigations.

Earlier we saw that the affective relief is not only characterized by the unity of its objective field, i.e., the unity that is conditioned by the prominence through contrast and homogeneity, but it is also regarded in its subjective-objective unity. The subject-side of the relief corresponds to our “readiness to be affected.” The latter is inextricably intertwined with our actual “being-affected.” On the one hand, “being-affected” depends on our “tendency to be affected,” i.e., on the latter’s particular formation to which the affection is each time exerted. On the other hand, our egoic response to the affection points to another level of unity between the two sides of the affective relief and contributes significantly to the formation of our “readiness to be affected.” Thus, “being-affected” has two facets: on the one hand, it offers the ground for explicating the passivity of our “readiness to be affected” by concretizing it, while, on the other hand, it is responsible for the conscious continuity of the egoic response.
to affection. Here we have two distinct operations that are related to two distinct temporal aspects. Concretization, on the one hand, has its source in our consciousness’s proto-impressional function. On the other hand, conscious continuity of the striving is achieved through the retentional-protentional intertwinement of our consciousness: retention constituting the continuity by retaining the just-past moments of the striving, while protention achieving the forward thrust of the continuous striving.

That much seems to be self-evident from our conception of the affective relief. Furthermore, one cannot fail to notice that the cooperation of the intentional moments of our living-present does not occur at one and the same level of the affective relief. On the one hand, in the state of “being-affected,” our readiness or tendency to be affected is concretized through proto-impression and is retained as such, while it also bears a protentional direction toward the continuity of this “being-affected” as fulfillment of this tendency. At the same time, fulfillment of this tendency entails the new concretization of the tendency, i.e., a new readiness to be affected. Thus, the “openness” to affection as a state of the affective relief seems to exhibit a peculiar temporal structure. On the other hand, fulfillment of our tendency to be affected entails the disclosure of the egoic striving toward what exerts affection. Response presupposes the preservation of the awakening of the ego as well as of the transition of affection from a null-grade into the state motivating the response, i.e., the turning-toward. This transition depends solely on the favourable conditions of contrast and homogeneity, i.e., on the conditions that are fulfilled as transition is experienced in the object-side of the relief.

Linking up with what we saw in the previous chapter, the subject-side of the relief partly consists in our instincts in all their forms and stages. This means that our “readiness to be affected” is partly structured by our instincts and their corresponding

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617 Cf. Mensch (2010a), p. 232. Mensch does not thematize the first aspect explicitly, but it seems to be implied in the way he understands the relationship between being-affected and ego’s striving. Needless to say that what is denoted by the term “readiness to be affected” is by no means some “latent” subjective layer isolated from the affective structure of our living-present and which is somehow “activated” in it. It is just a distinct but not independent affective layer that determines the configuration of affective force. It denotes the existence of a distinct scale of affective gradation. Husserl seems to be referring to a similar distinction of gradations. Cf. Hua Mat, VIII, 340f.
formations, i.e., the state they are in in the process of their disclosure. Both the instinctive striving and the affective pull were examined in their various forms as the genetic origin of our consciousness’s forward-directedness. With respect to the latter, we saw that what is responsible for experiencing it as anticipation is its tendency of propagation. What is missing from our account is an inquiry into the double-aspect of this propagation: “affective propagation” is carried out through the subjective-objective unity of the relief and not merely within its objective field. Since the subject-side of the affective relief actually constitutes a distinct “source” of affectivity, as it were, we should pose the question of how propagation of affective force occurs through it. How does the subject-side of the relief contribute to the unitary propagation of the affective force of the relief?

More specifically, what is at stake here is the possibility to account for our consciousness’s passive tendency toward the future, not only on the ground of an ego-alien hyletic element that pulls it, but also on the basis of experiential components that shape and manifest the striving itself toward the ego-alien hyletic moment, i.e., on the basis of subjective components. On the ground of the unitary affective relief we are in a position to thematize those components both in their shaping and manifesting functions. Primal passivity does not merely lie in the experiencing of the hyletic flow and in the passive flowing toward or along with the ego-alien components; it also consists in the formation of this flowing-toward or along-with as well as in the experienceability of this transitive formation. It remains to be seen whether and in what respect the latter level of passivity intersects with the primally temporalizing synthesis of transition.

We saw that our “readiness to be affected” involves both objectifying and non-objectifying instincts. Each of these kinds of instincts has its own mode of carrying out its own continuation, i.e., the propagation of the affective force through the subject-side of the relief. The objectifying instinct impels the transition from lower level syntheses to higher level ones. The relation between subject- and object-sides of the relief here has the form of giving in to the “contrast” as objective condition of affection. However, this is not enough for the full portrayal of the instinct of objectification. Giving in to the affective pull exerted by the hyletic datum does not lead directly to the aforementioned transition. The instinct of objectification, as a
dynamic component of our “readiness to be affected” in the state of “being-affected,” undergoes a kind of concretization that binds it to the confines of our living-present and more precisely to its affective structure. Thus, examined in its limitedness within the bounds of the affective relief, one is not in a position to follow the full unfolding of the instinct up to the point of reaching its goal, i.e., to the constitution of objectlike formation.

Two points should be raised here. First, we need to clarify whether and how this instinct manifests its peculiar dynamic in the affective relief. Second, it is essential to analyze its future-directedness at the level of the relief as well as in relation to the horizon of its continuation toward the constitution of worldly objects. The aim of the first point is rather clear. A definite reply to the questions it poses will determine the possibility of such an inquiry as well as the the level on which it can be performed. With respect to the second point, we can engage in the analysis it proposes by dealing initially with its first branch. It will soon become obvious that we need to account not only for the kind of prefiguration motivated by the proto-impressional presence of the affecting hyletic data, but also for the prefiguration motivated by the proto-impressional presence of the instinct itself or of the kind of contents that render it experienceable. Furthermore, we have to examine whether the prefiguration motivated by the instinctual presence involves only the determination of contents toward which the instinct strives or if it also implies our consciousness’s “having-in-advance” a material “being-present-to-itself.” The latter means that protentional consciousness also prefigures in material terms the continuity of the instinctual striving, its continuous “being-with” the hyletic content to which it is primally directed.618

Primal affection that pertains to the instinct of objectification differs significantly from the primal affection of non-objectifying instincts.619 Their difference comes to

618 With respect to “hunger” as the specific instinctive striving Husserl says: “Das Hungern ist ein Habitualität des Ich, eine kontinuierliche während des bewussten Triebes, eine inaktuelle während der Bewusstseinsunterbrechung und doch in gewisser Weise kontinuierliche, nämlich in der Weise des ‘noch immer’, des ‘Forthungerns’ auch ‘inzwischen’, obschon dieses nicht ‘bewusst’ ist” (Hua XLII, 93). One cannot fail to notice the similarity between affective propagation (Fortpflanzung) and this continuity of hunger-drive (Forthungern).

the foreground by distinguishing either the levels of our analysis or our points of view on one and the same level. Primal affection qua objectifying instinct is at work in the constitution of sensual data, while primal affection qua non-objectifying instinct unfolds at the deepest level of temporal streaming. The latter can be seen as a primal egoic mode of experiencing the primal hyletic manifold in its streaming state.

If we now choose to consider the difference between primal affection qua objectifying instinct and primal affection qua non-objectifying as different perspectives of the same level of constitution, then we have to dispense with the constitutive hierarchy of the instincts but at the same time maintain their distinct functions in a non-vertical interrelation. Granted that their distinction is preserved in both methodological points of view, it seems plausible to suppose that protentional prefiguration takes on different forms in each case of instincts. While both of them belong to our “readiness to be affected,” the protention that adheres to each of them, as their primal temporal-intentional component, most likely protends different protentional contents in each case. However, given the relief’s unity, this difference of protentional prefiguration does not manifest itself in an experienced conflict between the relevant protended contents. Such would be the case if one considered instincts not in their essential interrelation in the deepest levels of constitution but as distinct temporal events, i.e., experienced as act-intentions. In the present context, their difference becomes manifest on the background of a mutual belongingness as it is sketched by the essentially unitary affective relief. Even if one were to regard the instinct of objectification as, so to speak, inhibited within the confines of our living-present, i.e., as not reaching its goal, one should not conflate its tendency with the

620 Lee accepts a sharp division of levels of constitution and acknowledges accordingly distinct roles for the objectifying and non-objectifying instinct. Cf. Ibid., p. 97ff. & 113ff. Micali criticizes Lee’s distinction of levels in light of the distinct modes of relating between affective content and Ego, since it is based, according to Micali, on an overestimated reading of manuscript C16 to which Lee refers in order to ground his interpretation. Micali suggests that we should understand it instead as merely one way of accessing the phenomenon of affection. Cf. Micali (2008), p. 214, n. 132.

621 It should be kept in mind that our aim here is to analyze protention’s role within the components comprising the affective relief and not to dissolve it in order to reach the deepest level of temporal streaming the way Lee does. For that reason, the non-vertical interrelation between objectifying and non-objectifying instinct offers us a clear view of how the continuity of the constitutive order is experienced and thus of how the reduction to the level of the synthesis of transition becomes phenomenologically accessible.
tendency denoted by non-objectifying instincts. In terms of content, we could say that the latter is responsible for the direction of our consciousness toward specific data that will “subsequently” serve as presenting contents for our intentional acts. Protention is thus directed toward contents as non-individual bearers of the quality that concretizes them, as is, for example, the quality of providing nourishment.\textsuperscript{622} Instinct determines the protentional function, without necessarily being bound by the proto-impressional and retentional presence of hyletic data.\textsuperscript{623} The instinct of objectification, on the other hand, as we saw earlier, establishes the scale, characteristic of each protentional function, on which the hyletic content becomes the sensual core of object-presentation. This means that the protentional content is experienced through consciousness’s tendency toward synthesis, leading up to the level of object-constitution.

However, as we saw above, protention just like retention can also be seen as manifestation of our primal non-objectifying instincts. But doesn’t this entail the ongoing efficacy of non-objectifying instincts even at the level of a prefiguration that is motivated by our instinct of objectification? This is partly what we just saw. Non-objectifying instincts contribute to the concretization of protentional prefiguration, even though, as we saw, the transversal intentionality of time-consciousness is a manifestation of the objectifying instinct. In this respect, the “activity” of non-objectifying instincts is, nevertheless, traced back to our consciousness’s being-present-to-itself in the mere having-in-advance of hyletic givenness, i.e., to protention’s longitudinal intentionality. But this is certainly not a manifestation of our non-objectifying instincts that can be traced to our “readiness to be affected” in our “being-affected.” Thus, it becomes clear that our analysis of the affective relief does not relate to consciousness’s longitudinal intentionality as a form of impressional self-

\textsuperscript{622} In this respect Husserl speaks of the “generality of the drive.” He says: “Der ‘allgemeine’ Hunger, die Allgemeinheit des Trieb, die jeder Besonderheit vorangeht: Es ist nicht eine Allgemeinheit im gewöhnlichen Sinn, auch nicht die eines Horizonts, der schon eine Mannigfaltigkeit von Möglichkeiten vorgezeichnet in sich trägt. […] Ausbildung der Allgemeinheit als allgemeiner Horizont: Hunger, gerichtet auf ‘irgendein’ Nahrungsmittel, mannigfaltiger, bekannter und noch unbekannter, aber doch verwandter Formen – was wir in unserer Kultursphäre unter Speisen verstehen etc.” (\textit{Hua} XLII, 94f.)

\textsuperscript{623} Instinctive striving is not motivated solely by the presence of sense-data, but also as self-affective. Sometimes self-affection can amount to a total disregard of this presence.
affection, not even in our having-in-advance such an impressional pre-reflective self-awareness. This impressional self-affection can never appear to the phenomenological regard as an “arching” of the relief, i.e., as its subjective formation from within, but solely as its formal ground.

The fact that this subjective “arching” is also experienced directly and pre-reflectively through this self-affection opens up a whole new field of analysis, always within the unity of the affective relief. Therefore, we should turn our attention to the mode in which instincts are primally experienced within the dynamic of our “readiness to be affected.” Introducing such a limitation entails an acknowledgment of the restricted use of the model of affective relief. While it renders possible the tracing of the distinct “sources” of experience, the inextricable affective interconnection between the subjective and the objective side of the relief makes it impossible to describe this impressional self-affection in terms of one or the other of these experiential grounds. Thus, even though we may loosely denote our inner time-consciousness as a kind of drive-intentionality, we should not go so far as to claim that time-consciousness has its origin in the elements we included in the affective region of our “readiness to be affected.”

§10. Postscript

Protentional consciousness has been described in all its aspects and illuminated in its connection with affectivity. And our findings so far are enough, so we hope, to alleviate any worries regarding the formal or transcendental character of Husserl’s

624 Cf. Bernet (2002), p. 335. Bernet is using this characterization to denote the function of proto-impressional consciousness and not the contents that are involved in the texture of the affective relief. Cf. Brudzinska (2010), p. 110, n. 182. Despite the promising perspectives of the analysis of the affective relief, it does not offer us a way to carry out a “de-formalization” of time-consciousness. Our analysis leads us to the conclusion that one should distinguish carefully between two modes of self-affection: on the one hand, the peculiar experiential ground through which consciousness affects itself in its instinctual life and, on the other hand, the way in which protention qua self-affective accomplishment is responsible for the temporal constitution of this ground. Protention itself serves as the bearer of instinctive tendencies and thus exhibits a certain plasticity. In fact, the primally establishing transition from one protentional function to another (for instance, the transition from protending more red to protending green or yellow) may have initially been a transition that bore this character of plasticity.
analysis. Now, let us put aside Husserl’s technical terminology and turn to a
metaphoric imagery drawing from our everyday understanding of time. This
description is found in Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of Kafka’s famous parables in
the collection of aphorisms entitled “HE.” The parable goes as follows:

“He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind, from his origin. The second
blocks the road in front of him. He gives battle to both. Actually, the first supports him
in his fight with the second, for he wants to push him forward, and in the same way the
second supports him in his fight with the first, since he drives him back. But it is only
theoretically so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but he himself as
well, and who really knows his intentions? His dream, though, is that some time in an
unguarded moment –and this would require a night darker than any night has ever been
yet– he will jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, on account of his
experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with
each other.”

According to Arendt, “this parable describes the time sensation of the thinking Ego.”
Following her reading, “He” who stands in the battleground is a man situated in a gap
signifying the present, while the two antagonists fighting each other in this
battleground are the past and the future. Naturally, those two forces do not only fight
each other. “He” is also caught up in this battle –they are also “his” antagonists. As
Arendt describes “his” situation:

“Man lives in this in-between and what he calls the present is a life-long fight
against the dead weight of the past, driving him forward with hope, and the fear of a
future (whose only certainty is death), driving him backward toward the ‘quiet of
the past’ with nostalgia for and remembrance of the only reality he can be sure
of.”

What “He” dreams is a chance of jumping out of this fighting line and becoming the
judge of the battle. Such an escape would signify “his” flight from time. But is that
really possible? We already know that the battleground itself is permeated by time-
relations that orchestrate the persisting “pushing” from both sides. This “pushing”
does not occur in a void and, in some mysterious manner, gives meaning to
reminiscence and hope. It occurs with the force of its manifestation. Contrary to what
Arendt claims, man is not inserted into the time continuum as a mere gap of presence

626 Ibid., p. 205.
constantly besieged by two infinities: “past” and “future.” We are never aware of ourselves in a permanent readiness to jump out of this presumable entrapment in our most intimate state of battle. Or, to be more precise, this readiness never amounts to our self-awareness. On the contrary, what generates the evidence of our situatedness in a gap between past and future is the experience of an aspiration articulated in the pursuits of reflection. Indeed, such a gap can be only opened in reflection. Thus, even though thinking has its proper temporal locus in that gap, as Arendt also claims, it is thinking itself that posits it as such. In order to illustrate how thinking finds its proper “time” between past and future she uses an image. It is the image of two colliding forces, each of them originating from infinity and meeting at the present, thus forming a parallelogram.

![Figure 6](image_url)

Thinking, depicted by the diagonal line, remains on the same plane with the forces of time. The difference between thinking and the two forces is that the latter have an indefinite origin, while the former has its determined starting-point in the clash between the two forces. Though it points to infinity, the diagonal remains bound to the present, enclosed within the limits ascribed to it by the two forces. This is how

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627 Cf. Ibid., p. 206.

628 Ibid., p. 208.
Arendt interprets the image. We do not mean to criticize either the image or her understanding of it but only suggest that both of them invite a slightly different reading, one that emphasizes future’s role in thinking.

While our thought-train originates in the point where the two forces meet and it extends into the infinite, its point of departure becomes accessible ex post facto. This fact brings to light the inextricability between the determined destination of thought and the undetermined ending to which its own force leads us. The thought-train, as the diagonal force resulting from the relation of past and future in Arendt’s image, has a known origin. But the familiarity of this origin does not simply consist in the determinations of the present; it also attests to a “thinner” kind of familiarity that is traced in the projecting of thinking and calls for a very elaborate reflection in order to unearth its lawfulness. This familiarity is none other than the one resulting from our continuous living through the various layers of anticipation. Thinking as projection in its aspiration exhibits a genetic depth which concerns not only thinking’s hingedness to the present and past but also the small weavings of its future. In order to account for the origin of thinking and its aspiration, one should turn to the issue of how we experience thinking’s continuous aspiration. It does not suffice to point out how thinking opens itself up toward the future, within the plane outlined in Arendt’s image, through a somehow blind and inexplicable desire to know. The future of thinking lies ahead in its complexity and inner articulation; what matters is that thinking itself is able to grasp this complexity.

In our study we came to recognize various aspects of our awareness of future that are operative in the deepest and most passive levels of our conscious life. We dwelt on the fine line separating our more or less smooth sense of future’s approaching from the imminence whose thrust attests to the most intimate cohesion between past, present, and future. By realizing that consciousness’s intuitiveness is permeated by protention through and through, we saw that it copes with what eludes its most lucid relation to the future with the help of a “mere filling.” The pressure of the future lies in the relentlessness of its approaching that, despite its smooth occurring, imposes itself on consciousness. It, does not merely invade a slice of life; it is a pressure that

\[629 \text{Ibid., p. 209.}\]
meets resistance in its own unfolding. It does not merely push against us, like a “he” who was suddenly inserted in time, but closes upon itself in an extremely fine and multifarious manner. Its thin contours are weaved by following the complexity of our protentional consciousness: structures of anticipation enfolded within structures of anticipation. But this complexity is not limited to the temporalizing depths of our experiential life: it is immensely magnified and transfuses the peculiar interconnections of protentional functions into our entire egological selfhood. Hope and desire may intrude on sense-perception resulting in a fleeting compound of anticipations. Unnoticed desires may force their way through a larger life-project regardless their instrumental or inhibitory effect. Horizons of anticipations fuse with each other and build up relations of conflict or reinforcement. It is this fusing of horizons—the primordial form of which lies already in our protending tendency—that enables various forms of “otherness” to lay claim to a future that inevitably concerns me regardless its “origin.” To that extent we have to admit that the future does not primarily appear as a kind of pure form; it is not first and foremost the productive impact of a monolithic menace addressed to us from the other side of a safeguarded “not-yet.”630 There is no recipient of this threat who has not already risen up as a weft of anticipations susceptible to it; future appears as threatening or demanding only if its seriousness can resonate through its finest joints.631 In fact, it is this resonating that ascribes to any particular experiencing of future the function of revealing the experiencing of future.

That being said, one should underline the dependence of our experience of future on subtle aspects of our experiential life. This dependence does not only concern their conditions of possibility as distinct experiences of our everyday life but also their eminent role in manifesting the givenness of future as such. As we have seen,

630 For an opposite view, cf. Arendt (1996), p. 13, where Arendt discusses and interprets Augustine’s doctrine of love as “caritas” and “cupiditas.”

631 Bernet’s remark concerning Levinas’s position that death comes to me from the other is quite relevant. In his words: “But by saying that the temporality of my life is engendered by the threat of my death, does it follow that it comes to me from the other, or simply that it escapes my own power and that I undergo it in the most complete destitution?” Cf. Bernet (2004), p. 95. Undergoing death as a threat in the most complete destitution consists in undergoing the loss of anticipatory vigor throughout our whole structured selfhood. Following up on this thought, any radical experience of future should allow for an investigation of its totalizing effects on the formations of anticipation that reveal anticipation in its genetic depth.
Husserl’s phenomenology of protentional consciousness offers us a detailed description of these subtle dynamic aspects of our life. Any theory aiming at a clear understanding of how we experience the future cannot avoid getting involved in his rich analyses. The task of the present study has been to search for a thread that may lead us through the complex paths of Husserl’s thought to a new understanding of the future.
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